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*"I cannot help plead to my countrymen, at every opportunity, to cherish all that is manly and noble in the military profession, because Peace is enervating and no man is wise enough to foretell when soldiers may be in demand again."*—GENERAL SHERMAN.

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NOTES ON PROMOTION.

BY BRIG.-GEN. HENRY T. ALLEN, CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY,  
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.



IN spite of the well-known opposition of soldiers, especially old ones, to innovations or even ordinary changes in customs of the service, the past ten or twelve years have effected much for us in administrative reform and field preparation.

Within very recent times it was un-American to speak of a general staff, war college, general-staff schools, or of maneuvers in connection with our service, although it was obvious to straight-thinking people that they were indispensable in the preparation of the modern game of war. As everyone knows, they have been incorporated in our system in a liberal degree—beyond the anticipation of their early supporters. For these much needed institutions we have to thank certain clear-sighted officers who worked out the plans, the masterful Secretary, backed up by the Commander-in-Chief, who early grasped the importance of these measures, and certain members of the military committee who recognized the practical business aspect of the pending changes.

As a rule the sense of justice, fair play and right to equal opportunities is so strongly developed in the American that it is only necessary to put him in possession of facts connected therewith to find him a ready champion. The army is no exception to this rule.

Do young men selecting the army as a career enjoy a *right to equal opportunity* on a parity with those who go into the law,

medicine, engineering, diplomacy, or other professions or business where advancement depends almost solely upon individual efforts and merit?

Is it *fair play* to yoke vigorous, wholesome specimens of manhood with the weak and non-progressive and say that, regardless of qualifications and endeavors, their advancement must be pace and pace?

Is it *justice* to men who possess superior attainments and who distinguish themselves in their chosen work to refuse them such recognition as would be their right in other walks of life?

And finally is it a good business procedure for the Government to tolerate a system wherein such restrictions obtain?

The army is pre-eminently a business machine (or should be such), and like any other, should be administered on business principles. For its success physical activity is not less valuable than mental vigor. Every incentive to maintain a high standard in both should be assiduously fostered, and the army itself should take the lead in this advance. Rightly, no officer would admit that the army is maintained and trained for peace purposes, nor would he deny the necessity of immediately making great changes in the personnel were hard field-service involving large numbers required. Why should this contradiction exist if we are truly maintaining an army for the purposes which are the fundamental reasons for the existence of all armed forces? The Government has a right to expect much, and if officers do not of their own volition take steps to keep themselves on the highest plane of army efficiency, external action should effect it. The most promising system is based on a full recognition for merit, in which failure to die or resign certainly is a factor, but not the most potent as at present.

When actual war confronts us, the principle of selection is carried to a degree that leaves no doubt that we have been maintaining an organization adapted almost solely to times of peace—totally unlike the successful policy of Japan, which has not changed one of its principal military leaders since the outbreak of the war.

There is not an army officer who does not know among his friends and acquaintances, in the several grades, certain ones who stand out as highly capable, and others whom he knows to be below a medium standard, if not inefficient; the



former, full of initiative, improve themselves continually, while the latter do solely what is ordered, and that with the least disturbance to their comfort. By reason of fitness, the former are called upon to do far more than the latter, especially if the work or the circumstances connected therewith be new or difficult. No one can say that the rewards of these two classes should be coequal, and furthermore no commanding officer will fail, when times require men of head and action, to recommend the advancement of the meritorious at the expense of the incapable.

Long standing customs are difficult of eradication, even when they are known to be based on false principles. Russia knows that the *mir*, the fundamental inferior governmental unit of the land which gives to each one equal material rights, regardless of efforts, is sapping its vitality and radically retarding its progress and development, in comparison with other countries of Europe and with America. The army knows that by continuing the present plan it is refusing a proper recognition of merit to some, is advancing others beyond their deserts, and is fostering a system that necessitates changes in the higher personnel the moment troops are to be mobilized for the defense of the country.\*

I am divulging no secrets when I say that a number of officers to-day in command of regiments are unfit both by reason of age and the absence of a non-competitive training for any war position requiring unusual initiative and energy.

\*That the long existing discontent and growing disloyalty in our native army might have been discovered sooner, and grappled with in a sufficiently prompt and determined manner to put a stop to the Mutiny, had the senior regimental and staff-officers been younger, more energetic and intelligent, is an opinion to which I have always been strongly inclined. Their excessive age, due to a strict system of promotion by seniority, which entailed the employment of brigadiers of seventy, colonels of sixty, and captains of fifty, must necessarily have prevented them performing their military duties with the energy and activity which are more in the attributes of younger men, and must have destroyed any enthusiasm about their regiments, in which there was so little hope of advancement or of individual merit being recognized. Officers who displayed any remarkable ability were allowed to be taken away from their own corps for the more attractive and better paid appointments appertaining to civil employ or the irregular service. It was, therefore, the object of every ambitious and capable young officer to secure one of these appointments, and escape as soon as possible from a service in which ability and professional zeal counted for nothing. It is curious to note how nearly every military officer who held a command or high position on the staff in Bengal when the Mutiny broke out, disappeared from the scene within the first few weeks and was never heard of officially again. Some were killed, some died of disease, but the great majority failed completely to fulfill the duties of the positions they held, and were consequently considered unfit for further employment. Two generals of divisions were removed from their commands, seven brigadiers were found wanting in the hour of need, and out of the seventy-three regiments of regular cavalry and infantry which mutinied, only four commanding officers were given other commands, younger officers being selected to raise and command the new regiments.—From "*Forty-One Years in India*," by Field-Marshal Roberts.

It is true that they are qualified for a peace organization and garrison service, but that standard is wholly inadequate for leaders.

Under these circumstances it is but natural that the appointing power should seek commanders outside of the army from among men of character whose open and unfettered competition with the world has, in a large measure, fitted them for the emergencies of war. Only when the *mir-policy* shall have been eliminated from the army, and men are advanced in peace in accordance with their value to the Government for war purposes, will the appointing power find leaders at the top better than any that can be obtained outside.

While fully sympathizing with the opponents of a change of the existing system in their principle objection—the danger of political interference and preference—I do not share their views as to the impossibility of eliminating this evil.

At the risk of approving of an injustice to the Government, and for the sake of those who feel that their long service entitles them to whatever promotion the present system may offer, let it be assumed that the new selective policy shall not apply upon its adoption to those in the service above the grade of first lieutenant. But let junior officers and all who contemplate the army as a career fully understand that they may reap as they sow, profiting or failing in accordance with the results of their efforts.

The following extract is from a communication of the undersigned sent through channels to the Secretary of War, on October 17, 1904:

The experience with the corps of constabulary officers in this connection has been very instructive. In the first set of regulations, promotions from third lieutenant to captain, inclusive, were fixed as follows: two by seniority, one by selection. It was hoped and believed that this would be satisfactory.

Scarcely had a year passed, however, when it was evident that this system was bringing up to captains, officers, who though valuable as first lieutenants, were not qualified to fill the responsible positions of senior inspectors of provinces.

The principle so often enunciated that an officer who is qualified for a given grade should qualify for the next higher failed when subjected to a thoroughly unsentimental, businesslike test. It therefore becomes necessary in the constabulary to limit the promotion from first lieutenants to captains solely to selection.

This is truly significant and shows what has always taken place in a less or greater degree in the army when it has been called to the field as the final arbiter.

With the superior school system recently introduced, with the improvement made in rendering personal efficiency reports, and with the establishment of a high-grade, capable personnel in the General Staff the power to properly select has been largely perfected.

The first step in the proposed change would be to determine what percentage of promotions should be by selection. It should be large enough to insure obtaining a sufficiency of high-class officers in the successive grades who would eventually make highly efficient regimental commanders or officers of equal grade, and from whom general officers, worthy of the Government in all respects, would be selected. The percentage should fall between 25 and 50, probably nearer the latter number.

How should the selections be made so as to avoid bringing them within the influence of politics?

My answer is, to have it done by the army itself.

I shall not attempt to set forth a complete scheme, but will merely outline in a general way a plan that may serve as a basis for development: After a few years' service with troops, let the most promising available officers be sent to the service schools, then let the most promising from these schools be sent to the General Staff College, where they may be thoroughly tested in both practical and theoretical work. It is safe to say that the successful ones from this institution might well form the principal element in the lower grades from which the lists for promotion by selection should be made. Those who fail in these trials should not be granted special promotion. Specially meritorious officers of the lower grade who through exigencies of the service may not have been available for such tests, and highly deserving officers of the upper grades, should be put on eligible lists upon recommendation of department (brigade) and division commanders. From these lists the Chief of Staff or a general-staff committee would select and propose to the respective boards described below a certain number of names with records for final selection for each vacancy. To entirely eliminate political bias, there should be established a board for each branch of the service, or a general board composed of members of the various branches to definitely pass upon all promotions below the grade of general officer. Generals would be selected by the President from colonels, and still higher officers from the grade next below.

If the former method were adopted, and infantry promotions were in question, the board might for example be composed as follows, regardless of the officer holding the grades, the third ranking colonel, the fifth ranking lieutenant-colonel; and the ninth ranking major. Analogous boards would be established for the other branches of the service.

If a general board were adopted as suggested above, it should be composed of a larger membership, but selected in a way similar to that suggested for the branch boards.

If deemed more consistent with the appointing power of the Chief Executive, these boards might recommend two names, or even three, instead of one to the Secretary of War for his choice for each vacancy.

It is difficult to see how, under these circumstances, political influence could make itself felt.

The importance of this subject is as great as its antiquity. Probably no state or nation has escaped its consideration.

In the report of the Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, in 1857, occur the following potent remarks:

We have retained another fault, abandoned, at least practically, in almost every service among civilized nations, even the most aristocratic and monarchical. This is promotion by seniority. Age and experience should bring excellence; but the test lies in the actual possession of the latter, and not merely in the circumstances which, it is assumed, should produce it. Seniority, with the requirements essential for position, ought certainly to give precedence, but without these, that dignity and respect which belongs to rank and command can never be secured.

All that has been urged in favor of retaining it with us is the danger of political or personal favor governing a selection. There may be danger from this source; but by the rule of seniority, the worst officer of any army must, if he lives, come to be one of the most important and responsible officers under the government—the colonel of a regiment. By selection it is possible that the very best may not always be chosen, though the choices are in favor of this hypothesis; but certainly the very worst never will be, and this is surely a gain on the present rule.

\* \* \* \* \*

The army must undergo some such internal change in order to properly qualify itself for the greater responsibility that has fallen to it under the extension of American sovereignty and with the subsequent increase of points of contact with other nations. It is simply a question as to when. Would it not be better to carefully settle a matter of such far-reaching importance to the service now, rather than await an unsystematic

application of the principle of selection when the struggle is on? We are painfully familiar with what takes place under this condition in the hurried appointment, mobilization and transportation of regular and volunteer. Reproach to our intelligence and shock to our pride make this a disagreeable subject to dwell upon.

Just as success in every vocation of life—in schools, workshops, business, and professions—is graded in accordance with talent and endeavor, so should the standing of army officers be determined from the product of their capacity to think straight into the energy of their moral purposes and physical strength.

MANILA, P. I., December 1, 1904.



## ENLISTMENT.

BY CAPTAIN H. B. FARRAR, ARTILLERY CORPS.



It is not my intention to criticize existing laws, but merely to express an opinion with the hope that our law-makers may find the remedy for what appears to me a crying evil in our army. Every thinking officer to-day must realize that something is radically wrong somewhere. The number of desertions is comparatively great, while the percentage of re-enlistments is discouragingly small. Few organizations can boast of more than four or five old soldiers, and probably four or five others in their second term of enlistment.

I believe it would greatly benefit the service if something could be done to encourage more good men to re-enlist, and the following suggests itself as practicable:

Under the present law every soldier enlists for a period of three years. He probably remains at the recruiting station for a short time, and is then sent to join his organization, which he usually reaches within one or two months after he has taken the oath of allegiance. The next four months are spent in breaking in the recruit, and in teaching him what the life of a soldier is. Experience has shown that a large percentage of the desertions occurs among the soldiers of about this length of service. The recruit having served from six months to a year becomes dissatisfied, and decides that he does not like the service. He has to look forward to two years or more of a life entirely different from what he expected to find, and a life he does not like. Again, he has been in the army hardly long enough to fully realize the gravity of desertion. He takes the first opportunity to desert.

To partially correct this evil I would establish two terms of enlistment as follows: The first enlistment to be for a period of one year, and all subsequent enlistments to be for periods of five years each. Suppose the first term to be as stated for one year. As at present, a number of men at the end of six or eight months would want to leave the ranks and return to their vocations in civil life. However, with only four or six months more of service to look forward to, they would remain

and perform their duty. It would not seem so long, and an honorable discharge would be worth waiting for, for a few months

Besides, of what value are these dissatisfied recruits to the army? Their worth is nil. Would it not be better to let them go and fill our ranks with new men, to try many and find the best material, to keep, and devote our attention to those who wish to make a life work of it and rise to the higher positions in the enlisted strength?

One year is long enough for a recruit to decide whether or not he likes the life of a soldier, and if, after this period, he decides that he wishes to take it up permanently, then five years is not too long. The total of his first two enlistments would be the same in either case, six years.

Recruiting officers are cautioned to explain to each applicant just what a soldier's life is, but experience has shown that very few understand what the real conditions of service are, until they have actually tried it for a longer or shorter time. Hence many enlist with a total misconception of what is before them. A year would be ample time for the commanding officer of any organization to form an opinion of the recruit. Again many men who are unfit for the service do remain in, and serve out a period of three years. They may not have merited a dishonorable discharge, though their services were poor, and themselves troublesome. So they hang on for a whole term of three years, occupying the places that might be filled by worthier men. Under the system suggested the end of the first year would find these undesirables out of the service and new men being tried. Company commanders should be enjoined to use greater care in noting on discharges if any objection to re-enlistment is known to exist.

This being the condition of affairs on a peace footing many more men would return to civil life with some instruction as a soldier. The instruction would probably not be so thorough as a three-year term would give; still, considering the number of desertions under the present system forming a class not eligible to re-enlistment at any time, there would be a treble increased number who in time of war might be re-enlisted, and who would start with some idea of the fundamental principles of soldiering. The many men who are now deserters would, under the suggested system, form a class of eligible men with honorable discharges.



A recruit for the first year he is in the service is of very little use to the Government. His value is almost nothing as compared to, say, a first sergeant of from five to ten years' service. Still, at present, the raw recruit receives \$13 per month, while the first sergeant of over five years' continuous service receives only \$30, and of over thirty years' continuous service, \$35. A sergeant of five years' service receives \$23, and a sergeant of over thirty years \$28. These are barely more than double the pay of the recruit the first year, yet every officer recognizes their services as being worth many times that of the recruit. A corporal who should be classed as far superior to the recruit receives in his third year \$16, and if a first-class gunner in the artillery, as well, \$18. Are his services to the Government only \$5 more valuable than those of the recruit?

There should be some proper incentive to re-enlist, and to become a non-commissioned officer a still greater inducement. Were there sufficient inducement, more desirable men would re-enlist, and strive to rise. In such cases sergeants would not be made until they had had at least six years' continuous service, and corporals at least three. This end could be best accomplished by increasing the pay of old reliable soldiers, especially non-commissioned officers. I do not advocate an increase in the pay of all enlisted men. But why not reduce the pay of recruits, whose value is small and whose number is great, and give the difference to the older soldiers?

Suppose, for instance, a company of coast artillery, 109 men, one-third of the men in the first year. These recruits are not worth more than \$6 per month to the Government over and above their clothing allowance and rations. That is a saving of \$7 per month. One-third of the company would be about thirty-six men, the average in the first year. That would mean a saving of \$252 per month, which could more profitably be used to increase the pay of valuable men. Suppose this money to be used to increase the pay of eight sergeants and twelve corporals of the company in the proportion that eight sergeants should receive the same as twelve corporals; then each sergeant would receive an increase per month of about \$15.75, and each corporal of about \$10.50. This would be something like the pay each should receive.

Such an arrangement would make an inducement to re-enlist, and even then would hardly be an adequate reward

for long and faithful service and the responsibilities of a non-commissioned officer. Each soldier in his first enlistment would see before him, if he serves well, a position as good, if not better, than his contemporaries have in civil life, and would accordingly do his best to attain the coveted position.

Another point in my opinion is pertinent here. It has been my experience that soldiers are not generally liked or respected by the civilian world. There are many reasons for this. Near all large cities soldiers go to town, and frequently misbehave. If, however, we stop to consider, it will be readily seen that, comparatively, the conduct of soldiers is unusually good. One or two trifling and worthless men will bring contumely on an entire command. Should a soldier be seen in town drunk, civilians will see only the uniform and condemn all who wear it. Should a civilian be seen in the same condition, it is the individual man who receives the odium and not the community at large.

An enlisted man, though he may be a graduate of the Master Gunners' School at Fort Monroe, and is in every way a valuable man to the Government, receives such small pay that it is not possible for him to associate with the class of civilians who are his contemporaries in age and learning. A carpenter or a mechanic in civil life receives from \$4 to \$10 per day, whereas a non-commissioned officer of the army, holding the honorable and responsible position of say, first sergeant of artillery, receives little more than seventy-five cents per day. This would seem to be putting a premium on manual labor. As a result, the most desirable men are often lost to the service, and consequently the outside world receives its impressions of the army from the recruits who are continually joining and deserting. If, on the other hand, an old soldier of long and faithful service were properly pecuniarily remunerated, he would be retained in the service. And after some years of this system at least two-thirds of each organization would be composed of old and tried men, proud of the uniform they wear, and who would not disgrace it nor allow others to do so.

In this way, in a comparatively short time, the offense of desertion would be looked upon as disgraceful by the enlisted men, and it would be materially decreased. Moreover, in thus having a larger percentage of old soldiers, recruits and younger brothers in arms would be taught respect for the uni-

form and good behavior when off duty, and the general opinion of civilians would be changed. The punishment for desertion and the reward for apprehension should be increased. This, in connection with a short period of one year for first enlistment, would practically eradicate the evil of desertion; while a large increase of pay for old soldiers, gunners, and especially non-commissioned officers, would guarantee to us such a set of men as civilians would be proud to recognize in the uniform of the United States Army.



## DESERTION.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL J. W. POPE, DEPUTY QUARTERMASTER-GEN.,  
FORMERLY COMMANDANT UNITED STATES MILITARY PRISON.




WITH regard to the subject of desertion, it is strange to mark the threshing over of those issues which had been fought to a finish in what must now be called the Old Army of '70 to '95. This would never have occurred but for the abolition of the admirable system of punishment which had been built up with the United States Military Prison as its culminating point and the substitution of the present guard-house abortion. It is still more remarkable that so many of the precepts which had been studied and had been regarded as settled principles of military penology have been buried into oblivion in so short a period of time. We have lived fast in these strenuous times and another generation of army officers and another army have forged to the front.

From an experience of fifteen years in dealing with the general mass of army prisoners, mostly deserters, and many years of study and writing of that class of criminals, let me recall for the benefit of the younger generation of students of military penology, some of the work done and the principles settled by the older generation. Judging from the annual reports of Division and Department commanders, it is evident that they generally approve of a return to the punitive system subverted in 1895, when the United States Military Prison was abolished.

### SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT.

The large percentage of deserters at the close of the Civil War (and during that war as well) excited the wonder and apprehension of officers in the army then, as at the present time. It seemed incredible that ten per cent. of the American Army should break their oath of enlistment. They felt that this reproach upon the service must be eradicated, and the elementary notion that severity was the only adequate remedy prevailed and was given ample trial.



U. S. MILITARY PRISON, FORT LEAVENWORTH.  
The Sally Port.

Some officers advocated absurdly severe punishments, the infliction of which would never have been countenanced by the people upon fellow citizens who had enlisted in the army and had their execution been attempted by the military authorities, a sympathy would have been created which would have nullified the benefit of the penalty. Among such sentences were long periods in a dark cell on bread and water diet, or otherwise, and corporal punishment of various sorts. In general, however, the advocates of severity confined their attention to the length of the sentences and, as there was no limit in this regard to the power of a court-martial in those days, their influence was evidenced by the long-term sentences to be found in the General Court-Martial Orders of that period.

The army had soon to abolish the branding of deserters (See 98th Article of War), but that practice revived in the mark which was afterward made upon the recruit, above the knee, for the purpose of identification under color of vaccination. The drumming out of the deserter at the close of his sentence also sank soon into the oblivion of the branding-iron.

A favorite scheme of the amateur penologists was to make the length of the sentence equal to the term of enlistment of the soldier, under the impression that the deserter would in this manner be deprived of any benefit from his crime, and, in particular, such action would deter the large percentage who desert in the first year of their enlistment.

All the advocates of severity laid great stress upon rigorous treatment of military prisoners. The lives of such criminals as were in confinement must be made as wretched as possible without conflicting with Article VIII of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, forbidding "cruel and unusual punishments."

It will be recalled that few of those who called for excessive harshness were given charge of prisoners, and of those who were given that disagreeable responsibility, none were ever allowed to put their brutal theories into practice.

In the midst of all this theorizing and experimentation with reference to court-martial sentences, it was apparently forgotten that the number of the deserters captured was so small that the degree of punishment suffered by them could have very little effect on the mass who escaped scott-free from any consequence whatever. The total number arrested was not much more than ten per cent. of those who criminally left the

service. No man, particularly an American of the adventurous class, who enters the military service, would hesitate to run the risk of being the one in ten who is caught, when he has no scruples, and an overpowering desire to escape from an irksome duty. Again, in the early days, as now, when the deserter was confined in the guard-house, his chances of escape were excellent and it was the exception if any long-term prisoner completed a guard-house sentence, nor was it an infrequent occurrence for the deserter to take French leave between capture and sentence. This greatly added to the uncertainty of the punishment. The places of confinement varied from the State Penitentiaries down to the one-post guard-house, and the treatment of the prisoners varied as greatly, and this still further increased the uncertainty of the amount of punishment the deserter suffered even when caught, tried and sentenced.

#### CELERITY OF PUNISHMENT.

Again while there has never been any great amount of just complaint as to "the law's delay" on the part of the military authorities in the trial and sentence of courts-martial, nor in their action upon the proceedings of such courts, still there were undoubtedly much longer intervals between arrest and sentence of offenders in those days than later, with the consequent danger of escape or of pardon or interference of political or social nature.

The result was at any rate a lack of the celerity of punishment which is almost as essential an element in deterrence from crime as certainty.

The formation of the Summary Court has greatly relieved and facilitated the procedure of military courts.

#### THE POINT OF VIEW OF DESERTERS.

I once made a study (and those views were published) of the causes of desertion from the point of view of the deserters themselves for which I had ample opportunity. While all who have had large experience in the management of convicts understand the doubtful value of such testimony, still there were certain complaints which had, in truth, some grounds of injustice, and I believe every one of the complaints which had a real basis was remedied. For instance, in the early days if a



soldier was absent without leave for three days, whether there was any indication of desertion or not, he was reported a deserter on the company book and when he came back, the officer making the report often, if not generally, felt obliged by consistency to prefer charges against the man. Many deserters claimed that they had gone off for a frolic, and having overstayed their pass for three days were afraid to return and face a court-martial. This appeared particularly unfair, inasmuch as the officer was not reported as a deserter under three months' absence without leave.

The commander of the Department of the Missouri was so much impressed with this injustice that he issued an order forbidding a soldier to be reported as a deserter inside of ten days which order was revoked by the War Department as not within the power of a department commander. The War Department itself afterward regulated the matter. (See Army Regulation, Par. 131.)

Another complaint of deserters was that they were lured to enlist by false representations (that good old perennially recurring growl), or had made an honest mistake in thinking that they would like the service and had found the restraint intolerable, or their dependent mother or other relative had appealed to them to return and needed their attendance and a hundred other similar facts or excuses. The point of the complaints of the dissatisfied soldiers was, however, that they could not by any means remedy their mistake in enlisting, could not in any way honorably separate themselves from the service. The most important aspect of this complaint was that, as the deserters insisted that any soldier with sufficient influence, political or social, could get discharged without any difficulty, and were able to point out any number of such cases, which could not otherwise be explained, where soldiers were discharged from such company when others could not secure the same result.

It was then pointed out that, if any soldiers were discharged all should be allowed equally the same privilege under such restrictions as might be prescribed by the War Department. The proposition was made that any soldier be allowed to buy his way out of the service upon paying the amount which his enlistment was estimated to have cost the Government.

The basis of this complaint has also been eliminated by

wise action on the part of the War Department (Army Regulations of 1901, Par. 156).

One of the greatest bones of contention was over the question of adopting a graduated code of punishment. I was able to point out that for the identical crime and under no essential difference or criminality the sentence varied from *ten years in a penitentiary*, like Sing Sing, to *one year in a guard-house*. This presented a prima facie case of injustice so glaring as to attract attention, and after a long fight for justice the present code has been the result (see Manual of Court-martial). The main controversy over the question of a proper punitive system for the army centered in the struggle for a general military prison instead of the penitentiary or guard-house for long-term military convicts, and this was won at the early date of 1875. From the establishment of the United States Military Prison resulted the above-named reforms and various other reforms concerning the criminal element of the United States Army.

#### PRESENT REQUIREMENTS.

My object in recapitulating these few efforts made in the past to build up and improve the punitive system of the service, is not to exploit those efforts but to see whether they do not offer some instruction for those who are now taking up anew the study of the crime of desertion and its suppression or diminution.

These efforts should be primarily directed toward the adoption of the principle of the general prison for long-term offenders. Several prisons would be better than one, as reformers do not favor the congregation of large numbers of prisoners in one prison. There would be required at any rate one prison for the Philippines and one for this country, say at Fort Leavenworth, or Fort Riley, Kansas.

I have recently written in favor of the establishment of such central prison (see JOURNAL OF THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION for July-August, 1903, "Three Stages of Army Penology") and of the evils of the guard-house for the confinement of long-term convicts, and need here do no more than emphasize the contention that the re-establishment of such central prison should be the first, as it would be the most important, step in future prison reform. Furthermore, it would be particularly desirable that action should be taken before the experience gained by the organization and management of the old military

prison is forgotten, so that the methods and practices developed during the two decades of its active existence may guide toward a revival of its merits and an avoidance of its defects.

However, the old saying applies here that one "must first catch his hare before skinning it." It has been the plaint from olden time by the army that the public is wholly indifferent about this crying evil of desertion from its ranks; that it will place no stigma upon the soldier who thus violates his solemn oath, will neither ostracize him or place any contumely upon him. This has always been true and always will be true so far as one can judge the future by the past.

Such a complaint on the part of the officers of the army seems to me utterly puerile and unprofitable. In my opinion after much experience, the public has been quite fair toward the army. It has allowed the War Department plenary power over the punishment of the deserter and has not interfered with the measures devised by the military authorities to capture such absconders. Congress has regularly appropriated the amount deemed necessary as a reward for the capture of the deserter, which has been twice increased. Further than this, the apathy of the American public toward this technical crime is natural and inevitable. The truth is that it is the indifference of the army itself, not excluding company and regimental commanders, and including in particular the rank and file, that is chiefly responsible for the failure to bring a large percentage of deserters to justice. Can the army expect the people to take more interest in the prevention of desertion than the army itself? With fifty dollars reward, and well directed, zealous efforts on the part of army officials, few deserters indeed could remain at large in the United States territory.

This statement is made on the strength of experience which will be related. During the seven and a half years that I was in charge of the United States Military Prison at Fort Leavenworth some fifty convicts escaped from that institution. Of that number about forty-three, or eighty-six per cent. were recaptured. This was the more remarkable because the system by which the success was accomplished was in operation only a few years. The same system was, in all essential respects, adopted in the army (see Army Regulations, Par. 116) and failed to have, even approximately, the same success, and why? There was no real difference between the recapture of the es-

caped prisoner and the deserter; the sentiment was quite as strong in favor of the convicted as of the untried deserter, in the country around Fort Leavenworth, as elsewhere. The difference in the success achieved in the one case and the failure in the other was due to the different manner in which the system was carried out, and, as before said, in the apathy of the responsible officers and the rank and file of the organization from which the desertion occurred.

When a prisoner escaped, some five hundred circulars describing him were sent out to all post-offices in the neighboring towns and in the principal cities, as is now done under the Army Regulations in cases of desertion. The effort did not stop here, however, careful inquiry was made as to the relatives or friends of the escaped man and every bit of information that could be obtained was taken note of. Wherever relatives were located or other persons connected with the individual were known, police officers or detective agencies were written to and urged to take up the pursuit. Any real clue almost certainly led to recapture.

There was no sentiment whatever in the whole business; none was available nor was appealed to; it was business solely. There need be no sentiment as there is an immense amount of money in the capture of deserters and the proper detective agencies have only to be directed upon the right course and deserters will lead very unsafe lives in the United States. Five thousand deserters a year at the fifty dollars reward now authorized amounts to two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and if such an agency as Pinkerton's would enter the business, of capturing deserters, there would be a lot of money in it. When you add the deserters already at large "there is millions in it."

Instead of this sort of effort to capture soldiers deserting, what happens? The rank and file are absolutely indifferent; judging from boards of survey, their fellow soldiers immediately appropriate their effects, and have in so far a slight interest in their not being caught. The company commander generally considers the man's departure a good riddance and does not care to get the nuisance back, which might happen in the event of recapture. The post commander does not care to bother about the affair at all. This was, at any rate, a very general feeling and situation in the old days when I was investigating the matter.

Now with such condition of feeling in the army itself, how absurd it is to talk of the indifference of the American public! The reform should begin with the officers becoming thoroughly aroused to the gravity of the subject, or rather the disgrace of this crime to the army. The officers, particularly the company and regimental commanders, should then impart their feeling of the disgrace to their men.

It should not be difficult to build up such a sentiment among good soldiers. With such sentiment among enlisted men, information could easily be obtained from the associates of the deserter which would lead any good detective to capture him.

While endeavoring to secure the capture of escaped military convicts in the year 1894, I made effort also to induce various detective agencies to take up the capture of deserters. The reward had been raised to sixty dollars and I was myself surprised at the result, for the number of convicts in the military prison swelled from some four hundred to six hundred and fifty, if I rightly recall the figures. There was no fair chance to try the effects of the work fully, for the reward was then reduced to ten dollars, and this would hardly pay the expenses in many cases.

The difficulty of recapturing soldiers who desert has been greatly exaggerated. If the authorities doubt this fact, let some enthusiastic and energetic officer with aptitude for the work be picked out and assigned to this special duty, and I fancy the result would surprise those doubting Thomases who have laid the blame on the American public.

The present system, although carried out without zeal, has certainly borne some results. I have paid right in this city of Philadelphia, some thirty-four rewards in the last six months; it has only been since October last that the thirty dollars for apprehension and twenty dollars for expenses were consolidated, an excellent improvement.

It must be admitted that it would be unfortunate to start such a reform when the many captured deserters would have to be confined in guard-houses and could so easily escape and thus put the Government to the excessive expense of paying the rewards over and over again.

#### CONCLUSIONS.

The reformer, desirous of stopping desertion and improving the punitive system of the army, should therefore advocate


the speedy establishment of a general prison for the longer termed prisoners (over six months) of several such prisons. This is a *sine qua non* of any just and enlightened punitive system for this or any army.

The head of this central prison should be required to keep himself in touch with various detective agencies, which could be utilized for the recapture of both escaped prisoners and of deserters. Company commanders should ascertain all the personal history that is possible of the deserter, of his family, his friends, acquaintances and correspondents, and every fact bearing on his habits and probable whereabouts. These he should report to the head of the central prison, nor should he or his soldiers stop there but continue the efforts indefinitely, as it is often much easier to capture a man after he has dropped his own watchfulness.

All such facts, and any other that can be learned, should be communicated to the proper detective agencies for their aid in the real work of tracking down the deserters. Such a system carried out with zeal and enthusiasm by one who has the required aptitude, would go a long way to solve the problem of desertion from the army or from the navy.

I have been disappointed too often in the effect of reforms to believe that any one system or any degree of activity could entirely eliminate desertion from the American Army. This crime is with the army to stay, and we can only diminish it and mitigate its evil effects.

Whether we can do away with the evil or not, we should firmly endeavor to do full justice to the offender, which does not mean severity any more than leniency, but does require in its punishment the three essential elements of certainty, equality and celerity, which need for their attainment, prompt pursuit and capture of the offender, his prompt trial and sentence, and equitable treatment in a suitable prison where escape is impracticable, or as nearly so as walls can make it.



## JUNGLE TACTICS.

BY FIRST LIEUT. LOUIS McLANE HAMILTON, 14TH INFANTRY



THE writer had hoped to find in the new drill regulations some formation prescribed which would meet the conditions encountered in our island possessions, where the character of the country is so entirely different from that at home that movements devised with the latter as a basis, are not as adaptable in the first case as one might wish.

The dense jungle found in most parts of the Philippines renders any formation like our advance guard impracticable, for if flankers were put out not only would they be unable to see any part of the column, or observe its direction of march, but owing to their moving through a pathless tangle of tropical growth, the main body would be held down to a gait of about two miles a day, while its only connection with them would be by the obviously undesirable means of shouting. Then, again, it has been shown that open formations are not desirable here, as shock, instead of fire action is mainly to be guarded against, and especially in the southern islands.

The British Infantry Regulations for 1902, under the head of "Savage Warfare," say in this regard:

"Against an enemy armed with the breech-loader close-order formations in battalion and in brigade are applicable only for assembly, for marches and during the preparatory stages of the fight.

"Accordingly, for civilized warfare, no close-order movements other than column are practiced.

"Attacks by savages armed with spears and swords must, however, usually be met in close order, and for warfare against such an enemy movements in line, echelon and in square will be practiced, in addition to those described in Part III," and their experience in this particular line of fighting is to be respected.

It is well here to consider the character of the country in which the proposed formations are intended to be used, as well as the usual tactics of the Filipinos who are not without resourcefulness in this respect.



The communications are for the greater part narrow trails often bounded by cogón, which is a coarse, wiry grass from six to nine feet high, very dense in growth, and impossible to penetrate with the eye for more than about three feet. Occasionally this, which is the most dangerous from a military standpoint, is supplanted by bamboo thickets, mangrove, hemp-fields, dense brush and rarely open spots. The growths afford ideal concealment for the enemy who may lie within a few feet of a trail with the rarest possibility of being discovered. These trails are formed by the natives, and when leading to the high ground almost invariably follow the bed of a stream, and these, after a rain of two or three hours, are impassable.

Then again, there are generally heavily wooded heights on each side where two or three men, properly armed and instructed, could play havoc with the column below; they could do this without being seen, and to pursue them would be idle.

Very naturally, it will be said that all this might be obviated by the use of flankers, but flankers to be of any value in cogón grass must be at the most twenty feet apart, and in making their way through this growth would hold the column to a march of from two to three miles a day, and it is impossible to accomplish anything at this rate against the elusive native.

Hence, the column is restricted to a single-file formation, and how this is to be divided, if at all, becomes the subject of consideration.

Taking up the tactics of the natives, as remarked during our occupation, and especially those of the southern islands, it may be said that their fire action should not in itself be considered to any great extent; that is, directly.

Primarily, because their shooting is absurdly bad. Secondly, because they have not now, and with an efficient coast-guard service, never will have many rifles. However, upon a column being fired upon, its commander should give his attention not to the fire and the ground in its direction, but to all the other ground; as it is fairly certain that the fire is for the purpose of attracting the attention, and that the real attack will be by bolomen from an entirely different direction. Or again, if the column allows itself to be led on in the direction of the firing the attack may come from a fold in the ground or brush while the command is yet far from the position of the riflemen, taking it more or less by surprise.

Thus a command passing through cogón grass might have its attention attracted by a frontal fire, and while provisions were being made for a frontal attack, it might be rushed by bolomen from the flanks and rear. As an example of the density of the cogón grass, there are many instances where bolomen have crouched in it beside the trail and cut down persons while they were passing, without exposing more than their arm to view in doing so.

This goes to show the uselessness of the "point," as well as the ease with which bolomen may get between the subdivisions of a body in such a manner that shooting becomes impossible on account of hitting men of one's own party. And this, besides being an argument against dividing the force, is also one against the distance between files being great.


It is, of course, true, that no matter what disposition is made of an attacking force in this country, the defensive may take up such a position that were they properly equipped and instructed, half the battle would be won at the outset. And the terrain is such that it is optional with them to sit in the grass and allow the offensive column to pass unmolested or attack it. It may be remarked in connection with this that the Philippine system of runners, "boujons,"\* and "pictics" is such that the strength and destination of a column is known far in advance of it, and that runners are able and actually do watch a column's every movement, which information being transmitted to the enemy, puts them in a position to pick a place for the attack, or get out of the country.

An amusing story in this connection was told me by a member of the constabulary. It seems that this man followed a band of Poulajans several days, upon information given him, and that upon the second day he heard the "boujon" continuously ahead of him, and thought that the trail was getting "warm." This was continued for three days later, when, becoming disgusted, and having been without rations two days, he turned back.

The sequel is that the Poulajans had been in the grass beside the trail, had considered his expedition too strong to attack, and had left one of their number to go ahead and blow the "boujon" in order to lead him into the territory of another band while they calmly waited until he passed and walked

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\*Native bamboo bugle or the conch shell. Telephones made with hemp which act upon the order of the bell-pull.



in his rear. So that in the event of his going far enough his party would have been subjected to both a frontal and rear attack, not to mention what might have been done on the flanks.

The following is given as an example of Philippine tactics: A party of constabulary were sent down the Gandara River with prisoners. Upon arriving at "A" (see illustration) their boats were capsized by a rope across the river, and they were fired on from "B"; it turned out afterward that there were only two or three rifles at "B," but the men being surprised by their ducking very naturally swam to the other side of the river "C," where they were cut up as they landed by bolomen who had been hidden in the brush.

The following day this having been reported, a body of constabulary landed at "D," and proceeded up that side of the river. At "E" they were fired at from "G," upon which a formation for attack was taken up and an advance made upon "G." They were surprised at "F" by a bolo rush from both flanks and from the front, with disastrous results, which all goes to show what may be expected by rifle fire in the Philippines.

Then there are cases where the different bodies of advance guards have been cut off by bolomen simultaneously, and as fire action could not be employed without hitting their own men they were taken at a great disadvantage.

There are like cases too numerous to mention, and as it is impossible to scout each side of a trail in this country properly, and as the "point" passing a place is no indication that the main body will not be jumped, the advance guard formation simply serves to weaken the command.

The following suggested movements are intended for the use of small bodies not to exceed a company, as that is the force which will be most largely used under all circumstances which are likely to arise:

1. Being in column of squads to form trail column in single rank. *Right (or left) by file or skirmishers.* *March;* which is executed as in the Infantry Drill Regulations except that the distance between files is forty inches. After this movement is executed the first sergeant and right guard watch the country to the front, each front-rank man to the right, each rear-rank man to the left and the second lieutenant and left guide to the rear; the captain marches at the head of the column. Upon halting, the men face to the right and left, as also resting, sitting down, and may all be caused to face in a given direction by the commands *face to right (left, front)*. Fire may also be delivered

in any or all directions by the command *fire right* (*left or right and left*) prefixed to the authorized commands for firing.

The advantage of a formation of this description is that no matter from what direction the real attack comes the column is always ready for it.

2. Another formation which could be used with advantage is the time-honored "circle."

Being in column of skirmishers, *circle*. At which command the right guide stands fast, and the first platoon forms a semicircle in double time with the left guide (of the first platoon) on the trail. The head of the second platoon, forms a semi-circle as prescribed for the first platoon, in the opposite direction. Interval between men, four inches.

3. Being in circle. *Skirmish circle*, which is executed by each man moving to his front until he has an interval of two paces from the man on his right.

The circle expanded in this manner may be contracted by an appropriate command.

The advantage of being able to change the circle from one of close order to one of extended order is that it may be used against either shock, or fire action.

The circle may be put in march, the ground permitting, by the commands, *to the front* (*rear, right or left*) *march*.

4. Being in circle, *line to front*. The first and second platoons execute change direction to the left and right, respectively.

5. Being in circle, *line to rear*. Executed in the same manner except upon arriving upon the line the men face to the rear.

6. Being in circle *line to right*. The first platoon takes its original position when in file of skirmishers on the trail facing to the right. The second platoon marches to the rear until it is in its position of file of skirmishers and faces to the right.

7. Being in circle. *Line to left*. Executed similarly to paragraph six, substituting second platoon for first platoon and facing to the left.

8. Being in line to front. *Line to rear*. Execute about face.

9. Being in line to front. *Line to right* (*left*). *To the rear right* (*or left*). *Turn march*. Execute about face and right (*or left*) turn.

10. Being in any formation. *File of skirmishers march*. Executed by the men returning to their regular positions in column.

When terrain is encountered which admits of it of course the formations prescribed by the Infantry Drill Regulations should be used.

The weak point in operating in this country is the necessity of employing cargadores when on an expedition of any duration. These obviously have to be put in some part of the line which naturally weakens it.

I cannot see how this is to be avoided, but it may be lessened by dividing the cargadores up when they are many, which, although it cuts the column in more than one place, so tens the gap between troops.

CABALYOG, SAMAR, P. I., January 1, 1905.

## IN MANCHURIA: THE BATTLE OF SHAKHE (SHA) RIVER.

BY GEORGE DE SALLE.

Translated for the Second Division, G. S., from *La Revue de Paris* (January 15, 1905)

BY LIEUT.-COL. JAMES ROCKWELL, JR., ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

"For the whole thing is to kill them,  
Kill them in heaps....."—*Jules Ferry.*



OUR inaction had lasted for weeks and began to weigh heavily. Each morning, we asked the same question, "When will they fight?" The advance guard was engaged incessantly. Nearly every day the cannon thundered, but the big battle held off. At Mukden we lived in an absolute calm. To while away the time we walked to the tombs of the Manchu emperors (I met General Kuropatkin there one day), or through streets filled with bustle and encumbered with long files of military trains; we visited the shops and bargained for furs and Chinese curios from Germany.

One bright morning the Russians seemed to be more nervous, and soon a vague rumor was current of a near action on the offensive. This was in the early days of October. I put little faith in the reports. Even the possibility of anything on the offensive surprised me, and I was not alone in this; and how many times, for months past, had I not heard prophecies of every kind, mostly false. A supply of skepticism for every day, "tangle-foot" fly-paper for the summer and insect powder for all seasons, these were the three things always necessary in Manchuria. But the rumors of battle grew to such a size that I began to feel uneasy, so on the morning of October 5th I set out in search of evidence.

I went to the station. My road took me along the platform occupied by the retinue of the general-in-chief. His private car had stopped opposite a tent, in which the ceremonies of orthodox worship were being performed. About the tents were many groups. I drew near, from curiosity, and then I was held by a sight imposing in its magnificent setting and in its family simplicity.

It was, indeed, if I may say so, a family reunion. Under the

tent divine service had just been celebrated. The pope, tall, long-haired and with bearded face, had, at the close of the service, tendered the cross to each spectator; the general-in-chief had come first, then each, in the open air, bare-headed, and on his knees, had kissed the crucifix and exchanged with the pope the embrace of peace. A chant was then intoned by all, asking the God of armies for his help in the approaching attack.

The general-in-chief then proceeded to bestow decorations. He was giving out the last when I arrived. A few troops, a battalion at most, was to march past for his inspection. All waited. The officers, in the clear space between the tent and the car, put their men in formation for the march past. The cold was quite keen, but winter in Manchuria is a joyous winter, sunny and under a cloudless sky, a season which makes one long to leap and run. In that atmosphere of surprising purity, the uniforms of all those officers, gold-laced, striped with red, with blue, with green shone resplendent. Ladies were numerous, Sisters of the Red Cross mostly, and among them were two, infinitely elegant, bonneted in the height of fashion, and young and pretty. I admired their dress, their complexions, rosy with the cold, their sparkling jewels, and I thought of Paris. One could have believed himself in the Bois on a fine day of winter. The talk did not rise above a polite murmur; an atmosphere of perfume, of the drawing-room, surrounded us; the tall forms of the officers inclined forward for hand-kissing.

In front, aside from the little group, and with two aides-de-camp, General Kuropatkin was standing against the railing which skirted the cars. He gravely awaited the march past of the men. His uniform was of marked simplicity. I have forgotten its details, even its color, but I retain the memory of a man below middle height, with grizzling beard, with pleasant features which seemed to show repressed feeling—all in somber garb. Were it not for the visible deference toward him, he might have been taken for a subordinate among his superiors.

\* \* \* The march past commenced.

In columns of fours, loaded like beasts of burden, haversacks and cartridge-boxes banging at each long, heavy step, they passed, and when opposite the chief, with heads turned toward him, they saluted with the hackneyed formula and usual cry: God preserve you, Excellency. They were reservists, men of thirty years. Many of them were heavy in flesh. I recall especially one, an officer, short and fat, who took strides too



long to keep step. Hand to his cap, motionless, the general-in-chief returned the salutes \* \* \* and, if I could not hear it, I could guess it so well, despite the unequalled mastery he has over himself, despite all his power, his voice was moved in answering to this, *Ave Cæsar!*

They passed in a cloud of dust. And these troops, who nine months ago were torn from their firesides, their business, their fields, their mother-country for this country of perpetual revolt, were going to their posts. Oh, brave men! Around me, without ever stopping, the talk went on \* \* \* a polite murmur. \* \* \* The medley of perfumes floated about it, and in the ears of women too pretty, under the cover of the great plumed hats the voices of the officers grew confidential.

The bulk of the troops had begun the advance the day before. October 6th General Kuropatkin was visited by the viceroy, Admiral Alexieff. The interview lasted long, at Mukden station, in the car of the viceroy, who was to set out immediately for Harbin. They parted about noon, and some hours later the general, with his entire staff, took horse and set out to the south.

Next day, October 7th, the foreign military attachés followed, and all available troops moved forward, impassive, splendid. \* \* \* Always the same consideration in all the orders: "Is it an attack?" "It will be an attack!" "An evacuation?" "It will be an evacuation!" At last it was an attack! The enthusiasm was great. The general's order of the day was received with numerous "hurrahs," but my astonishment at this change in tactics was not lessened, and many Russian officers had made me feel their apprehensions. It was reported that the station of Shakhe was reoccupied. It was said that the Japanese were weak along the line of railroad as well as to the west, in the immense plains of the River Liao, where the Russian force could be deployed. I find also in my notes the report, without confirmation, moreover, of a first contact between our extreme left and the enemy. I learned afterward that this was but one of the cavalry encounters which were incessantly occurring. The morning of October 8th it was announced that no general action would take place inside of two days, and indeed the action did not become general until the latter part of the night of the 10th and 11th.

\* \* \* \* \*

The objective was Yentai, and, secondarily, Liao Yang. General Kuropatkin made the following dispositions: Three army corps, the First and Second Siberian, and the Third (formed in Manchuria of various elements) constituted our left under General Stackelberg. We called it the Army of the East. The First Siberian Corps had originally General Stackelberg himself at its head, and I do not remember the name of the general to whom he afterward gave its command. The Second Siberian Corps was commanded by General Sassoulitch; the Third Corps by General Ivanoff. This Army of the East was to attack the Japanese right flank, opposite the Yentai mines, marching through a mountainous region where the progress of the troops had to be very slow. Having forty versts to cover, this Army of the East started first—I believe, but am not sure, that it was accompanied by about six batteries.

The Russian center and right from the environs of Mukden, where they had been knocking around for weeks, moved in their turn about two days later. The center comprised the Fourth Siberian Corps (General Soroubaieff) and the First Russian (General Meyendorff). The right was composed, from left to right, of the Tenth Corps (General Sloutchevsky), the Seventeenth (General Binderlinck), the Sixth (incomplete—a brigade, I believe—and I have never learned definitely the name of its commander), and finally the Fifth Corps.

I judge the total strength did not exceed 200,000 men, and yet I give it in round numbers, and in my uncertainty prefer to estimate too high rather than too low. The Russian officers—and I would be the last to blame them—were more than discreet as to the numbers of their troops. I do not speak Russian, and how can I estimate accurately these masses of men? On paper it is very easy, too easy! You open an army list and see, for example, that a Siberian corps comprises about 20,000 men; then X, at the head of such and such a corps, has 20,000 men under him. But coming back to Manchuria, you dare not make any estimate without reserving a margin of error of at least 50 per cent. However, the secret was well kept, and my technical inexperience is complete. I will simply say that I know of regiments of only 500 men whose regular effective is 2400 men in the Siberian, and about 4000 in the Russian corps.

Thus the objective was Yentai, against which marched

about 200,000 men. The front extended from seventy to eighty versts, a verst being about four-fifths of a mile. But the Russian forces formed three masses: the Army of the East or the left (Stackelberg), the Army of the Center, and the Army of the Right, and between these masses were two intervals, two "gaps," of several miles each. And these two "gaps" caused, in my opinion, the affair of the Sha, which, in its ten days of fighting, includes three battles, distinct and separate from one another.

With such an extensive front I had to make a choice; as I could not see all and thoroughly, I decided for the operations of the center, and my remarks on the other armies must be only vague. I was in complete ignorance about the Army of the East until the evening of the 12th.

\* \* \* \* \*

We are therefore three distinct masses. The two wings are to press back the flanks of the enemy, while the center is to hold him in a vise. We are to advance slowly to give the wings time to complete their encircling arc. Then, having finished our concentration, on to Yentai and Liao Yang.

October 10th I left Mukden about noon to join the general's staff at the center. General Kuropatkin was at Erdago, about thirty versts south-southeast of Mukden. I crossed the River Hun by the great bridge of the Mandarin road, to which had been added seven temporary bridges. The cannonading was continuous—I hurried on. The face of my *mafou* (Chinese groom) who accompanied me, was lugubrious.

I went on and on until five o'clock in the evening. I looked at the sun frequently and with uneasiness. The sound of the guns proved that I was quite close up, and I judged it useless to be too near, but where in the world were the troops? On this straight, monotonous road, extending thirty versts, I did not see a soul, at least a European, and all was so quiet and peaceful? Upon their thresholds, when we passed by villages, the Chinese grinned at the foreign devils' garb, or joked at my man. I was, as I understood next day, in one of the "gaps" between our center and our right.

Not a soul! Where to get information or find a sign or a guide! The company I began to desire presently appeared in the shape of a bicycle, which my horse first noted. The little

wheels glittered a few hundred yards away, and the pony took a lively interest, judging by his ears and distrustful gait. In a few seconds he decided that the unknown and peculiar machine was coming too near, and showed his desire to return to Mukden, but I held him in, though with difficulty. It was quite ludicrous, for the officer who was pedaling had courteously dismounted and tried to put his wheel behind him, while with speech interrupted by the pony's capers I launched out by turns in polite phrases to that amiable officer and in abuse of my restive beast: "I am deeply grieved. \* \* \* Be still, you wretched jade." \* \* \*

But I learned news, and found I was almost under the batteries of the Seventeenth Corps. "Nothing extraordinary has occurred to-day. Our position is a good one, and we have even made a slight advance. The village near by is very safe; you need have no fear for the night. Good luck. Good-by."

He left, and in a moment up came another officer, this one on horseback. We conversed, nearly all the Russian officers, especially of the staff, speaking French. He was full of politeness, drew me out a map, and pointed out places; then he suddenly became uneasy. "You are surely not with the Japanese!" I reassured him and set out to find a lodging, for night was coming on.

At the village, my mafou knocked at several doors. I saw clearly, being moreover used to it, that they gave him the cold shoulder. Lodge a foreign devil! I began to use my ordinary talisman. *Fa-goua*, said I several times, and the faces expanded into pleasant smiles, I clasped the offered hands, the little children were no longer afraid; *Fa-goua*. French! Doubtless the Chinese were saying, "This is one of the same race as he who, white-bearded or black-bearded, wears a long gown like ours, who is kind, charitable, gives us clothes, and every morning performs rites before a table on which stands a beautiful painted image with open arms."

The women of the house had disappeared. The room I was to occupy was swept out. I dined and went to sleep.

\* \* \* \* \*

The morning of the 11th, about five o'clock, I was half awake and congratulating myself over the zeal of my mafou. He was already preparing to boil water for the tea. From my

camp-bed, where I lay stretched out, I heard the water singing and bubbling. I rose and went out. No bubbling, no tea, but plenty of infantry fire crackling on every side, and which, in my half slumber I had taken for the singing of the water. I believe I swore; at the same instant, near-by batteries opened fire. \* \* \* The day's work was beginning. During the night the Japanese had seized a height opposite us, not far from the Mandarin road. It was necessary to move our batteries back, so I had awakened between two fires. My preparations to depart were not delayed.

I pricked to the left, toward the east, across the fields. For an hour, I met few troops. Then at the foot of a hillock I distinguished men and horses. It was a park of artillery. On the flank of the hillock stood some tents. I went to ask information. I received a perfect welcome. No one knew where the corps was I desired to rejoin. But I could not leave like that. Coffee was offered, and was very welcome. It was not hot, and I was fasting. In turn, I tendered my flask of brandy, and we chatted about the Baltic fleet, our constant preoccupation. The battery was in reserve. At the foot of the hillock covered with armfuls of *gao-lian*, the guns waited.

To our left, at the summit of the saddle-back heights, was presumably General Binderlinck with his staff. I resumed my way. Indeed, I could soon see that the height was covered with people. I felt some modesty in disturbing them at such a time; but what was I to do? I presented myself to the general, a superb man, with long white beard. He extended a white hand with very pink nails, and I observed how dirty mine were. "To the east, farther on \* \* \* you will find. \* \* \* Good-by!"

I had acquaintances among the numerous officers about the general. We exchanged a few words, when one of them, extending his arm, said with pride in his voice, "Look!" Before us in the great yellow plain we looked down; supporting troops in close formation, as on parade, were moving toward the firing.

The rest of that day was passed in wandering over the plain, inquiring the location of the general staff. The cannonade thundered without a pause. Toward five o'clock in the evening it redoubled in violence. I ran across my friend, Maurice Baring, who was following a battery from the Trans-

baikal, ordered up to General Kuropatkin. \* \* \* That was in my line. The colonel commanding the battery authorized me to accompany it. Baring and I commenced to gossip. We were happy to meet once more. We had lost sight of each other for some time, and such days one never knows.

We stopped in a village. We occupied a house. In an instant, the court was filled with men, horses and baggage. We both went into an unengaged room. About us, the flies swarmed. We sat down on one of the two *Kangs* (a kind of stove-bed); upon the opposite Kang was stretched what we at first thought a corpse. Was it a man, a woman? A face of waxen pallor peered from somber rags and was terribly emaciated with the fixedness of death; the eyes were shut, but a sudden moan came from the white lips, and a bony arm, a skeleton hand, made a motion to push back the hair with the weakness of exhaustion, and it seems to me that Baring then said, "Death everywhere!"

The battery awaits an order. In the court stands a table, and we drink cup after cup of tea. A Polish volunteer, very Parisian (he has in fact done his military service in Paris) mounts to find from General Binderlinck where the action is. The noise of the cannon is terrible, the atmosphere is full of strange vibrations. The order comes: "*Mount!*" and we are *en route*. The winding road is encumbered with endless lines of vehicles, going or coming. From time to time a wagon stops; the driver leaps into the neighboring field, brings back an armful of sheaves of abandoned *gaolian*—so much forage that the "Japs" will not get.

I feel a little feverish. Ah, I wanted to be there, in the battle! I am there now! Each step of my horse carries me a little nearer to it.

At the end of about an hour we stop. The commandant dismounts and we do the same. Baring has just told me about him; a queer man, an artillerist from the line, eaten up by cancer of the stomach, with wasted features; almost unable to keep the saddle, but always wishing to march with *his* men and *his* pieces. He sits at the side of the road, his head between his hands, used up. An officer sets out ahead to prepare lodgings, or rather to try to find them. For this village, in a picturesque flat, covered with verdure, and which we looked down on from the road, will shelter us to-night.

The Polish volunteer has rejoined us. His news is not good. Our right seems to be giving way. \* \* \* I leave Baring who remains with "his" battery and is going to lodge with "his" officers. God knows where! In this village of twenty houses, where a thousand men are crowding, I begin the search for a *fundza* (Chinese house). To my great surprise I find one. I was prepared for a night outdoors. Ah, the *Fa-goua*! The good Chinese even found me two eggs, but my servant broke one of them while bearing them in triumph. General Kuropatkin was, it appears, quite near. The action had extended along the entire line. After having abandoned, the night before, without much resistance, their first positions, perhaps because they appeared too much advanced, the Japanese seemed to outline to-day a beginning of counter-attack. They also passed again from the offensive to the defensive. There was no news from the army of General Stackelberg.

The cannonade and infantry fire lasted all night.

\* \* \* \* \*

October 12th. Ten minutes' riding at early morn brought me to the next village where the general staff was quartered. How fair it was in color and movement under the rising sun! The fields swarming with men and horses, the batteries thundering with livid flame, in haloes of light smoke, the big bivouac fires, the thick smoke eddying, officers on foot, mounted, rushing in hot haste, all the village lanes filled with carts jolting in the ruts and puddles of water, the swearing of the drivers, the shouts, the flags, the standards floating above the tents, the courts and houses filled with men, horses picketed everywhere, and the splendid light bathing all that feast of Death! I wished I dared think it beautiful. \* \* \*

I suddenly came upon the Red Cross tents. An imposing hospital tent of green canvas towered above the smaller ones; all about moved hundreds of stretcher-bearers. An instinctive movement made me turn aside and I found myself facing the procession of wounded, the lucky ones, who returned. \* \* \*

Upon regular litters, or upon four rifles wrapped about by a cloak, with hurried steps, for time pressed and others yonder were waiting their turn, they brought \* \* \* things. Things without name, covered with wraps from which blood was dripping, torn bodies, in pieces, armless, legless, halves of faces gone—and not a cry. Something took me by the



throat; I was nailed to the spot. I uncovered. I wished I could speak, but where to find words! Even now, in writing, in recalling that hour, the same emotion overwhelms me. It was enough to make one weep.

I leave my horses in charge of the mafou. Perhaps he will disappear with them. They may likewise be stolen. So much the worse! It is still more risky to bring my mount nearer and the prospect of having a horse killed and of becoming a plain pedestrian is not alluring.

My point of observation is all selected. Hardly a verst away rises a series of hills, *sopkas*. They are not above a hundred yards high, but the flanks are steep, and I become breathless in my haste. \* \* \* My choice is fine! I just miss falling over the staff of the general-in-chief. I should have been nicely received! Now I understand why so many horses are browsing on the slope: they belong to the escort. My place as a mere idler is not in the midst of these people at work.

I redescend slowly. Where shall I go? I see red trousers on the next height; the French attachés!

Upon my way I meet a young Russian officer with whom I had had a good time in Harbin: "Have you any cigarettes? he cries from a distance, and he lights my *papiro* with enjoyment. He informs me that the Japanese on our right took a battery yesterday, in two night attacks, by flanking it. I ask him as to his general impression. He shakes his head. "And Stackelberg?" I say. He moves his arms to tell me he does not know.

At the top, I find the chief of the Spanish attachés, Marquis de Mendigorria (forgive me, Colonel, if I spell your name wrong), and see again with pleasure his bronzed face and glowing eyes. "Where is Stackelberg?" he asks, as soon as he sees me. "Isnai, I don't know." We chat for some minutes. Then I join General Silvestre and Captain Boucé. "Hello! you here?" "Where is Stackelberg?" "I do not know, General." Mid the roaring of cannon, both eager for this terrible struggle, Captain Boucé and I exchange a few words, and in five minutes surprise one another by talking of Paris. We remark this and smile.

I soon leave him, lean against a rock, and adjust my field-glasses.

Upon my left, the ridge of heights, irregular, broken, with

dark and wooded valleys, all of stern aspect, arrest the view. There lay the Fourth Siberian Corps. Batteries quite near roared from the foot of a wood, shrapnel were bursting as far to the left as the eye could reach—a light cloud, sudden, mysterious, quite small, like a white ball, spreading gently, gracefully, in slow curves; from time to time came a “*brisant*,” a high explosive shell containing about a kilogram of melinite, lyddite or chimosi powder (all these explosives are similar); it raised an enormous dark garb of smoke and dust. To the right one's gaze was lost in the infinite plain, at the end of which, on the horizon, I imagined the Liao River a hundred versts away. Before us stood out, indistinct and bluish, the heights of Yentai and Liao Yang, our objective. A bend of the River Sha gleamed like a piece of ice. A locomotive puffed in the distance. A village was in flames, and everywhere in the clear air, under the radiant sky, the trails of shrapnel darted and showed themselves like a flight of white doves.

Where is Stackelberg? It is he who should strike the decisive blow. Upon him depends the result of the battle. The Japanese, overlapped on their flank, must beat a retreat to save being turned. He marches over mountains, true, but he should be here, now! It is five or six days since he set his troops in motion. There were forty versts to cover, and from his direction not a shot is heard!

I was to learn, much later, that the Japanese in front of him had withdrawn, almost without resistance, from their positions in the first line, but that further on the Russians had encountered real mountains, and formidable intrenched positions, before which they had to retire. Their numerical superiority, great numbers of guns, their bravery, were in vain. The assault was attempted. It was a massacre. From the height of their lodgment some handfuls of Japanese (a brigade with a few guns, I am told), to save their scant ammunition, crushed them with rocks.

It might have been ten o'clock. With my glass, I searched the horizon and the plain to discover the Russian batteries carefully concealed in deep trenches. The pieces appeared as black points. Only the muzzles were visible. Beyond, some reserve infantry, of weak force, on the flank of some heights and with rifles stacked, I did not see a man. \* \* \*

I started to rejoin Captain Boucé. A Russian battery, quite near us and a little to our right, fired without pause.

With the glass, we could see far away its shrapnel burst over an unknown target. From a hill, an officer, standing, gave, from time to time, orders to a man behind him, who then waved two flags, and the battery executed the orders. We followed anxiously the reply of the enemy's projectiles. They fell near our guns, but without much harm; we felt their hesitation, their groping. They burst to the right, then to the left, in front, in rear; then there were pauses, the search seemed abandoned, and I was glad. \* \* \* General Silvestre had joined us, and I remember saying: "Well! suppose they sent a few shots upon our hill!" At the same moment began a startling sight. The Japanese had found \* \* \*

Shot after shot, second after second, the shrapnel burst right over the battery. The spot—just those few yards alone—was literally drenched with projectiles. They came, as if placed by an invisible hand, with a stupefying precision, on the line of the battery, perhaps a yard above the pieces, like hail, or rather like a jet from a steam-pipe \* \* \* I gasped at each new shell, I felt something like a blow in the stomach, and suddenly thought of my friend Baring—he was perhaps down there—and of the hell those men were in! I seemed to see them accepting the challenge, reloading without a stop; with the roar of their pieces mingles the explosion of the hostile projectiles; orders cannot be heard; decidedly the place is too hot; burrowing like beasts in the deepest of trenches, weary and haggard, covered with earth, our men see the ground plowed, scored by the shot, covered by formless débris which were their comrades; here half a body, there an arm, a leg. The dying writhe, shrieking with pain, among the blackened fragments of projectiles. They see and await the end of the storm.

An aide of General Kuropatkin comes up and tells General Silvestre that the commander-in-chief will soon take his post of observation on the hill we occupy. We rise and prepare to leave the place. A queer humming makes us turn our heads. Right upon us from very far off something advances through the air with prodigious quickness. \* \* \* The shrapnel passes with a strange singing, deep and mournful, like the sound of a stormy wind upon telegraph wires—bursts farther on. We gaze at one another. A second and a third follow. They fall behind us in the village below. Ah, my horses! I keep my countenance for the sake of appearances,

but have a great desire to skip out. Next, it is a lyddite shell which bursts at the bottom of the gorge we crossed a few seconds ago. A fragment falls at the feet of General Sylvestre, who puts it in his pocket \* \* \* a cloud of earth and powder rises heavily. An intolerable stench is emitted.


I descend; I am going in search of my horses. I turn around from time to time. General Kuropatkin and his escort come around the hill at a sharp trot. He is leading. A short space separates him from his escort; a "brisant" falls and bursts between him and the foremost Cossacks. \* \* \* In the village the tents are struck with feverish haste. The large Red Cross tent has already disappeared. The conveyances move away in confused masses. In a few minutes the whole village will be deserted.

Two versts back are other heights; one of them, the highest, is crowned with rocks on which a little temple is built. General Kuropatkin is already up there, seated on a campstool, telescope to his eye. It is about noon. I find the military attachés on the height next the post of the general-in-chief. I feel myself in perfect safety now, and utter a sigh of relief.

I had just passed through a painful moment. Once mounted, the village cleared, traveling toward a little wood yellowed by autumn, I asked myself: "Is it now; is it twenty yards away? In a few seconds?" I was in the full zone of fire, and no way to avoid the danger. This mass of animated metal, with clock-work movement, automatic fuse, and whatever else, started, God knows where, had only to be regulated by the "Japs" for the exact distance to where I was, and the thing was done. \* \* \* And I did not desire it done!

The height I have just gained had been occupied by the Japanese a few days earlier. They had dug great trenches there. I enjoy an immense view. The great plain extends infinitely, and I see only yellow fields, villages hidden in groves of trees, which make dark spots. A village, fired by projectiles, is now but an enormous mass of smoke, dragged by the west wind into endless drapery, and I am in the midst of battle.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]



Major Howze,

Lt. Col. Crane,

Major Amos,

OFFICERS PORTO RICO PROVISIONAL REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.



INFANTRY BARRACKS, SAN JUAN, P. R.  
Showing damage by Sampson's Shells

## THE PORTO RICO PROVISIONAL REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

By SIGMUND KRAUSZ.\*



SINCE launching out on his imperialistic course, the army of Uncle Sam has undergone considerable changes in every direction. All of these tend toward the general improvement of the service, which, it has been found, must be brought up to the standard of the best, if the new course of the United States Government is to be kept free of embarrassing obstacles.

A most interesting experiment among the metamorphoses in the army since the Spanish-American War is the establishment of the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry—a body of men recruited exclusively from the native population of the island, and officered by men from the regular and voluntary service of the United States.

I call it an experiment, mainly because the title of the regiment in itself indicates a sort of transitory state, but, from

\*Author of "TOWARDS THE RISING SUN," etc.

what I have seen and learned of it, I have come to the conclusion that its experimental stage may well be regarded as past. Uncle Sam himself must, in reference to this regiment, by this time, have gained the conviction that the attempt to make of his new Latin-American subjects soldiers which are the equal of any in his employ has proved an unqualified success. This is meant not only as far as discipline, valor, and other military qualities are concerned, but also in regard to patriotism, that most essential ingredient in the make-up of soldierly virtue.

In making this assertion, especially the latter statement, I wish to say that it is based not only on my personal investigation, but on careful information gained from the commander and the staff and subaltern officers of the regiment, to all of whom I am deeply indebted for their kind assistance in gathering the data for this paper.

Before hearing of the regimental body itself, and on the principle that the surroundings and the clothes of a man are a valuable aid in judging his character, it will be of interest to the reader to pay with me a mental visit to the quarters of the men in the large infantry barracks near Morro Castle, San Juan, Porto Rico.


It may be reasonably doubted that in any military country of the world the common soldier is housed in such a roomy, comfortable, and sanitary way as are the men of the "Provisional Regiment" in their palatial quarters in San Juan. The barracks, in size and aspect, really appear like a great palace; far more imposing than that of the Governor of Porto Rico, or, for that matter, than any other building on the island. Next to the splendid military road, leading across the island from the capital on the north coast to Ponce on the south coast, these barracks are the most valuable surviving memento of Spanish rule.

They cost the Spanish Government an immense amount of money in the course of their construction which, probably on the *mañana* principle, lasted nigh unto fifty years. In relation to these barracks and their cost, a story is told of Queen Isabella who, looking one morning wistfully through a telescope over the ocean toward the west, was asked by one of her courtiers as to what she was spying at. "I am trying to get a glimpse of those barracks in San Juan that take so much money out of my treasury," she replied. "But, your



Majesty," ventured the courtier, "Porto Rico is more than 3000 miles distant from here." "Well," said Isabella, "according to what they cost me to build, they ought to be big enough to be seen even at that distance."

I should not care to vouch for the truth of this anecdote, but there is no doubt that if all the money appropriated by the Spanish Government for this building had been employed toward the object, instead of finding its way into the pockets of thieving colonial officials, the barracks could perhaps have



REGIMENTAL BAND.

been built high enough to give the story a little semblance of probability.

At the time of the first military government of the United States in Porto Rico, the infantry barracks were found to be, like the rest of Spanish buildings, in the most dilapidated shape, being also considerably damaged by the projectiles of Admiral Sampson. Everything, however, has been thoroughly repaired, and the four imposing three-story wings appear palatial. The large, splendidly paved court, under which extend some gigantic cisterns, reminds one somewhat of that of the Palace of the Doges in Venice. The corridors running

around it, open through great arches to the court and are extremely broad; one part, decorated with flags and palms, serving, in fact, as a ballroom for the officers.


The latter, with the exception of the commander, Lieut.-Col. Chas. J. Crane, who occupies the ancient Casa Blanca, said to have been built by Ponce de Leon in the early part of the sixteenth century, have their club rooms, mess and living quarters in the barracks, which fact, no doubt, adds to the excellent state of order in which everything is kept about the buildings.

The company rooms are spacious, airy, bright, and the comfortable beds are surrounded with snowy mosquito nettings. The kitchens are extremely cleanly, and the food provided is, to a certain degree, adapted to the native taste of the men. Although Uncle Sam does not provide for this, the rations being the regular ones of the army, the deviation toward *garbanzos* and other native delicacies is effected by the sale of surplus provisions not suited to the taste of Porto Ricans, and the purchase, in their place, of such food as they prefer.

A well-equipped ice-plant is attached to the barracks. The bathrooms with shower arrangements are such as to overcome the inherent aversion of the average Porto Rican for bathing, and they are freely used by men who formerly may have looked upon a bath as an unnecessary luxury. I was told a story about a man who wished to enlist in the regiment and was advised by a friend to take a bath before submitting himself to the physical examination. "That's all well," replied the man, "but—*caramba!*—what if they don't accept me?"

That the native islander of the lower classes, who originally does not incline to neatness and cleanliness in his personal habits, except as to external appearance for the sake of vanity, may be trained in these qualities, becomes apparent while making a round of the company rooms. I was given an opportunity to examine the beds, accouterments and individual lockers of about half a dozen men at random, and found everything in the best of order, from the shining bore of the guns to the underwear and shoe-brushes.

While examining the arms in company of Lieutenant Gambell, who acted as my *cicerone*, he called my attention to the fact, proven by the army records, that there were more sharpshooters in the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry than in any other regular troop of the United States.



THE PORTO RICO PROVISIONAL REGIMENT.

This in spite of the strict laws which, under Spanish rule, forbade natives the possession of firearms, with the use of which only few of the men were familiar before joining the regiment.

As to the personal appearance of the men, any sojourner in San Juan, whether he has an eye for such matters or not, is bound to notice their fine carriage, tidy uniforms and general military bearing, whether strolling on the plaza of an evening, or marching in columns through the streets in the course of their duties. The great majority are middle-sized, slender, olive-skinned descendants of the Spanish settlers, with only a sparse sprinkling of mulattoes and full-blooded negroes; and quite a number of strikingly handsome, martial faces may be seen among them.

They seem to like their profession, and to take pride in being soldiers of Uncle Sam. One does not need to deeply search for the psychological reasons of their contentment, for there are hardly any. They are more of a physical nature. Uncle Sam providing them with far superior fare and clothing than they had ever been used to in their civilian state, without in return exacting from them too much in the shape of work.


The American patriotism which the Porto Rican soldier shows for the present is more closely allied with his physical welfare in the regiment than with any other cause, and it would be unfair to expect of him, after an allegiance of only a few years, other reasons of loyalty to the United States. Neither has cause anything to do with effect in this case. The *Landsknechts* of the middle ages were only mercenaries, but they served their masters well, and shed their blood in the cause of their employers with the same zeal and willingness as the most fanatic communard could have done in the cause of the French Revolution.

A characteristic keynote to the Porto Rican soldier's feeling toward the United States may be found in the authentic story of a private who, on returning for a visit to his native village, during a short leave of absence, impressed the villagers with his wonderful tale of the generous manner in which Uncle Sam keeps his soldiers in food and clothes. "Why," he said, in conclusion, to some girls, "we live like kings, and have nothing to do but drill and salute the officers."

His loyalty to the United States goes, however, on occa-

sion, further than a mere tribute of words and, although he has so far not had a chance to spill his blood in our cause, there are cases when soldiers of the "Provisional Regiment" got into serious fights with civilian natives who had abused the American Government in their presence. In one of these brawls, which led to the arrest of the fighting parties, a soldier was accused of having seriously beaten his opponent. After stating his case to the American judge, he was promptly dismissed with the injunction that, on similar provocation, he might lick his opponent again, but not quite so hard.

Under such conditions it is no wonder that the regiment has more applications for enlistment of recruits than it can



NATIVE SOLDIERS.

possibly entertain. In fact, the number of recruits accepted is exceedingly small, as most of the men in active service re-enlist as soon as their terms are over, and, like some aristocratic club, the regiment has a waiting list of applicants.

The American officers are quite eulogistic about the soldierly qualities of their men, and consider the Porto Rican natives not only fully as good material as any on which the United States Army may draw, but as superior.

"They are cleaner, more easily disciplined and better

behaved than American soldiers," I was told by Lieutenant Colonel Crane. "They are furthermore much easier managed than Americans, being in this respect even superior to our colored troops, who, as every army officer knows, are less difficult to handle than white soldiers. We have absolutely no desertions in the regiment. There are no courts-martial, or, at least, they are of rare occurrence, and only for minor offenses. Cases of drunkenness, so common in American regiments, are absolutely unknown among our men."

Another officer said: "According to my observation—and I have been with the regiment ever since it was changed in 1901 from a volunteer troop to the Provisional Regiment—the original morals of the men, which are rather lax before they enter the regiment, improve considerably in our service by their imbibing American ideas. Concubinage is quite a common practice in Porto Rico, and for that reason we close an eye when our men get married without first obtaining the prescribed permit from the commanding officer."

Watching the drills of the regiment, I noticed that the commands, even by non-commissioned native officers, were given in English. Occasional corrections, however, for example, in the line of formation, had to be made in Spanish, as very few of the soldiers understand more than the strictly military commands in English. They will sometimes attempt to answer questions in this language, but invariably switch off into their native tongue. The knowledge of Spanish among the American officers is, on the other hand, also very limited; a deficiency which ought to be corrected in the interest of the service, as their moral influence with the men is certainly bound to improve with the acquirement of their language.

The uniform and accouterments of the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry do not differ from those of other American regiments, with the exception of the dress uniform which consists, for officers and soldiers alike, of a white helmet, blue blouse and white trousers. The regiment, however, is made up only of eight companies of a peace strength of sixty-five men, four of which, under Major Ames, are detached to Cayey, about thirty-seven miles from San Juan, and half-way on the military road to Ponce.

Although there is a goodly number of Porto Ricans who still look askance at Americans and everything American, I

have observed that all of them seem to be proud of the native regiment. This feeling cannot but help to aid materially in the instilment of American patriotism and the gradual development of universal loyalty to the United States among those natives who, as yet, are still regarding the Americans as invaders.

That there is a considerable percentage of Porto Ricans who entertain indifferent or hostile feelings against Uncle Sam is best proven on those evenings when the regimental band plays on the plaza. The "Star-Spangled Banner" invariably forms the closing number of the program, and while its strains last every American and loyal Porto Rican stands uncovered. The large number of listeners, however, remaining seated and covered during the rendering of the national hymn shows decisively that we have, as yet, not succeeded in making good Americans out of *all* Porto Ricans.



NATIVE PORTO RICAN.



## REMARKS UPON TACTICS WITH REFERENCE TO OUR INFANTRY DRILL REGULATIONS.\* II.

BY COLONEL JAMES REGAN, NINTH INFANTRY.



THE tactical formations in our new tactics for handling large bodies of troops are numerous and varied, in both close and extended order, and the intelligent tactician will apply them properly. So whether or not they are too numerous makes but little difference. Von Sherff says: "The more extended individual order becomes our battle formation, the more important will practice in close order become." The whole principle is really in having the greatest force at the decisive point. The present tactics, therefore, differ but little from the old formations, except that they are deeper and more extended.

The consensus of tactical opinion is that close order can only be used with advantage to march to the scene of action or to hold the troops in hand for deployment. Extended order is the rule and close order the exception. Hohenlohe tells us that during the preliminary stages of the battle of St. Privat, that the Guard Corps marched toward the enemy in mass formations, due to their excellent cavalry screen. They had an advanced guard with the main body close upon it, and marched in a single column in close order with the artillery in column of batteries in the intervals, and did not form for attack until within reach of the enemy's bursting shells. This is an exception, as it is now well understood that the column formation cannot be used within the range of effective fire.

The line formation conforms to the fight and terrain. The column is suitable for assembly and maneuver formations. The company column is the battalion maneuver formation in the zone of the enemy's fire, and also in the fighting formation. Columns are formed from line for convenience of movement, and for the purpose of again extending in line. The tactics prescribe the different ways in which they are formed for the attack and change of position. The main purpose of the column closed in mass is to keep the troops well in hand for

\*Concluded from May number of the JOURNAL.

instant deployment. The column is also a suitable formation for the bivouac and camp.

The infantry in close order has three principal formations—line, column and route, or fighting, maneuvering and march formations.

The troops, as they come up from the route march, are held, as a rule, in this formation in mass during the preparatory stage of the artillery and the long-distance fire of the infantry, and upon the defensive as long as possible. They should, however, be always ready to take the combat formation. The reserve should be held in this formation as long as possible to be sent in to sustain the advance lines, or when the enemy is exhausted. In the presence of an enterprising enemy it is recommended that the masses be kept on the menaced side. A broad front, with little depth within reasonable bounds, is favorable for forward movements.

It is really more necessary for the immediate commanders of troops to know their tactics than the higher commander, who simply fixes the principal points of the movements to conform to his plan of battle, or the part he is to take in it. The supreme commander, however, must understand the characteristics of the three arms, so as to get the full value from them, singly or in combination. Boguslawski puts it pointedly when he says that "The art of handling troops does not consist only in the resolution of the commander to attack in this place or in that place, to march here or there, but also in having a good eye to country, in judging the effect of the different arms and employing the formations which are adapted both to the country and to the arms."

All officers, and particularly staff-officers, unless they have a perfect eye for distances, should know the number of paces of himself or his horse it takes for the front of a battalion and higher units so as to decide promptly on the formations necessary to put troops in position. For example: to carry a front of 800 to 1000 yards it is necessary to put in a whole division, from five to ten men per yard, and that the proper front for an attack is about 2200 yards. To meet these conditions properly it is evident that an officer must be well up in tactics. In the past, when our army was scattered on the frontier, an officer who could handle a battalion well was looked up to as a wonder.

All wars, foreign and domestic, for the last fifty years, have

emphasized the necessity of keeping infantry well in hand. Von der Goltz says "That those leaders will have the best chance of success who bring up their troops to the enemy's in compact tactical units, without having suffered considerable loss. The knowledge of how to do this is gained by a careful study of the terrain of great battles."

Up to this time we have referred almost entirely to close-order formations, but from now on they will be referred to only incidentally to show their relation to extended order, or the combat formation. Let us presume that we have pulled away from the routine or grind of garrison life, to which, as a rule, too much valuable time is given. An able French writer says on this subject that "Once drilled in the manual of arms and the execution of commands, the man to-day will stand in need of nothing further than a practice drill now and then. Marching, target-firing, field-service and combat maneuvers, are the matters which should almost constantly constitute his course of instruction. The routine of the drill should be returned to only for the purpose of recalling them to those who may have become forgetful," and how can this better be done, to recur to the subject again, than in the large camps of maneuver, which should be persistently continued. Von Sherff says: "They cultivate mutual acquaintance between the different crops and arms, to give mutual support and to give officers of all grades the practical experience of what they have learned of offensive and defensive tactics."

In leading up to the combats or battles of to-day, the formations partake of the close and extended orders combined, the former the firing line and the latter the reserve. There are generally three lines; the front line covers the rear line or pursues the enemy, but does not maneuver; the second line closely supports the first, caring for the flanks, extending the front and forcing the approach up to the assaulting point, or driving forward such parts of the first line as may have been forced back, strengthening it to the highest degree when it shows the least hesitancy; and when necessary it relieves the first line. The third line is independent for maneuvering, and under the immediate orders of the commander is used for eventualities, such as flank attacks, to repel counter attacks, and to secure the position and pursue the enemy. The rear lines are habitually kept within supporting distance, the leading lines gain in boldness when this is done with spirit.

But when and how these formations should be taken will depend upon the terrain, with its topographical features, and the experience and quick perception of the commander. Our tactics point out the most suitable formations, and when, as a rule, the deep order should be departed from, based upon the battle-fields of Europe, *i. e.*, extended order for the first line, and in order, perhaps the company column and masses. Columns side by side generally deploy when they come within range of the enemy's artillery. It requires well-disciplined troops to keep the close order under fire. The Germans, in 1870, under the protection of their artillery fire, moved forward within the range of the enemy's artillery fire, which was only moderately good.

Let us observe that the most recent experience, including the present war in Manchuria, sustains previous experiences since 1870, that the troops attacking must be superior in numbers and guns, and must go in to win and not fear losses.

It has become an axiom of war that the point to be attacked is the flank, as the frontal attack is almost impossible, except in the case where the enemy occupies too much front or he is inherently weak. What a fine example of this the Japs have given us in their crossing of the Yalu, the study of which is a liberal lesson in the art of war. They have evidently studied the Germans in the War of 1870, General Ghourki, in his passage of the Balkans, and General Sherman in his Atlanta campaign. Their tactics were to threaten the enemy's front by engaging their attention with a fire of the skirmishers and strong supports in near-by shelters, and then by turning their flanks to compel them to fight at a disadvantage or retreat. These masterly soldiers have given us valuable lessons in strategy and grand tactics in perceiving the weak points and making proper dispositions preparatory to battle, and during the battle, so as to bring the mass of the troops against the weak parts of the enemy. They simply carried out the Napoleonic idea of holding the masses well in hand to be ready to strike at the opportune moment.

It is a serious mistake, and generally meets with defeat, to attempt serious movements within effective range of the enemy's guns. Such movements should be done under cover and with the greatest rapidity. Flank movements, and a few of them of a very serious character, have been made in every war. Jackson at Chancellorsville, which turned victory into defeat.

How Jackson could make such a movement with such an army is a mystery no longer; it was simply due to laxity in security and formation. Von Sherff says: "These movements will never be favorable to success if attempted by an oblique movement under fire, or by a change of front after you are already engaged. . Straight to the front, 'forward' is the word of command suited to the attack."

It is claimed that flank movements may be successful if properly guarded on the side of the enemy. Such movements are often employed to turn an enemy's position. It will not do, therefore, to sleep on post with an active enemy around. Remarkable examples of this may be found in every war. Security and information is of the greatest importance.

We are fully satisfied from our experience in the West, in operations against Indians, and more recent experience in war, that scouting, not in the narrow but important sense of tactics in extended order, the grand scouts, but in the much broader sense of reconnoitering, will be of paramount importance on account of the fire-swept zone in all future wars. It will be necessary to feel the enemy and get at his purposes, not specially in organized bodies, but like Indians, the best natural scouts in the world. It will never do for massed bodies to go within decisive range, which means annihilation against a concealed enemy, frightful examples of which we have had in almost every war. Nor will it do to take the extended order until the ground in front has been explored, because the authority of the regimental and company commanders is gone, and success is in the hands of the commanders of small detachments.

Scouting, in the sense in which it is applied in our new tactics, is concisely referred to with hardly any explanation, much being left to general professional reading. Of course it is understood that the drill regulations are only the expressions of general principles, great discretion in active service being left to the judgment of officers as to details; and in this we may learn much from foreign armies. They cultivate the initiative in their officers, and allow a wide latitude in the training of troops. They avoid all variations from simplicity and naturalness, all adherence to fixed forms and pedantry, especially on points of tactics.

The men selected for this line of work should have excellent eyesight, be intelligent, active, good shots, and good marchers

—in a word, good huntsmen and soldiers. The Germans and Japs give good examples. The men should have some special instruction and training, besides all that taught to the men in extended order, such as estimating distances and the strength of bodies of troops seen afar off; and also in those specialties for battle, such as moving within a fixed zone, and availing themselves of the most favorable conditions, reconnoitering the enemy's defenses, and how to transmit the information that they have secured. The enemy in this line of work may be outlined, and the exercise should take place on a variety of grounds.

Recent changes in drill regulations of foreign countries have given this matter much and careful attention. Because of the difficulty mounted men experience in reconnoitering the enemy's position, only well-instructed infantry scouts, who profit by the smallest accidents of the ground, are employed to crawl up sufficiently to a position to obtain reliable information, and to avoid surprises.

The present tactics prescribe a few instructed men to act as scouts to precede the company. In foreign armies about one to a platoon. They should be most vigilant, should maintain themselves within the zone of fire of their companies, and should drive back the enemy's scouts. They should never lose sight of their objective, grouping and extending according to circumstances, and when temporarily forced from their direction they must retake it as soon as possible.

In our tactics the number of scouts thus sent out is left to the judgment of the officer. They should be numerous enough, however, to cover the fronts of their companies and support the scouts of the adjacent organization. In important cases they are under the charge of an officer or non-commissioned officer. Our tactics prescribe that upon reaching a position about 1000 yards from the enemy, they hold such position and await the arrival of the firing line. The distance the scouts are sent out to cover the troops varies from 1200 to 1900 yards. Of course these are only approximately correct, as much depends upon the enemy to be engaged, the nature of the mission confided to them, as well as any eventuality or character of the ground. Connecting patrols should be used between the scouts and the firing line, and the other lines in rear when necessary, to send in important communications. These affairs are usually determined by the captain, especially as to



distances or the points to be occupied on sheltered or broken ground. Care should be taken that they are not put in a position to be surprised, or beyond the support of their company. The scouts should try to develop the enemy's artillery, and the position of the infantry, and keep them guessing.

There is much merit, we think, in Captain von der Goltz's idea of independent patrols, not as an habitual form of attack, but upon proper occasions. He proposes eight marksmen for each section, in a German company a total of twenty-four marksmen. In this country we would suggest independent companies, principally of men from the West and South, whose habits naturally prepare them for this kind of work. Their duty is that of screening the main command, to ferret out the enemy, reconnoitering his position, and to guard against surprise and ambush. It is claimed for them that owing to the smallness of the target which they present they can easily approach within 600 yards of the enemy, and concealing themselves, can open fire on the enemy. In the meantime the staff, from the high ground, is reconnoitering the enemy's position, and the different lines in rear are advanced with the utmost rapidity to within 600 yards, from which a vigorous attack is made in the usual way. A system of this kind might have been of advantage in Cuba and the Philippines. Of course the men selected for this work must be hardy and brave and good stalkers. The recent papers referred to a case where a few Japs, a patrol, traveled 250 miles, crossing the Russian lines, and getting within 200 yards of their positions. We all know what was accomplished by the Prussian officers' patrol in the war of 1866.

No matter how well a plan may be conceived and dispositions made, they are apt to fail if the leadership lacks energy. The formation must be suited to the circumstances, the attack concentrated and carried through with energy. The skirmish line, thickened to the fullest, must be gotten to the enemy, and the lines must be arranged with that idea in view; there must be no turning back. The Japanese have given examples of this. A French general, in referring to this point says: "The assault must be made as heretofore, that the troops for this work must accomplish the final end by shock, and that to this end a certain density of formation is necessary; heavy losses in these troops will be inevitable, but the position will be carried, and will be carried in no other way."



As the march in close-order formation is more fatiguing than extended order, it ought not to be assumed before it is necessary. According to von der Goltz, the solution of this is no easy matter, because, besides other qualities, it requires careful calculation of the time, space, depth of march and the marching capabilities of the troops. The important thing to keep in mind is the evolution for battle so that the command may change in time from close to extended order.

The masses should be so arranged that the enemy can not get between them. The Franco-German War presents examples of this where the enemy approached in such a way as to compel each of the separate columns to fight a battle, being out of support of each other. The Japanese gave an example of this in their line at Liao Yang, but the Russians failed to take advantage of it. This fine piece of strategy and tactics was wisely exercised by Napoleon, and nearly always wins out with superior numbers. Another pretty well established rule is that deployed infantry should receive the attack of cavalry without changing its formation at the time. Groups should not be resorted to except as a last resort.

The improvement in firearms and recent experiences have forced deployments to be made at greater distances from the enemy. Our tactics point out these distances beginning at 2500 yards. In recent maneuvers, abroad, deployments in a few cases have been made as far back as between two and three miles. It is while thus deployed and advancing, and the fire is hot, that the men take advantage of the ground and intrench, because it is now, when the defenders in the lines are being reinforced, that they try, by a heavy fire, to annihilate the firing line, using volleys as far as possible, holding the rapid fire for the supports. This is a trying time, and its seriousness has been demonstrated by the belligerents in Manchuria. There are numerous instances in this war where men have crept on their knees with head closely bent to the ground, to get a favorable position for the charge. Our men get but indifferent practice in these affairs.

In European armies, until the men are well within the decisive range, the movement forward is deliberate, with very little rushing. But from there on the movement is rapid and vigorous, the different lines mutually assisting each other when in a most vigorous and persistent assault. Call to mind the terrific assaults of the Japanese in Manchuria. Maude

says: "The troops who can stand the most drilling under fair conditions are the ones who will meet with success. Constant attempts at concealment will give indecisive results." The enemy can not be expelled from his position by stalking him, and a vigorous assault is indispensable. Americans, who are unquestionably among the most intelligent and bravest fighters in the world, must ponder over this idea. The better we are prepared, the less will be our loss in future wars.

There is really no fixed place for the reserve; it may be in the center, on one flank, or on both flanks, but as a general rule it is in the most important place, according to the judgment of the commander. When in doubt, the middle is the best place.

The advantages of extended order are that it allows the most effective fire and the rapidity of movement over rough ground. It stands to reason, however, from its extent and freedom, that it requires the strictest discipline. The Japanese in Manchuria have shown the importance of this. The way they screened their movements and attained their position for the final charge have never been surpassed. Everything was worked out in advance and carried through with precision, the subordinate commanders and the men doing their full part. Their example shows that the men must be taught to obey commands with the utmost precision and rapidity, no matter how given. The officers must be among their men directing or leading them, and their commands should be given by trumpet or signal, as the human voice cannot be heard in the noise and clatter of battle. It is under just such conditions that fire discipline shows to advantage. This was pointed out in a previous article.

Fire discipline and how to shoot is, therefore, of the greatest importance. It is gratifying to know that a decided move is being made to teach shooting to our organized and unorganized militia. Every military man should be taught to shoot with deliberation, and fire only when he can make his shot effective, generally, only within the decisive range, and then with the greatest intensity consistent with the supply of ammunition. He should take one of the prescribed military positions. In foreign armies the lying-down position is the exception. It is well known that the impulse of the soldier in his first battle is to fire without aiming, and frequently without seeing the

enemy. This was a common error in the Philippines, even when the bamboo was not combed. These remarks accord with the idea that the principal factor is the man and not his armament—nerve when aiming the gun—"the man behind the gun." The Germans require their men in advancing under fire to estimate the distance of the enemy for correct elevation and direction; to fix sidearms particularly while lying down; to rise quickly at the command, and to cease firing at the sound of the trumpet or signal. This is also the spirit of our tactics. The athletic training the men receive in time of peace in the way of jumping, running, climbing and scaling walls will admirably fit them for this severe work. The preparation of the Japs in these things accounts to some extent for their successes over the Russians, the difference between them being about the same as between light cavalry and dragoons. The Russians had too much impedimenta in camp and on person.

While much is expected of the officers, the men must be brave, self-reliant and intelligent. It has been stated that poor skirmishers will not advance, but will fire from behind trees, ridges and walls, doing but little damage. They must move forward with the greatest vigor. In their advance the Japanese held on to every inch of ground, sturdily advancing until they attained the position for the attack, and they were generally successful. The only chance of success in an assault, according to General Skobelev, is by successive assaults of skirmish lines. The commander must place himself behind the skirmishers and reserve, where he can feel the pulse of the battle and where, with his troops well in hand, he can judge the moment to send in his reserve battalions.

It is now more difficult than ever to give a proper direction to the lines and reserve and to handle them properly, because of the improvement in firearms, the cavalry screen and the consequent difficulty of guessing the dispositions and intentions of the enemy. The Germans have recognized this, and the Japanese, in their present war, are following in their footsteps in assuming the offensive at all cost.

In order to get the full effect of the range and rapidity of fire of the new firearms, the number in the fighting line is increased and the line extended, hence the reason that the company and battalion reserves only exist at the beginning of an action, and are entirely absorbed before the enemy is seen, and this accounts for the company reserve being done

away with in our tactics. This is the practice abroad, and is based upon the fact that if the supports must extend to avoid the intensity of the enemy's fire, it would be better for them to advance and join the firing line at once, not that they will suffer less, but rather to put them in a position to inflict loss. In such cases the support comes from rear regiments, which must be close up for the decisive moment, or the rapid fire followed by charge bayonets. The proper moment is when the defense is practically silenced and demoralized.

The duties of officers are of the gravest character. They should never be in doubt in details which they are expected to know, and should always be prompt in the performance of their duties. They should act with decision, and be imbued with justice and firmness, because the men look to them to do the right thing. And all officers should feel, as Jomini says, the conviction that resignation, bravery and faithful attention to duty are virtues without which no glory is possible, and no army is respectable. They should feel that firmness among reverses is more honorable than enthusiasm in success, since courage alone is necessary to storm a position, while it requires heroism to make a difficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy. With these qualities in a command failure is impossible.

How will these words fit the present war?

This subject cannot be finished in this paper, and when time permits, and it meets the approval of the Institution, it will be considered the offensive and defensive of our infantry tactics, in another paper at some future time.



## AN AMERICAN UNIFORM FOR THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

BY MAJOR CASSIUS E. GILLETTE, U. S. A.,  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS.



OUR uniform has recently been revised and is not yet fully adjusted. Some day it may be revised again. The following thoughts in anticipation of this contingency are based on the idea of working up a uniform from fundamental principles rather than by copying from foreign armies whose requirements are generally not the same as ours. In the past we seem to have done a good deal of this copying. Whenever one foreign army has whipped another we have generally adopted some item of the victor's "get-up," apparently with a view of absorbing with it some of his victorious qualities. The military prestige of the French, due largely to the genius of Napoleon, dominated our ideas of uniform for many years. It made our men fight on the torrid plains of Mexico in clothing which, while doubtless suitable for troops watching Germans across the Rhine, was a poor outfit for the tropics. The French chasseur cap, which we used till about 1872, had many serious defects, but the victory of the Germans in 1871, brought us something worse, the unmitigated helmet. Even some impressive German autumn maneuvers, a few years back, seem to have been responsible for our recently discarded elastic gaiters without tips. The Germans are a great military nation, but that should not compel us to adopt their shoes, in the manufacture of which they are somewhere back in the Miocene period, while we, as a nation, are the leading shoe-makers in the world.

When the Russian has been driven beyond Lake Baikal, or the Jap expelled from continental Asia, we may confidently expect that our devoted soldiers will be called on to wear some part of the Japanese or Cossack outfit, according to which turns out to be the winner. It is to ward off, if possible, such a contingency that this production is penned.

To get down to first principles, the question naturally arises, what is a uniform for? At first glance it might appear



UNIFORMS OF TO-DAY.  
*Reproduced from N. Y. Herald.*

to be a rather unimportant matter, but a little thought will indicate that the uniform is one of the most important things with which military authorities have to deal. A proper uniform serves to distinguish us from the enemy. It indicates rank and branch of the service at a glance, being in this and analogous respects a tremendous aid to organization and discipline. It attracts suitable men to the recruiting office, and increases the morale and soldierly qualities of the entire organization. Upon it depends, in many ways, the health and efficiency of our soldiers. To secure in the highest degree the full development of these functions is worthy of the most profound study.

Omitting any further reference to the general subject, let us consider the matter of an ideal uniform for our army under modern circumstances. The conditions that such a uniform should fulfil seem to be about as follows:

1. It should enable us to distinguish our own men from the enemy. In ancient days gaudy colors and striking effects were used, and neither side could make any mistakes with the short ranges then possible. At the present time, on the other hand, concealment is a great object, and we gain a decided advantage if the enemy at long range shoots into his own men or refrains from shooting at ours through mistake. Hence, our uniforms should be for our own information and not his, except, possibly, so far as enable him to distinguish medical and other non-combatants.

2. It should be as inconspicuous as practicable. This applies primarily to the field uniform, but is not wholly inapplicable to the pomp and circumstance of full dress.

3. It should be "smart" and attractive to the eyes of the gentler sex. This is by no means an unimportant matter. The qualities that women admire are the qualities that the race will develop and if that admiration be for the qualities that make good soldiers, better men will seek the ranks. A suitable uniform is, therefore, in this respect, a matter of very great importance.

4. So far as is consistent with the other qualities, its cost should be minimum. This, too, is no trivial matter. The addition of an article costing only two dollars to each uniform means, for an army of 500,000 men, an extra expense of \$50,000 annually for an indefinite period. This, capitalized at 4 per cent. means \$1,250,000. The requirement in our army that a major's full-dress coat shall have nine buttons in a row, instead of the seven it had when it covered a captain, causes the



Government enough useless expense annually to about pay the salary of an extra captain or two. The cost of the recent rapid changes in full-dress coats, in shoes, box spurs, shoulder knots, caps, etc., would pay the salary of a few extra general officers for several years. That such expense falls primarily on the officer is of no moment, for it ultimately falls on the Government, since the majority of intelligent men who give their ability and their lives to the Government service, do so, at least partly, in exchange for the net income they receive. Therefore, all that part of an officer's salary spent in paying for useless articles or changes in uniform is, in the long run, merely so much government money wasted.

5. It should preserve the health and comfort of the wearer and enable him to develop his strength, activity and endurance to the highest degree. The reasons for this are self-evident.

6. For citizen soldiery like ours it should follow the lines of civilian clothing, except where a real necessity requires that it deviate.

In giving these principles practical application, in the development of a suitable uniform for our troops, the following points are worthy of consideration:

#### FOR THE SERVICE UNIFORM.

*Color.*—Concealment at long range is now a vital matter. The color that blends with the landscape most effectually is the best. This, of course, depends upon the background. Among green fields, green would be the least conspicuous: on a snow-covered hillside, white would be the best. With an autumn landscape, dead grass color, or some shade of tan or brown, would be the most difficult to see. But our soldiers cannot change their appearance like chameleons to suit the varying background. At present we have adopted the khaki, or mud-colored cotton uniform for the tropics, and a mixture of olive-green and tan wool in two weights for the United States. Both these colors cannot be best. The khaki was copied from the English-Egyptian service and olive-drab came from experiments of our own. This last was on the right principle, but it is not yet certain that we have the best color. In its selection it is understood that only a few comparative tests for invisibility were made and no consideration was given to the principle of giving a smart effect to the uniform.

It is not impossible that further experiments would develop a color better for concealment, and at the same time,

more attractive to the eye. Something could be sacrificed to the latter consideration, for, while concealment is a very desirable feature, a soldier ought not to object being seen once in a while. It would be desirable, too, to get a color that could be produced in cotton as well as wool, because there are many conditions of climate where one man would require woollen clothes, while another would be better off in cotton. Questions of practical dyeing may interfere with it, but a single distinctive color is very desirable for the above and other reasons, and an effort should certainly be made to attain it.

Probably the best guide in nature to the exact shade that is the best for concealment would be the color of those wild animals that depend for safety on flight, or, perhaps, more appropriate for soldiers' use, the color of those wild animals that run down their prey by daylight, and must make an invisible approach. The result is the same either way. The gray rabbit and the gray wolf are nearly of the same color. Doubtless, somewhere, between that color and the olive-drab, the best shade will be found. It is worth further and elaborate research.

*Materials.*—The only two materials for uniforms that have ever been found suitable at reasonable cost are cotton and wool. Apparently, a greenish cotton mixed with a tan wool might make a satisfactory material. Should experiment indicate the desirability of a summer or tropical color, and a winter color, the proportions could be varied, giving a greater amount of cotton with a greener effect to the summer material. The recent adoption of thin wool for warm weather in the United States will probably not prove satisfactory. A thin woollen garment loses its shape easily, tears too readily to stand rough work among briars, etc., and is not so cool as cotton goods. Most objectionable of all, it cannot be washed without shrinking.

*Insignia.*—At present we have a rather heterogeneous mixture of totems, heraldic devices and alphabetical abbreviations to indicate organization and rank. They are arranged without much system, are incongruous in some respects, and doubtless could be improved by careful revision.

The following principles would appear reasonable, should such revision take place:

1. The distinction between a commissioned officer and an enlisted man, and that between a non-commissioned officer

and a private, and if possible, the exact rank should be unmistakable up to such distance as commands or other directions are practicable. Beyond that, such distinctions should not appear to the naked eye. This last is to prevent the enemy's sharpshooters in battle from picking off the officers. It is not practicable to prevent him from distinguishing officers by the use of telescopes or field-glasses, but this is offset by the fact that the same man cannot use a field-glass and a rifle at the same time.

To fulfil the above condition requires that the insignia of rank should, in all cases, appear on the same part of the person, so that the enemy could not pick off the officers by the location of the device. At present, in our field uniform, we place the insignia of rank for a commissioned officer on the shoulder of the blouse, on the cuff of the overcoat and on the collar of the shirt. It would be an advantage if it could be found always at the same place. Some uniformity in size would also appear desirable. At present the rank indication of a lieutenant-colonel, as shown by the blouse, can be covered by a three-quarter inch circle; on the overcoat it has about seventy-five times this area. One of these sizes must be ill adapted to the purposes of a field uniform, and so long as black braid is used on the cuffs, the value of an inconspicuous color for overcoats will be partly lost. A field-officer's sleeve braid certainly furnishes, at present, a fine bull's-eye up to at least 500 yards. A second lieutenant in his overcoat is now hard to tell from a private. A further objection to the braid indication of rank is that it is difficult by it to determine the exact rank even at a short distance. This is true of both field and full dress.

Apparently, the best place for rank insignia is the top of the shoulder. The smartness of any uniform is increased by an addition at that point. It is visible in nearly every position, and has been thoroughly tried and found satisfactory. The piling of possibly three sets of insignia above one another, on shirt, blouse and overcoat, is a seeming objection to the above suggestion, but this is easily overcome by the use of a suitable material for the insignia. It is no remedy for the trouble to remove the overcoat insignia to the cuff. If any have to be removed from the shoulder, it should be one of the underneath ones, there being no apparent objection to adding any amount of insignia to the top garment. Moreover, the

shoulder is about the only place where a meaningless strap can be added to a private soldier's coat without appearing meaningless, and *something* should appear on all uniforms to prevent the enemy from making targets of the officers. The non-commissioned officers' chevrons are conspicuous where now located on the upper arm. If there is any objection to placing their insignia upon the shoulder, then something should be added to the uniforms of officers and privates to prevent the non-commissioned officers' chevrons serving to distinguish them to the enemy's marksmen.

2. The insignia, to denote organizations, can always be placed upon the collar of the coat, as now. Upon the shirt, when worn without the coat, it should, if possible, also be placed upon the collar. To facilitate this, there seems to be no reason why both the coat and the shirt should not be constructed with standing collars. Many enlisted men wear the blue shirt with the collar turned up and held in place by one of the points being pinned neatly across the throat. A non-shrinking collar could be fastened with hooks and eyes just as readily as the present khaki coat collar is fastened. By the addition of suitable pockets to the shirts, it might be possible to do away with the service coat, which would mean a large saving in money, and an appreciable saving in bulk and weight.

*Materials of Insignia.*—The present bronze insignia have the objectionable features of soon wearing bright and glistening in the sun. Those on the sleeves of the overcoat catch on brush, etc., and get torn off. Apparently, leather, celluloid, or "vulcanized fiber" could be used to advantage in place of metallic insignia.

On the woolen uniform there would seem to be no objection to leather insignia. It is light and flexible, would look well and could be carefully adjusted in shade so as to be visible for a short distance and invisible to the enemy. As such garments do not have to be washed, the insignia could be permanently sewed in place. On wash garments, wash leather, or some kind of vulcanized material could be available that could be removed, or that would stand washing.

*Shapes of Insignia.*—There are some objections to the present forms. They vary too much in size. If the artillery crossed cannon are the right size, the commissary crescent is much too small. Simple shapes are best. The quartermaster's mark is too conspicuous.

*Suggested Plan.*—For service insignia, in accordance with the above ideas, the following is suggested: Place on the coat of the private soldier a strap of the same material as the coat, but of suitably different shade, fastened to a button near the collar like the present strap. Widen it on a suitable curve near the shoulder seam, so that the insignia of commissioned rank can be placed near both the forward and back edges of the widened part near the seam, so as to be visible from both front and rear, as well as from either side. Revise these insignia to make them each of about one square inch in area, and depending on shape alone to distinguish the different grades. Make the insignia of leather or similar material of the color of the uniform.

Similarly for the non-commissioned rank. Sew into the same shoulder seam a piece of the same material as the strap above described, exactly similar in shape to the sleeve itself and closely covering its upper three inches. Upon this place curved bars of leather, or similar material, of the color of the uniform and half an inch wide, convex upward—one bar for a corporal, two for a sergeant, with a half-inch space between. Add below the first sergeant's lozenge, etc. All individuals will then look alike at sharpshooter's range, while rank will plainly show where it is needed, and no radical departure will have been made from the present system.

*Headgear.*—The various monstrosities that soldiers have in the past been required to wear on their heads almost surpasses belief.

In the days of broadswords the equivalent of an iron kettle may have been useful as a head-dress, and at times something to make the wearer look fierce and military may have been useful, but now the conditions are different. The important part of the fighting will take place at ranges where the expression of the head-dress will be of no consequence. Much of this fighting will take place behind earthworks where hats will be useful in inverse proportion to their visibility.

The conditions that a field hat or cap should have seem to be:

1. Invisibility.
3. Good eye-shade.
3. Ability to stay on.
4. Protection from rain.
5. Smart appearance.



UNIFORMS OF TO-DAY.  
*Reproduced from N. Y. Herald.*

These are about in the order of their importance. The first requires a proper color and the minimum size, with no unnecessary brim. This would indicate a small, close-fitting cap of the color of the uniform. The second can be provided by a low sloping visor, which should not be black, but nearly of the color of the cap. To cover the fifth condition the visor might have the color of the insignia. A cap will stay on better than any other headgear. Protection from rain, however, is better provided by a hat, as its brim will keep the rain out of the back of the neck. A duck hunter's soft cap, with a sort of visor to the rear, as well as one in front, would fulfil all the conditions except the fifth. It would not have a smart appearance. Probably a cap would be developed on these lines that would look all right. The subject is worth investigating.

The above applies to the summer cap. The winter cap should furnish in addition some protection against cold, especially to the ears. This is provided in the duck hunter's cap referred to. The addition of ear protection and the change to heavier material should cover the difference between the summer and winter caps.

There appears to be no need of insignia on the cap. Insignia should always be on the man, and the cap is too easily lost. All caps should be precisely alike, except possibly in texture. When close fighting in trenches, etc., is going on, the enemy should not be able to distinguish the officers by their caps. There is no apparent objection to the cap being ornamented with a coat of arms, spread eagle, or anything of that sort, but it should not be depended upon for any of the functions of insignia.

Our present campaign hat is too large and will not stay on. Our recently adopted service cap is too heavy and is unnecessarily large. Its black visor and band are too conspicuous, and it affords no protection to the back of the neck against rain. It has to be augmented by a hood to be satisfactory in cold weather.

*Foot Gear.*—For the field the following conditions should be fulfilled:

1. Protection against mechanical injury, and as far as possible, against dampness.
2. Lightness.

These are probably the most important functions of any



part of the uniform. An army's ability to march is almost as important as its ability to fight. Nothing is so important in marching as the foot-gear. If it chafes or blisters, or permits the feet to be injured, the wearer's usefulness is vastly decreased.

An extra half pound on the feet is worse than an extra pound elsewhere. Worn out soles may be impossible to replace before a march upon which profound results may depend. The sole is the important part. It should be stiff enough to protect the feet against injury from hard or rough ground, or from fatigue produced by the same causes, and at the same time flexible enough to permit some bending under the ball of the foot. If possible, it should never wear out. Perhaps the three most important things in a campaign are the soldier, his gun and the sole of his shoe. The most durable sole leather should be used, regardless of expense, and if a better material than sole leather can be produced, the Government should offer a liberal prize for its inventor.

To prevent chafing, the upper part of the foot and the ankle should be covered with a tough, waterproof, but not air-proof, material. Leather seems to be the best material yet devised for this, and the shoe is the best form for it. Boots are impossible to adjust to the foot and are uselessly expensive. They should find no place in any uniform for our army. Their advantages for foot soldiers are far outweighed by their disadvantages. They may do for cavalry that never dismounts, but the cavalry of the future that amounts to much will be mounted infantry, and the shoe will prove its best foot covering.

To protect the lower part of the leg against briars, wet grass, etc., leggings have been found useful. They have many disadvantages. Among the latter are their discomfort in camp and garrison, necessitating both trousers and breeches, a defect of some importance. Leggings are troublesome to put on and off. They are likely to add to a bungling excess of cover immediately at the ankle. As at present worn, cases might occur where the ankles would be covered by five thicknesses; drawers, stockings, shoes, trousers and leggings. It will always be covered by at least three of these. Two thicknesses at any point of the body are enough—one for warmth and comfort, the other for protection.

With this view, it is desirable to eliminate, if possible, the leggings. The socks and drawers should furnish the necessary

warmth and comfort to the feet and legs. The shoes and trousers should be made to furnish the protection.

Assuming a pair of high lace shoes, with the tongues sewed into the tops, it should be an easy matter to devise a pair of trousers that would do the rest. The following solution is suggested: Make the trousers entirely of stout canvas, of a different thickness for winter and summer. Make them of conventional cut for camp wear, but add on the outside of the lower leg a double row of lacing hooks in the form of an inverted "V" so that it will always fold at the same place. Then, for marching, fold in the trousers leg and lace it snugly around the ankle inside or outside the shoe top. This protects the entire leg against briars, etc., is mud-proof, and for a quick step or two, reasonably waterproof, and simplifies the uniform. The laces for both shoes and trousers should be strong, durable leather like porpoise hide. Those for the trousers should be detachable and an ample supply of extra ones carried. This arrangement is essentially the same as is used by many hunters, ranchers, etc., who seldom use leggings. It would be much more quickly put on than the present rig in case of a sudden call to arms, a most important point.

*Coats and Shirts.*—The principle of an undergarment for warmth and comfort and an outer one for protection would seem to apply properly to the trunk and arms. The first of these can doubtless best be obtained by a suitable undershirt. To determine whether the outer garment should be a coat or another shirt, is not so easy. The latter has some advantages. It gives greater freedom of movement. Most enlisted men wear their coats only to obey orders, and they leave them unbuttoned, except in the presence of officers.

Without the coat, suspenders cannot be worn as they are unsightly. Our enlisted men, however, are young men and of such figures that a belt can be worn to hold up the trousers. Not so with some of the officers.

On the other hand, a shirt is not so good protection against wind and rain and is not so easily provided with pockets. On the whole, the coat seems most advisable.

There seems to be no need of an overshirt for enlisted men. Its principal necessity arises from its use to hold collar and cuffs. These have no place in an enlisted man's field uniform. To give the coat a neat and clean appearance, a piping of white around the collar and cuffs could properly be added.

If this be protected by a similar piping of the material of the coat and extending underneath and just beyond it, it may be kept white and clean during the life of the coat. It would not interfere with the principle of invisibility.

The cut of our present field coat seems to be all that can be asked, except that a standing collar would be better.

*Overcoats, Rain coats, Capes, Etc.*—For ordinary protection the coat is sufficient; for extra exposure an extra garment is needed. This should be of a single uniform type and color. Now we have the overcoat the hood and a variety of vaguely specified rain coats, capes and ponchos.

To protect against extreme cold, a fur-lined coat, special cap and shoes, appear sufficient. These would only be needed under exceptional circumstances and would not disguise the uniform as the present loose requirements of capes, etc., may do.

Against rain and snow nothing is better than a mackintosh, and with warm clothing underneath, it is as good or better than an overcoat against cold, especially cold winds. To enable officers and men to use their hands freely, and at the same time be protected, the Inverness cut of garment with a rather long cape would seem to be the best.

The collar should be standing to show the insignia for organization. Insignia of rank should appear on the shoulder. Then all hoods, capes, ponchos and woolen overcoats should be forbidden.

#### DRESS OR GARRISON UNIFORM.

With the possible exception of hat and shoes, the garrison uniform for an enlisted man should be exactly the same as the field uniform. He should be ready to take the field at a moment's notice. The same thing applies in a slightly less degree to the commissioned officer.

If the field cap above mentioned cannot be made smart and neat looking, a garrison cap would be desirable, and lighter shoes should be permitted in garrison. The use of the latter, however, should not be continuous. The marching shoe should always be worn on duty under arms, both to insure its readiness and to accustom the feet to its use.

The economy that results from using new suits in garrison and worn ones for fatigue and field is a matter of importance,

dictating that there should be no difference between garrison and field clothing.

#### FULL DRESS.

At present we have for commissioned officers a full-dress coat and a dress coat, with trousers and breeches common to both. The enlisted men have a dress uniform with trimmings added to make it full dress. All these are totally different in shape and color from the service uniforms. The objection to this is that when worn somewhat, but still serviceable, all these garments must be thrown away. They are all much more expensive than the field uniform, and their value does not seem commensurate with the cost to the government. If the color of the field uniform be judiciously selected, and it be well cut, a new suit will be a very satisfactory garrison and dress uniform for both enlisted men and officers. For full dress, the former can, as now, add a few removable trimmings, and the latter can, if desirable, retain a special full-dress uniform. There appears to be no reason, however, for the full dress and field uniforms being of different colors.

It may be said that sentiment should cause the retention of the blue. This would be true if blue were used throughout; but it would be a crime to require our men to make blue targets of themselves in the field, and if the time comes that the olive-drab, or something like it, is the emblem of field-service and the blue of fireside duty at the Capital, there will not be much left in the sentiment part of the matter. Therefore, let us select one color reasonably quiet in tone for concealment and at the same time suitable for those occasions when full dress is appropriate.

At this juncture it would seem proper to inquire why have full dress at all? In ancient days, a gorgeously caparisoned chief added to his prestige by his clothes, and the terrors of a cavalry charge were doubtless added to by glittering helmets and streaming plumes, but the day of all this is past. To-day, a Russian prince, in his gorgeous uniform, gratifies the eyes of his peasant slaves, and it may also help to keep them in subjection. Our military dress is in many striking respects a sort of copy of his, but it has no similar use, and is in that particular absurd and un-American.

There is, however, a valid reason for a full-dress uniform in our army. This is exemplified by the fact that the entire army wants it. It is due to a very natural and proper cause.

The desire to be distinguished and to appear so is one of the mainsprings of human progress, and especially worthy of consideration in an army. Our simple American life is not opposed to this. Witness the gorgeous habiliments of the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Boston, the Old Guard of New York, and the flowing plumes and regalia of our Sir Knights, and of the Omnipotent Outside Guards, and other dignitaries of our alleged semimilitary secret and benevolent societies. It shows a strong characteristic of human nature, of which we may well take advantage.

A handsome uniform, suitably varied for the different organizations of our army, will attract better men to the service, and add very materially to the improvement that comes from added *esprit de corps*. It should be adapted, however, to the attraction of the right kind of people. A flamboyant uniform will attract flamboyant persons. This might be proper for cavalry sergeants and light-artillery gunners, where dash and "hurrah" are needed, but not for the general commissioned personnel where intelligence is the most valuable asset. Our full dress now is rather gorgeously golden. Its brilliant primary colors, too, are not pleasing to the discriminating eye. These were once necessary in campaign, but at present one can tell an infantry officer from a signal corps man four times as far in a ballroom as in the field.

A uniform, quiet in tone, of fine texture and neat cut, only moderately gilded, with stripes and facings reduced in width or tone, would be much more attractive to men of the qualities desired in our officers than is our present paraphernalia.

The double-breasted-high-standing-collar idea may once have been all right in the phalanx, and may still look military and make for discipline. But the present use of our full dress, viz.: ceremonies under arms and official-social duties, mostly in hot weather or superheated buildings, points to something less garish and more comfortable.

The present attempt at social comfort reached by putting shoulder knots and brass buttons on that most unmilitary looking of all garments, the civilian "swallow-tail," appears to the writer as a rather incompatible combination. It is suggested that for this purpose a simple band of the color of the arm of the service to which the wearer belongs, worn diagonally across the shirt front, would give a more appropriate military touch to the evening dress. The insignia of rank

could be worn upon it, and if the individual has won a medal of honor, he should be permitted to wear it suspended on the shirt front. This should not be extended to any other decoration. In this connection it does not seem to be good American taste to authorize decorations pertaining to various societies be shown on army full dress. The authorized decorations should be limited to those the individual has won himself and which have been given him through authority of Congress. An army is naturally not a democratic institution, but ours must not only be democratic but must appear so, and decorations due to the deeds of our ancestors, while appropriate in their place, do not seem to be suitable on a United States Army uniform.

To return to the subject of full dress, a comfortable coat that will look military is hard to provide for. The inspiration of its military appearance must naturally come from history, as with our present coat, or from recent events as it would be if we adopted the color or cut of our present field coat. A natural source of inspiration would be our Continental uniform, but while this would do for the coat, and possibly the hat, it would not look well unless the knee-breeches went with it, and this would not be in keeping with modern clothing. An objection to the shape of our present coat is that, while it may look well on thin men, it is not graceful on oval shapes, and many of our senior officers, who probably wear full dress more than the younger men, have rotund figures; and our plain, continuous belt line is not much of a success in such cases. The Continental coat breaks up this line very effectively and if a modification of it could be made that would go with modern head-gear and trousers, it would be satisfactory. It would also be comfortable.

Perhaps the wisest plan is not to go to history at all, but to devise a uniform from fundamental principles, just as we have the field outfit discussed above. Let us try it.

*Color.*—Assuming that a suitable color can be found for the field uniform that will go with the supposedly necessary decorations of full dress, it should certainly be adopted. Failing this, a white uniform is suggested. Our present white summer uniform with no glaring facings is certainly the handsomest uniform our army has ever had. A white serge of similar cut, with suitable insignia in gold and silver, would be attractive to a better grade of beauty and brains than our



present crude gorgeousness and would be both comfortable and military. It could be furnished with some mild form of epaulet, or shoulder knots, that would "square-up" the shoulders, and for rain or extra warmth, a blue, or "service" cap lined with white, or with the present "facings," could be provided. (Flamboyant colors are appropriate for linings.) This would make a suitable and attractive full dress, except that white breeches might not be suitable for horseback duty. These could probably be of the field-uniform color and pattern. Indeed, with the present full dress, the service breeches would go better on horseback than the present bright stripes disappearing into leggings or boots. Dark coats with light breeches are quite conventional and suitable riding clothes.

White full dress might appear expensive on account of its soiling easily. This is true, but full dress will not be worn much where it is likely to get soiled and serge or other material of good quality can be readily cleaned. However, the full dress is so expensive and comparatively unimportant that not less than three years' notice should be given of a contemplated change.

Once adopted, it would be a matter of great value to the Government if the use of its uniforms could be strictly limited to the United States Army. The distinction of wearing an army uniform of any kind undoubtedly brings to the service much better men than could possibly be expected from the present pay, and if the distinction were rigorously guarded, it would improve the personnel more than would the addition of a million dollars annually to the schedule of pay. The wearing of imitations of the army uniform by motormen, bell-boys, etc., requires the United States to add vast sums to its annual expenditures to get the same grade of military personnel that it would get for the lesser expenditure were the uniform exclusive.


Then, too, the uniform of the commissioned officer is frequently used by swindlers, and stolen army clothing is a staple in second-hand shops near military posts. For these reasons it would add to the welfare of the country if the wearing by anyone not in the army of the United States of any part of the uniform, or of any imitation of it sufficiently like it to be mistaken for it were made a misdemeanor.

This would prohibit its use by the National Guard and the question arises as to how to properly uniform them. This the



writer would answer by not uniforming them at all, for the reason that in his judgment the maintenance of separate armies by the States of this country is a relic of ancient days and can never be anything but a farce. If we need reserves, or home guards, or anything of that sort, they should pertain to the United States and be uniformed accordingly. The staff of seventy political "colonels," for instance, that is said to now grace the cortège of one of our State governors, would not be very useful as a "war measure," and the cost of their misleading uniforms could be much better invested in something else. This, however, is a subject beyond the limits of this article and will be treated in a subsequent paper.





GUARD IN FRONT OF CATHEDRAL, MOSCOW.

## A VISIT TO THE RUSSIAN TRAINING CAMP AT MOSCOW.

BY CAPTAIN D. W. C. FALLS, ADJUTANT  
SEVENTH REGIMENT, NATIONAL GUARD, N. Y.



RUSSIA is a country of great sameness. As you ride along the railway, every small town you pass looks exactly like all the other small towns. The village church, with its five gilt domes, is a counterpart of the last fifty you have seen, and of the next fifty you are going to see, as your journey continues. Even the people resemble each other strikingly, and the moujics, with their long light hair, full beards, red calico shirts and high boots, look the same, whether you see them on crossing the German frontier or on the log rafts of the lower Volga.

With this state of affairs in civil life, it can easily be seen how it would affect the military world, where uniformity is one of the requisites of a soldier's education. A description, therefore, of the camp of any battalion, squadron or battery in the Russian Army, will do for any other battalion, squadron or battery; and in going over the great mobilization camp at Moscow (except in point of size), you are seeing every other mobilization camp in Russia.

When the reverses in the East made it necessary to prepare more troops for the service at the seat of war, the Govern-

ment mobilized a sufficient number of reservists and conscripts to form what was to be known as the Second Manchurian Army. The headquarters were at Moscow, and here were assembled some sixty thousand raw troops, in addition to the already large garrison of that city. As it was summer, the regular garrison had been moved out of their winter barracks into a training camp near by. The new levies, as they came in, were taken to these unoccupied barracks, and there were fitted out and instructed, until ready to join the troops in camp. This grew daily, until, about the middle of July, there were at least eighty thousand men under canvas, within a few miles of the city.

To visit this vast encampment it was necessary to have the permission of the military governor of Moscow, also a driver of



CONSCRIPTS.

some intelligence for your droshky who knew his way about. The average driver of the street droshky could soon be lost in this vast canvas city, and would be getting himself and his passengers into all kinds of trouble by doing things that are not allowed. Having procured both these necessities—the former from the Grand Duke Sergius, recently assassinated, and the latter from the obliging porter of the hotel—we started upon our tour of inspection. A drive of two miles or so brought us outside the city and on the open plain used by the garrison as a drill ground when quartered in barracks. It was here that the great *fête* was held, at the time of the coronation

of the present Czar, where so many people lost their lives in a panic which occurred at that time.

Here we get our first glimpse of soldiers, for there are two cavalry brigades and some field-artillery out for their morning's work. One brigade was of dragoons, the regular heavy cavalry of Russia, and the other, our interpreter told us, with almost bated breath, was composed of Cossacks. The modern Cossack, as far as looks are concerned, is an awful disappointment. We are accustomed to picture him, from what we have read in history and romance, as arrayed in flowing, brightly colored garments, a high hat of priceless fur upon his head, and armed to the teeth with a variety of weapons topped by a long, slender lance. He should have a fierce and glittering eye, enormous whiskers, and always ride at a dashing gallop. As for drill and discipline, they should be unknown to his ideas of soldiering. How true this may have been in the past I cannot say, but to-day he is very like the rest of the mounted troops of this great nation. To see a regiment, dressed in dirty white canvas blouses and caps, quietly executing fours right and left at a walk, under command of a very stout colonel, anything but at home on the back of a sedate pony, certainly shattered another of the picturesque ideals of the romance of war in Russia. Except those of the Imperial Guard, who, on gala occasions are arrayed in their historic uniforms, the Cossack now dresses like the rest of the cavalry of the line. They still carry the lance, and in full dress their trousers are a trifle more baggy and the stripe much wider than those of the ordinary dragoon. Also, they never wear spurs. This is one of the incongruous things about the Russian service. Here are troops that are supposed to be continually in the saddle who never wear a spur, while in every other branch of the service, all officers of the rank of captain (who are supposed to be mounted) or over, never move without a large pair of them jingling at their heels. You will see a stout officer of the railroad regiment acting as station-master, who has probably never been on a horse in his life, arrayed in them, or an officer of marines clinking down the stone steps of the Admiralty. The troopers use the Cossack saddle with the high pad on the seat, which gives them the appearance, with their extremely short stirrups, of being anything but comfortable or secure on the backs of their mounts. However, they do some hard riding in this way, and are much more at home on their horses

than their officers. The latter use the ordinary English saddle, and nothing we saw that day in any way changed our opinions that the average Russian officer, as a rider, is a very much overrated individual. The horses are small, but looked tough and wiry. Their coats and equipments were in anything but good order, and the Cossacks themselves looked much better at a distance. The day was warm, and when they passed close to us, with the wind blowing in our direction, we were glad that the movement was being done at a gallop. The dragoons had larger horses, European saddles, and were equipped with rifles instead of lances, and were having a much more lively drill, with some particularly exciting charges.



DRAGOONS.

We drove on across the plain and passed a large building surrounded by a pretty grove and garden, and used by the officers as a casino and club. Here some regimental band plays every evening, and many entertainments are given. We soon arrived at the camp, and finding that we were at that part occupied by the First Moscow Grenadier Division, decided to make our first stop here. We were received most courteously by the division commander who welcomed us in excellent English, and after the usual glass of vodka and a cigarette, an officer was detailed to show us about. What I said at the beginning of this article applies here, and a description of more than the camp of the first battalion we visited would simply be a repetition.


The tents were pitched among a low growth of trees that added much to the appearance, but were not high, nor thick enough to keep out the sunlight necessary for all camps of large bodies of troops. The company streets, broad paths around the camp and in front of the officer's quarters, were free from grass, the earth rolled hard and carefully and neatly kept. In fact, they were the only things in the whole camp that seemed to come under these conditions. On approaching the camp, we were first attracted to a small shed standing well out in front of the first row of tents; an armed sentry stood at each side, and underneath were piled the drums of



OFFICER OF INFANTRY.

the battalion with the colors resting upon them. Here, also, on certain feast days, is displayed the sacred icon of the regiment, of which I will speak later on. At each end of every company street are stationed sentries, or rather orderlies, as they carry no arms, and they are responsible for the condition of the street. The tents are about fifteen feet square, and are supported by a long pole in the center and four small ones at each corner. In a permanent camp they are raised about four feet from the ground on logs or boards banked with earth, and are occupied by eight men. Around the center pole are racks for the arms and equipments. In the field, the tents are pitched directly on the ground, and then provide shelter for sixteen men. The average Russian is a large man, and the space allowed him on field service—6 feet by 2 feet—must in some cases be pretty well filled up.

The Russians hate fresh air for ventilating purposes, and even in the hottest weather will keep the double windows of their houses closed, while at the first sign of approaching winter every crack is hermetically sealed, and it so remains until the following spring. With a tent it is difficult to do this; still the soldiers manage, by banking the sides with earth and having a double fly over the entrance, to exclude a great deal of the good air necessary to properly ventilate the interior. A visit to six or eight showed them all to be in the same condition, and as the atmosphere was anything but agreeable, further inspection was confined to the exterior only. In all



those tents visited (selected at random) the same state seemed to exist. No attempt was made to keep things in an orderly manner; blankets seemed to be left exactly as the men had rolled out of them several hours before, and equipments and other property to be kept where and in the condition it suited the owner. Such a thing as dressing a tent under orders in a uniform manner and preparing it for inspection seemed to be as unknown as raising the sides to dry it out, or putting the blankets and clothing in the sun for an airing. These points of camp regulations which we consider a necessity seemed to be entirely at the option of the occupants.

One thing, however, there was uniformity about, and that



was the sacred icon. Every tent had at least one of these hung upon its canvas wall. It was generally that of the patron saint of the regiment, though many of the men had the icon of a special saint suspended over their sleeping places. These icons were small, cheap affairs, but many regiments have large and very beautiful ones that are displayed and carried by them on certain occasions. The icon plays a most important part in the religion of Russia, and troops will follow a regimental icon into battle with enthusiasm, under conditions that would make it impossible to get them to fight in any other way.

Until I visited Turkey and the Balkan States. I always supposed that the popular abiding place of the wicked flea



INFANTRY.

was equally divided between Italy and Spain, but am now convinced that the entire population of this order, from all these countries, were visiting their numerous relations in Russia last summer, and had selected the different mobilization camps as places for a pleasant outing during the warm weather. I cannot say that I actually saw any, but they certainly made their presence felt after visiting the interior of any of the tents or quarters.

Back of the tents are the officers' quarters. They live in small houses of four rooms each; subalterns are quartered two in a room, captains have a room to themselves, field-officers two rooms each and the regimental commander an entire house. There are also a headquarter building, adjutant's

office, etc., and a regimental mess building, on the same line. At the latter all the officers take their meals. On the next line are the storehouse, kitchen and mess shed; in the former are kept all quartermaster's stores and the dress uniforms of the men in time of peace. They are not allowed to keep them in their tents, but the uniforms are issued when the occasion demands, and are afterward returned. Dress uniforms have been discontinued for the time being, the troops bringing into camp only their field outfits, and the storehouses are now filled with war material to be issued later on when the troops leave



RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.


for the front. The kitchens are small, not at all clean, and as the bill of fare of a common soldier has little variety, the cooking arrangements are very simple—an oven for baking, and large pots for boiling soup, meat or coffee, being the principal equipment. Little of the latter article is drunk, however, the men preferring tea, to brew which, at all times, every company has a samovar of its own.

On account of so much bad weather each battalion generally has a mess shed for shelter. This is furnished with rough seats and tables, and the men go there to eat after receiving

their rations individually at the cook-house. There is no attempt at any messing together of the men, to procure luxuries, as is done in almost every other army; the Russian is more than contented with his bowl of soup, portion of boiled buckwheat and black bread, if there is only enough of it. This probably is much better than he ever had at home. There is sometimes a canteen attached to a regiment, but they are not much of a success. A private soldier, receiving only about six rubles (\$3) a year, has little money to spend, and if he has, prefers to do so outside of camp when he can procure his beloved vodka.

In rear of the camp are stables for officers' horses, wash-house for clothes (little used) and the inevitable hot baths. A Russian is a queer combination in his ideas of personal cleanliness; he will go for a week or more without undressing, or

## CAMP OF A SQUADRON OF CAVALRY.



SKETCH B

washing his hands or face, and then a sudden desire for a bath overtakes him. It must be a hot one, and he will sit for half an hour submerged to the chin in water that would peel the skin off an ordinary person from any other country. Arising almost as red as a boiled lobster, he arrays himself again in the same dirty clothes and walks out into the cold air perfectly satisfied. That they do this in the most severe winter weather, without taking cold from the sudden change of temperature, proves what a hardy race of people they are. The habits of his early life follow a soldier into the army, and every battalion must be provided with a bath-house. This is arranged with a small room for officers, and a large one for the enlisted men. Here are boilers for the heating of water, and large tubs for the bath itself. On entering, the room is full of steam, and I should not care to venture a guess as to the height of the thermometer. Around the room are rows of tubs, each one

with a smiling yellow head rising from it. During the rush hours the men go outside to dress, so as to make room for those waiting, and the newcomer does not always think it necessary to put fresh water in the tub, provided its former occupant has left it hot enough.

This finished the inspection of our first camp, and further investigation in other regiments and different branches of the service revealed nothing new or novel. With the cavalry and artillery there was a little different arrangement of tents (sketch B) to allow for the picket lines and the parks of the guns and battery wagons; the general plan, other than that, was substantially the same. The hospital arrangements are not shown to strangers, but I was assured by many officers that the average health of the troops was excellent. They certainly appeared so, for, in spite of the lack of ventilation, the disorder in which they live, and the pleasure they get in almost boiling the life out of themselves, they were a remarkably fine, healthy looking lot of human beings.



## FRENCH VIEWS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY IN COMBAT.\*

FROM THE QUARTERLY GERMAN GREAT GENERAL STAFF.

(FOURTH ISSUE, 1904.)

TRANSLATED FOR THE SECOND DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF, U. S. A.

BY CAPTAIN C. W. FARBER, EIGHTH CAVALRY.



FOR September 4th a new condition was given. The North-party, in command of General Durand, embraced the Fourth Cavalry Division, the Sixth Brigade of Corps Cavalry, one battalion of infantry and the bicycle company. It was to cover the disembarkation of troops at Amagne, toward the south, where the opponent was reported on the Retourne River.

The South-party consisted of the Fifth Cavalry Division, the Second Brigade of Corps Cavalry, and the Eighty-fourth Brigade of Infantry (less one battalion) in command of General Mayniel. During the night of September 3d to 4th, this South-party was sheltered in the Retourne Valley, between La Chatelet and Juniville. On September 4th it was to seize the railroad junction Amagne, and was to prevent the disembarkation there taking place.

The North-party crossed the Aisne and established itself in readiness on the left bank, on a broad front, between a point in the country south of Bethel and Givry; sent reconnoitering detachments toward the enemy and awaited his approach.

The advance of the South-party was certainly not free from objections: the Fifth Cavalry Division originally intended to proceed to Givry via Annelles, to secure the crossing at that place, while the infantry was to engage from Juniville over Annelles, Ambly and Seuil. To this infantry column, however, had been attached only two squadrons, which proved not enough for the information and security duties. The infantry was repeatedly compelled to deploy. The cavalry division, as it struck several hostile squadrons marching without security, southeast of Ambly, allowed itself to be

\*Concluded from May number of the JOURNAL.

misled in bringing its artillery fire to bear on these squadrons, instead of charging them by surprise. Thus it disclosed its presence and intention and found the crossing at Givry occupied in time by hostile wheelmen, whereas, originally, up to 9.30 A. M., only one cavalry post had been stationed there.

In this way it happened that the cavalry held itself behind the infantry, and left to the latter the solution of the problem, without an earnest effort on its part to make a flank movement, or by any action of its own to co-operate with the infantry, while it, the infantry, forced the passage of the Aisne at Ambly. By the time the infantry succeeded in this, it had arrived, to within several kilometers, near the disembarking point, Amagne, and thereby immediately threatened that place. The cavalry division was therefore entirely superfluous.

The North-party offered but slight resistance on the left bank to the advance of the infantry and soon withdrew to the right bank, where, from behind a water-course flowing close to Amagne, it intended to delay the deployment of the opponent when he reached the right bank.

Before the division got fairly to work in the solution of its problem, the combat was broken off, because the Minister of War, who was present, desired to have a parade and after that gave a breakfast.

One can also hardly agree with the proceedings of the North-party. Just how far it extended itself in its first position on the south bank, and how it distributed its strength, is not clearly to be seen in the reports. Even if it held its main body together (which, in fact, was the case at Seuil) it would seem that a prolonged resistance, with the river at its back, was precluded.

If desired to solve this problem defensively, the detachments of cavalry, which held the crossings of the Aisne, and which could have been replaced by the infantry and the wheelmen, would have sufficed to obtain the information of the direction of approach of the hostile squadrons, while the main body should have found a position on the right bank, in order to dispute the passage of the opponent. If one felt strong enough, or, if the railroad station at Amagne could be reached from the left bank by artillery fire, it would have been quite proper to cross to the left bank after occupying the crossings, though not to establish oneself close to the river at Seuil, but to move against the adversary.

Cavalry came more to the foreground on September 5th, the last day of practice of this part.

The North-party, in command of General Durand, was made up of the Fourth Cavalry Division, the Sixth Brigade of Corps Cavalry, the 151st Regiment of Infantry and the bicycle company. In the act of pursuing a retiring adversary it arrived at the River Aisne, between Rethel and Thugny, on the evening of the 4th, and on the 5th of September was to continue the pursuit and to prevent the hostile column from crossing the River Retourne.

The South-party, the Fifth Cavalry Division, the Second Brigade of Corps Cavalry and the 162d Regiment of Infantry, in command of General Mayniel, had orders to cover the retreat of two army corps, moving in a southern direction and to guard their crossing the River Retourne by maintaining itself on the heights of Perthes and Annelles. The passage of the army corps, between Juniville and Le Chatelet, was to begin at 7 A. M. and be completed by 10 A. M.

To carry out his instructions, General Mayniel occupied the north edge of the pieces of woods on both sides of Perthes, with the 162d Regiment of Infantry and the Second Brigade of Corps Cavalry and placed the Fifth Cavalry Division in readiness northeast of Perthes. Here it was charged by the Fourth Cavalry Division. The charge shaped itself favorably for the Fourth Cavalry Division, because its two batteries were efficiently engaged and because the bicycle company succeeded by an opportune movement to reach the flank of the opponent, and at a distance of 800 meters to develop an effective fire.

Retreat and pursuit were thereupon continued; another attack followed, after which the exercise was terminated.

In general, as far as the proceedings show from the reports, it would seem that things were conducted more satisfactorily on this day. Here cavalry charges were in order. The cavalry of the retreating party had to get rid of the pursuing party under all circumstances. Nothing is said of the action of the infantry.

The first part of the exercises, infantry and cavalry combined, was herewith concluded. The two following days, September 6th and 7th, were devoted to drills in the locality west of Rethel. One division drilled each day, alternating with the other, which had a day of rest. The principal pur-



pose was to test the most adaptable and appropriate formations to be employed under fire.

A regiment of cavalry, the machine guns and the artillery, composed the represented enemy. The regiment was employed to represent, with the help of flags, a large number of squadrons, which were to dismount to fight on foot and represent infantry. The entire represented enemy was established on a height with instructions to open fire with every squadron or each subdivision, also with artillery and machine guns, on every body of troops that became visible within 2000 meters and to cease firing as soon as the object was withdrawn from sight. The leader of each represented squadron was required, at the conclusion of the exercises, during the discussion, to report on the formation of the troops upon whom he fired and on the respective distances.

In opposition to this it was the problem of the cavalry division to advance against the enemy in bounds and during the movement to use such fighting formations most suitable to the ground, the hostile fire and the distance, that is, in single rank lines, lines in column of fours, yet to be discussed, squadron columns in echelon, and similar formations.

During this practice were included exercises in the charge, in the *melée*, assembling and pursuit. Above all there was to be brought out the necessity in the pursuit, to get in hand quickly, subdivisions formed in close order, while the represented enemy suddenly appeared on a flank.

For the third part of the exercises, which took place on September 8th, 9th and 10th, two parties were again formed.

On September 8th, General Mayniel, with the Fifth Cavalry Division and the Second Brigade of Corps Cavalry, was to hold open the crossings of the Aisne at Balham and Asfeld-la-Ville, for two army corps following from the south. The opponent was reported at Chaumont-Porcien.

General Durand (Fifth Cavalry Division and Sixth Brigade of Corps Cavalry), at Chaumont-Porcien, had to attack a hostile cavalry division which was protecting the crossings in the region of Asfeld-la-Ville and was to delay the passage of the troops following.

General Mayniel, with parts of the brigade of corps cavalry, occupied favorable intrenchments southwest of St. Fergeaux and placed himself behind it in readiness. His opponent, as soon as he was informed of this position, attempted to go around

the left wing of General Mayniel, with a view of forcing him away from the crossings he had to protect. In front, he kept him busy by a combat on foot, and on the flank attacked him from the direction of Bannogne. Here a charge was made.

The 9th of September was used for a thoroughly peculiar exercise.

According to the war situation, a west army, on September 8th, had reached as far as the heights of La Selve, west of the River Barre, and contemplated to rest on September 9th. The Fifth Cavalry Division was to undertake the covering of the army toward the east and bivouacked in the region of Bannogne, securing the army with the Third Brigade of Dragoons, which was pushed forward to the St. Fergeux Brook. This brigade occupied the crossings from Seraincourt southward to the mouth of the brook, established itself for defense and was to maintain this position in the event of an attack.

Opposed to this, the hostile Fourth Cavalry Division bivouacked in the region of Sery and secured itself by occupying the crossings of the River Vaux.

The design of the director of the exercises was to test those measures of security that were prepared at the various billeting places and at the intrenched posts thrown forward.

During the day both parties remained in their immediate camps and quarters. At the instigation of, and in presence of the director, operations against the crossings by single and by combined squadrons took place in the forenoon. In the afternoon a larger operation by the Fifth Cavalry Division, by the way of Seraicourt and Son, against the crossing at Mauteville, was undertaken. As soon as this movement became known, the Fourth Division continued to occupy the Vaux crossings and turned the main body against the Fifth Cavalry Division. At this moment the exercise was discontinued on account of the bad weather.

On September 10th the assembled Fifth Cavalry Division, east of Le Thour, was given the problem to destroy the railroad between Amagne and Hirson. Hostile cavalry in force was reported at Inaumont and Hauteville.

The opponent was a cavalry corps formed by the Fourth Cavalry Division and a division made up of the two brigades of corps cavalry (five regiments) in command of General Durand, and at 6 o'clock in the morning stood assembled in

the neighborhood of Inaumont on the Vaux. Here the leader received information of the presence of a hostile cavalry division at Le Thour, which contemplated the destruction of the railroad between Amagne and Hirson.

The Fifth Cavalry Division advanced from Le Thour via Ecly and Sorbon to carry out the destruction at Novy, but while on the march received the intelligence that a hostile cavalry corps, between Hauteville and Inaumont, was threatening its flank.

As a matter of fact the cavalry corps moved in two columns toward Arnicourt, from which place it intended to thrust itself against the flank of the adversary at Sorbon. The enemy was met at this point. The composite division attacked him from the front and on the left flank, while the Fourth Cavalry Division was to fall on him in rear. The attack of the composite division, however, was made too precipitately out of Arnicourt, as soon as it became aware that the artillery of the Fifth Cavalry Division had been placed in position at Sorbon to protect its flank. The attack, as developed from the column, in the echelon like manner, on account of the way Arnicourt was hurriedly rushed through, would most probably have failed before the Fourth Cavalry Division could have become engaged. Before the combat reached the final stage, the exercise was broken off.

According to the views of the director, the Fifth Cavalry Division would have best accomplished its object as follows: It should have united all the sappers of the division (in each squadron there are ten men especially trained in field-sapper duties) and sent them to the left bank of the Aisne, about as far as Thugny, where they could cross the river and undertake the destruction of the railroad. Most remarkably, nothing was said of the employment of the pioneer detachment. While this was going on the division should have been stationed on the left bank of the Flumion and Vaux, as a protection to the work of destruction, and should have occupied the crossings. In any case, the success of such an operation primarily depended on the condition, that it must be executed quickly and kept from the knowledge of the enemy as far as possible.

The director does not seem to have mentioned the principal difficulty, which consisted in ability to cross the Vaux and Flumion in the face of a superior enemy, and to take a position on the left banks of those rivers.

The exercises were herewith concluded.

The views of the director and the particular purposes that he pursued, in the design and execution of the exercises, are clearly apparent from his maneuver regulations and criticisms, as far as they became known through the press.

In his previously issued maneuver regulations, indeed many of the literary ideas, heretofore discussed, turn up again. It is nevertheless deemed appropriate to repeat his directions in a coherent manner.

In the first place, he dwelled on the purpose that the exercises should serve in testing those formations and movements which are the most suitable and adaptable within the limit of the enemy's fire.

Only by great celerity of movement, skilful use of the ground and adapting the formations according to each varying condition, is it possible for cavalry to maintain itself against the long range and fire rapidity of modern weapons.

The only gait at which even small cavalry detachments can pass over coverless ground, under hostile fire, is the extended gallop. Under cover, horses should be allowed to recover breath and order re-established.

Massed formations are absolutely excluded within the hostile fire.

The regimental column, the brigade in brigade column and in regimental columns are only formations of assembly, which may yet be employed in movements on the battle-field outside of the hostile fire zone, but within the limit of hostile artillery, would lead to the immediate destruction of the troops. Squadron columns are only employable beyond 1500 meters, though even then it is strongly recommended to place them in echelon, whereby they would be subjected to less loss and are more manageable for employment.

For smaller units, General Poulleau recommends the regular form of "line in column of fours," which corresponds to the well-known "line of section in fours" of infantry. This is a company column separated into sections, in which the various subdivisions are formed as sections and march abreast of each other with an interval of six paces or more.

This formation can also be assumed by the various companies, within the wide, deep and double column of the battalion, instead of the company column. In the deployment of the battalion for combat, it is recommended that the line

of sections in fours be used in the advance up to 1200 meters of the enemy.

In the squadron, according to the drill regulations, by the simultaneous breaking into columns of fours from line by each subdivision, the line in columns of fours is formed when difficult, broken ground is to be traversed. Lately there is a disposition, as has become known otherwise, to employ this formation for movements within the limit of hostile fire.

According to Poulleau's views, one can only use the line, preferably in single rank, within 1500 meters. It is recommended, in order to disperse the hostile fire, to broaden the front as far as the regard for the demand to hold the troops in hand and to lead them will permit. The fire effect particularly involves the necessity that a cavalry command separate and deploy with such intervals and distances, that in the advance it may utilize the accidents of the ground and reduce the losses. Owing to the rapidity of its movements there should be no danger in this, as it can readily unite at any time for the purpose of making a charge.

Poulleau frames his demands thereto that the movements of cavalry within the limit of hostile fire consist in a series of bounds, made from cover to cover, at the most rapid gait, and in such formations as are most suitable under the circumstances, the nature of the ground and the effect of the enemy's fire and which will diminish the losses as much as possible. Larger bodies of cavalry could therefore advance in brigade, regimental, squadron and even platoon formations.

Of the rest of the exercise directions, there is only worthy of note that, Poulleau reiterates the general maneuver regulations, in which the charge of cavalry against cavalry must be stopped within a 100 meters of each other, whereas, in the mounted attacks against infantry or cavalry, the hostile lines must be ridden through so far as this can be done without danger. Otherwise the cavalry must draw off to the right and left, but under no circumstances after the attack is it allowed to halt in front of the hostile fire.

Moreover, the passing-through attacks were in the meantime abolished by a war ministerial decree in 1904, because their execution apparently met with great difficulties.

Verbally, General Poulleau expressed himself as follows: "Faster, only faster! Only by rapidity and flexible forms can cavalry fulfil its glorious mission in the future, in that,

while under hostile fire, it employs light formations, quickly changing to close order under cover and thus is always ready to pitch in."

Special stress was laid by General Poulleau on the practice of the *melée* (compare the report of September 6th and 7th). Theorists maintain, however, that it will seldom come to the actual charge, because, before that point is reached, one of the sides, under the influence of the other, will turn about. "I do not wish to offend you, gentlemen, by believing of you that you will turn. But you must not also take for granted that the German cavalry; or any other, is less brave than we are. Consequently, it will after all come to the charge, the *melée*, and the pursuit."

In his criticism he pointed, out as the principal task of cavalry, the protection, the complete security and the support of its own infantry on one hand, and the action against hostile infantry on the other. The infantry must be sought, harassed without rest, delayed, forced to deploy and by often repeated sharp engagements, whether with the carbine or mounted, cause it to become nervous and exhausted.

In regard to hostile cavalry, it must be gotten rid of when met; but this is only a means, not the end. If it is not met with, all the better, in that case the other side did not do its duty and left the field free to us.

Poulleau then turned to the reproach of particularism, ascribed to the French cavalry, which is specially noticeable in the accounts of the great army maneuvers and seems to be justified. It is contended that during maneuvers cavalry is completely under the spell of the hostile cavalry and only exerts itself to seek that and to charge it, instead of turning to the main issue, to wit: to disburden its own infantry, and to gather information about, and to harass the enemy's infantry.

One continually sees the same picture during a maneuver; after the two cavalries have charged each other, they dismount and believe that they have accomplished their parts.

One cannot interpose here too much; time and again cavalry had to be reminded that it exists on account of the infantry. In a forward movement, it is the duty of the cavalry to seek the advanced parties of the hostile infantry columns and to delay them. But this is to be attempted in a manner suitable to the conditions. To engage the flanks of the in-



fantry column is useless, as the flanks are constantly ready to fire without having to deploy. Even an attack on the rear of a column compels the subdivisions only to form front, but does not stop the column.

What important duties do not fall to the lot of cavalry in a retreat and the pursuit? Then it must sacrifice itself for the infantry and cover its withdrawal, or must reach the flanks or rear of the retreating hostile infantry columns.

The innovation of the director to have an infantry brigade to participate in the first part of the exercises was very commendable. General Poulleau thereby carried out the object to accustom cavalry to act in common with infantry, also to show, as an object lesson, that cavalry is principally intended to support infantry. It was also to be particularly impressed that, if cavalry is to assert itself under the various conditions of combat against modern weapons, it must understand how to handle the carbine as well as the saber.

What purpose the director followed on the single days, with reference to the combined action of infantry and cavalry, is remarked by him in the following:

"On the first day, cavalry was to have supported the action of infantry; on the second day, it had to attack infantry; on the third day, it had to act in common with infantry, and on the fourth day, to cover its retreat. The exercises have shown that cavalry has yet very much to learn in order to act appropriately in accordance with the varying conditions.

"This verdict is confirmed by the course of the exercises just discussed, and by other sources of information. The military professional press particularly remarks that, 'the importance of the combat on foot, has in no wise yet entered into the spirit of the cavalry. Instead of taking to the carbine, at the proper time and place, it pleased the cavalry to constantly make charges, which often caused wholly useless sacrifices. Wherever it struck the enemy, it invariably charged him, immaterially, whether he was cavalry, infantry or bicycle men.'"

Concerning the experiences with "line in column of fours," no further accounts are given. General Durand who originally was an artilleryman, and later commanded an infantry brigade (in France generals are frequently transferred to other branches), and who expressed himself from an artilleryman's point of view, was also in favor of small columns. If they



move rapidly and skilfully over the ground, frequently changing direction to the right and left, it becomes very difficult for artillery to fire upon them with effect.

Of the leaders of the cavalry divisions, it is remarked that, just as in 1902, they stuck too closely to their troops, and on the march, were mostly found fifty meters in front of the main body. But whenever they rode forward to reconnoiter they appeared with their entire staffs and division flags, on top of the heights, discernible from afar.

The horses, we are told, generally presented an excellent appearance. It seems, however, that the squadrons only turned out in small strength, and to have left a number of horses behind in quarters.

Concerning the employment of the bicycle company, the detachment of pioneers and the machine guns, the following became known:

The bicycle company is praised very much, and as gleaned from the reports of the operations, appears to have repeatedly done most efficient services. Their leader was the well-known Captain (now Major) Gerard, the tireless champion for the necessity of organizing permanent bicycle companies. It was regretted that only one bicycle company was ordered to participate in the maneuvers, although four such companies already existed at that time.

Once, during an engagement, while the wheelmen were waiting on ground from which their view was shut off, and having left their wheels behind them, they were surprised by a half squadron of dragoons. These came upon the rear of the wheelmen and cut them off from their wheels. The spirited wheelmen, however, struck at the horses' heads with the butts of their rifles to disperse the riders, the latter were about to resort to their lances when the officers intervened.

Little use was made of the detachment of pioneers, ostensibly because it was not understood how to utilize them. For several years, regular efforts have been made at the large cavalry exercises to employ detachments of pioneers on wheels, without as yet having come to a definite conclusion.

The machine guns rendered valuable services. These, too, in France, are still in an experimental state with the rifle battalions, as well as with the cavalry divisions. In the rifle battalions, the portable machine guns are carried on mules and are intended for mountain warfare; those belonging to

the cavalry divisions are transported on wheels. It is known that in France the Hotchkiss system is being tried, but the model thus far experimented with, is, according to the military professional press, not yet considered completely serviceable for war purposes and requires improvement. It is, however, only a question of time before the defects yet in existence will be removed.

Experiments were also made with a bridge apparatus, with which the French cavalry, at this time, according to the budget, is not yet fitted out. The question treated of boats of steel, with which a bridge was constructed on which the men crossed, while the horses were made to swim alongside. Here the difficulty obtained that, though the horses took willingly to the water, they experienced much trouble in getting out on the other bank. To obviate this, a movable ramp was tried, though this increased the material and added weight to the outfit.

If one wishes to pronounce a grand verdict on the plan and execution of the maneuvers, one must acknowledge that General Poulleau knew how to frame the course in an interesting and many-sided manner. The great variations in the problems assigned the cavalry, the diversity of the conditions and the difference in the strength of the two parties on the single days, are worthy of remark.

From the extensive field of practice, assigned to the first two days' exercises, which, to be sure, fell through, to the closest contact with the infantry and the topically, sharply defined problems, the war conditions changed constantly.

The given problems were generally warlike in character. The often-repeated scant form of a particular order without sufficient foundation based on the alleged war condition is common in France.

The execution of the exercises proved materially more interesting on account of the free use of the variations of the ground, than when carried out on drill grounds.

The drawing upon the infantry for the four days was in itself a wise measure, even if the infantry did fail in its purpose on several occasions. The cavalry repeatedly stuck to its own infantry instead of using it only as a point of support for its own movements and as a reserve to fall back upon, but for the rest to retain freedom of movement. That several times it took the wrong course of procedure when it met hostile in-

fantry has been mentioned in the discussion of the single day's operations.

The cavalry did not always correctly grasp its relation to the infantry was partly due to the fact that, in most instances, the strength of the assigned infantry was in no reasonable proportion to the large mass of cavalry.

Under these circumstances infantry could serve well enough as a reserve for cavalry to fall back upon, but was utterly too weak to operate in common with it and to fight. If by drawing upon the infantry it was the intention of the director that the cavalry operations were to be conducted with a view to their main object, the support of the infantry, the latter branch should have been very much stronger.

Frequently the addition of infantry was neither justified on the ground of the general war conditions, nor on account of the particular problems of the cavalry.

For the summer of 1904, special cavalry exercises, on an enlarged scale, are again contemplated. The Second Cavalry Division (Luneville) and the Third Cavalry Division (Chalons) will be assembled in the district of the Sixth Army Corps, under the direction of the present President of the Cavalry Commission, General Burnez.

As the dates of these exercises partly coincide with the corps maneuvers of the Sixth Army Corps, General Burnez is supposed to have come to an agreement with the Commanding General of the Sixth Army Corps, General Dalstein, that all bodies of troops are to be united for the maneuvers on September 4th, 6th and 7th, between the rivers Marne and Meuse. At present, the limits of the Sixth Army Corps contain, besides three infantry divisions, also two cavalry divisions, the Fourth and Fifth, and a brigade of corps cavalry of three regiments. Altogether, in this manner, twenty-three regiments, that is about the fourth part of the whole French cavalry, will take part in the exercises.

It is to be assumed that this considerable body of cavalry will not only be employed in clearing up or intelligence duties, but that the attempt will also be made to effectively use it on the battle-field.

From all this will result that, in a future war, the French cavalry will be in its proper place on the battle-field and will seek to maintain its own. Nowhere did the views of General de Negrier prevail. At presumably suitable places, and even in

cavalry circles, they were abruptly declined. Now, as heretofore, it is the desire to have cavalry on the battle-field in readiness for a charge, even, though in altered form, taking to the carbine, when it cannot assert itself mounted. That naturally very much is yet to be done before French cavalry has grown up to its task, particularly with reference to combined action with infantry, has been proved in the foregoing discussions.

In comparison with the past, the horsemanship of the officers of the French cavalry is beginning to improve considerably, especially do those officers trained at the riding school at Saumur exhibit good work throughout. It may be accepted that this progress will also be gradually transmitted to the troops.

Extraordinarily much is being done in France to improve horse breeding. In 1902, according to the official report, 18,189,658 francs were expended in premiums and prizes of which the Government furnished 2,484,225 francs, the remainder was subscribed by the departments, cities and societies. The result is obvious; Government studs as well as private studs, are furnishing the army with horse-flesh, which, in number and quality, improves from year to year.

KUHL,

Major of the Great General Staff.

#### TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

This article is valuable, in that it shows just how far behind France is in the modern method of the employment of cavalry. They evidently still consider the "charge" as the very thing, giving but little value to the combat on foot, which really is the only fighting power of cavalry at this day. Though it seems that a ray of hope has penetrated the gloom, and that in future, according to the reports, French cavalry will do more fighting than playing the antiquated game of trying to ride down troops armed with to-day's exceedingly destructive weapons.

The new division into light and heavy cavalry was a forward step, which in time will be followed by abolishing the many kinds of regiments and uniforms, finally reducing that branch to one kind for business only.

It seems to me that they are still woefully in a state of backwardness, in face of all the teachings of our own Civil

War, the War of 1870 and the late Boer War. American cavalry would have been handled quite differently in the exercises herein described. General de Negrier's views are not so terribly far off as the French officers would have one believe.

The bicycle company is well spoken of. But its operations were probably limited to good roads and not cross-country service.

A perusal of this paper will probably call forth many different views all depending on the reader's ideas on the subject of cavalry.

C. W. FARBER,  
*Captain Eighth Cavalry.*



## MILITIA METHODS AT TELLURIDE.

BY LIEUTENANT G. DE GRASSE CATLIN, SECOND INFANTRY.



TEST case has lately come up before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado as to the right of the courts to interfere with acts of the military while in pursuance of their duties at the place and time of insurrection.

Charles H. Moyer, an official of the miners' union and a man of much influence among the strikers, was arrested and detained in Telluride by officers of the National Guard. They held that he was aiding and inciting certain persons to commit acts of lawlessness in that district.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus was made by Moyer to the State Supreme Court. The writ was issued and in obedience to it the commanding officer at Telluride, who was one of the respondents in the case, produced the prisoner in court.

Counsel for Moyer argued that he was being illegally restrained. They stated that martial law was not in force, that an act of the legislature was essential to make it so, and that even if such an act were not necessary, the governor had not declared martial law, and hence the arrest and detention of the petitioner was unlawful except by due course of law.

An answer was made to this by the attorney-general of the State for the respondents, Gen. Sherman Bell and Capt. Buckley Wells, of the National Guard.

The court rendered an opinion on June 6, 1904, to the effect that Moyer was lawfully arrested by the military authorities while the work of suppressing the insurrection was in progress, and that till this insurrection was suppressed his restraint was not illegal. The writ was discharged and the petitioner remanded to the custody of the military.

In connection with this case it may be of interest to consider briefly the methods employed by the Colorado militia in handling the insurrection in and around Telluride. And in so doing we will have an opportunity of observing the weakness of the troops while acting subordinate to the local authorities, compared to their efficiency when the officer in command was subject only to the orders of the executive of the State.

Telluride is in the Rocky Mountains, in the county of San Miguel, and is the source of supply and means of communication of some seventeen mines, mills and other places, which were influenced by conditions of lawlessness at the time under discussion. Many of these places are almost inaccessible. The distance from Telluride to one of the near-by mines is a little over three miles, the difference in elevation is 5000 feet. The only means of reaching the Tom Boy mine is by a tunnel from the mill, some three miles long. The Tom Boy Company owns a large lake which supplies its power and which is on the farther side of a very high mountain, about five miles from the mill. Four soldiers were sent to guard this place. It was reported that in case of a heavy snow-storm it would be impossible for them to leave until spring. The only way of traveling from this point in such weather is on snow-shoes and the combination of ice and precipices makes this a dangerous feat. The Liberty Bell mine is reached by a long aerial tramway. Supplies for both these mines are sent by mule train. The roads and trails leading to many other points are steep and narrow. Under unfavorable weather conditions those who make use of them do so at great risk.

On November 20, 1903, the governor of Colorado issued an order relative to the trouble in and near Telluride. This order stated that the sheriff of San Miguel, the commissioners appointed by the governor to investigate the troubles, and others, had reported that the county was in a state of lawlessness. Certain men had united for the purpose of resisting the laws and opposing their execution. These men were attempting to commit felonies, were intimidating persons and violating property rights. Moreover, the civil authorities were wholly unable to cope with the situation. The governor therefor directed that a portion of the National Guard be sent to San Miguel County to assist the sheriff in enforcing the laws and maintaining order. Gen. Sherman Bell, the adjutant-general of the State, issued an order, the same day, governing the details of the expedition.

The next morning two troops of cavalry, six companies of infantry and details from the signal and hospital corps, all commanded by Maj. Zeph T. Hill, left Denver. They reached Telluride on the 23d, were immediately divided into suitable detachments and sent to the various stations in the county. The commanding officer communicated with and controlled



the organizations at these different points by telephone or telegraph. He limited their actions to assisting the civil authorities.

Up to this time the sheriff of San Miguel had not had a sufficient force with which to preserve order in the county. He had closed up the gambling houses and dance halls which abounded in Telluride and was closing up the saloons as fast as he could. This last he took some time in doing, as it was not possible to keep those saloons, whose licenses were paid up, from selling without an order from the county commissioners. Such an order required a majority vote.

There were frequent assemblies of men on the streets and these were characterized by disorder. The police officers were often unable to handle these town features of the strike. Many of the mines and mills had been controlled by strikers. Murder, assaults and other serious crimes had been committed. Sometimes those clearly responsible for these offenses were acquitted by local juries which had no shadow of reason for giving such verdicts.

The presence of the militia allowed the sheriff to act. On the night of the 25th, his deputies arrested the secretary of the miners' union, and five other men upon capiases drawn by the assistant district-attorney. The next morning he arrested three men, one of whom was the president of the miners' union. These men were in communication with those apprehended the night before. On November 30th, thirty-eight men were gathered up by a force of deputies protected by the militia, and were brought before a justice of the peace and a police judge, on the charge of vagrancy. Twenty were discharged sixteen were fined twenty-five dollars each, two were fined thirty-five dollars each, and one five dollars and costs. The police judge suspended the fines until December 2d, with the proviso that those fined were to get to work, quit the town or be brought up again to work out their fines. This was done later in several cases, the men working on the streets guarded by soldiers and under the supervision of the street commissioner.

This "vagrancy" remedy applied in Telluride brought comparatively good results, and its effect extended into the outlying stations. On December 8th eighty-four men arrived to take the places of strikers in the mines and mills. Those who came spoke English, as most of the mine and mill owners

refused to re-employ Italians and Austrians. Contingents of new men continued to come in until some of the mines were working at their usual capacity.

There were frequent efforts made both by threats and persuasion on the parts of the strikers to keep the new hands from joining. Every day detachments of union men, at points just outside San Miguel County, boarded the trains bound for Telluride, and attempted to dissuade the "scabs" from continuing. It was reported that they had pickets on duty at the mountain passes leading from adjoining counties to the mines. These groups kept in touch with what was going on at both ends, and prevented fresh employees from using these roads in reaching the mines. On this account the authorities were glad to have the snow, for it rendered such trails impassable and left the railway and roads going to and from Telluride as the only means of entry and exit to the important points.

With matters as they were, under county control, difficulties arising from influences in other counties were hard to meet. While the sheriff of San Miguel, in maintaining order and preserving the peace, could make use of the arbitrary means and apply the harsh methods of the law of force within those limits in which the people had elected him to exercise the highest police power, yet he was as powerless to combat the evils which originated in the adjoining counties of Ouray, San Juan and Dolores as the governor of New York would be to deal with a strike in New Jersey. To settle this extended trouble it was essential that the strong hand of a common superior should be more directly felt; to whose control all the counties were equally amenable, and whose agents and instruments in establishing order should not be subordinate to an officer who was by law and custom unable to exercise authority except in a limited portion of the affected region.

On January 3, 1904, the governor of Colorado, in his capacity of commander-in-chief of the militia, issued General Order No. 1. This order rehearsed in several paragraphs the details concerning the past and present condition of San Miguel County. It noted the fact that a portion of the National Guard had been sent to aid the sheriff in the protection of persons and property, and said that owing to the limited power given to the military, the civil authorities were still unable to cope with the situation. It stated finally that a condition existed in the county bordering on absolute insurrection

and rebellion, and therefore directed the commanding officer of the forces there to use such means as he might deem right, acting in conjunction with, or independently of, the civil authorities, to restore peace in the community and enforce obedience to the laws.

On this authority Major Hill assumed full and complete control of the county and issued an order on the 3d to that effect, which was promulgated throughout. The next day another order was forthcoming directing all persons to bring whatever firearms they possessed to military headquarters, warning them not to congregate in crowds on the streets, and prohibiting their leaving their homes after 9 P. M., unless compelled by sickness or business to do so. Sentries patrolled the streets to see that this last part of the order was obeyed. The demonstrations on the streets, which had been of daily occurrence and in which the exasperation of the strikers toward the civil and military authorities had shown itself by provoking words and threatening gestures, were stopped immediately.

Wholesale arrests of disorderly characters, or those suspected of being such, were made, and enquiries into their records at once instituted. Many of those apprehended were promptly released as a result of these investigations. Those retained were the principal agitators and trouble makers of the community. In every case of retention the reasons for such action were duly noted and the names and addresses of those substantiating such reasons were carefully preserved.

On January 4th the commanding officer received authority from the governor either to deport agitators and other lawless persons, or file information against them. He used the first part of this authority only. All those apprehended and retained were taken by train to a point outside the limits of the county, turned loose and told not to return. This deportation plan eliminated largely the possibility of habeas corpus proceedings. Strict measures were taken to make it impossible for those deported to return. Outposts were established at stations near the county line and the members of these boarded all trains headed for Telluride, and ejected such persons as were recognized to have been deported.

The commanding officer established a censorship over the telegraph and telephone lines and forbade the sending of any news which might interfere with his plans. He prohibited further the despatching of any false or misleading statements.

We may say that the general plan of action consisted first, in giving protection to mines and those working in them; second, in disarming all persons carrying weapons without authority, and third, in ridding the affected district of all bad characters.

The steps taken were radical and the manner of carrying them out thorough and effective.

The district was pacified and the trouble ceased for the time being. Changes occurred, however, and these changes at times were for the worse. The measures used by the militia later were not so uniformly successful.

The methods employed in the winter of 1903 and 1904 which we have described, were to some extent influenced by the old proverb that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." The wisdom of this proverb has not ordinarily been successful when practically applied to riots and strikes by State soldiery. This has been because the rioters have generally thought that the militia would not carry into effect the action threatened. Sometimes they have been correct in their surmises. Not only have State troops failed to enforce respect for themselves, but on occasion officers commanding United States troops have allowed strikers to throw missiles at their men and to revile and curse them with words much too profane and indecent to print. As a major of infantry, who was present at the Chicago strikes, put it, the strikers were hurling stones and showering their curses at the United States, not merely at the soldiers as individuals. A game of bluff is undoubtedly a good thing, when lives may be spared and bloodshed avoided by working it. But it does irreparable harm if, on circumstances warranting, the rifles in the men's hands are as useless as so many broomsticks.

At times, however, insurrection and rebellions affecting small sections and limited to certain classes have been quickly subdued by a mere show of numbers or by issuing orders, stern in their details, stating clearly what would be done under given circumstances. The information that immediate punishment will follow the commission of certain acts, understandingly and unmistakably impressed on the minds of those intending to commit such acts, has a deterrent effect. There is an instance of this which still remains vivid in the memory of certain older officers of the Regular Army and which perhaps will bear telling.

An infantry regiment of federal troops was ordered to quell the rioting incident to a strike affecting a Western city and which threatened to spread through three or four States. When the train in which the regiment had traveled from its post arrived at the station, the soldiers quickly detrained, and the companies formed in a solid and silent line before a congregation of several hundred men, women and children who gazed at them with hatred tinged by respect. The colonel of the regiment ordered officers' call sounded and then walked into the waiting-room, where there were some strikers. When all his officers were gathered around him he told them he had been informed that the strikers were in the habit of sneaking up on the sentries and grabbing at their rifles. He ordered that each time such an attempt was made, the man making it be killed, not wounded. He further stated that another trick was to form a line of women, get behind it, and then shoot and throw rocks. If this occurred he ordered that the men be instructed to catch the women by any part of their clothing that they could, toss them over their heads and then attend to those behind.

This official talk of the colonel to his subordinates, which was overheard by outsiders, put an immediate stop to the disorder, rioting and bloodshed previously prevailing and from this time on not a shot was fired.

Now the problem which confronted the National Guard of Colorado was different in many of its features from the one solved so easily by the regular troops referred to. At Telluride a large part of the riotous element was alien in race, language and customs—Austrians, Finns, Italians and others. It was almost impossible to influence them, through their sense of fear and otherwise, by orders, for such communications not only had to seep through their fanaticism and hatred, but must necessarily have been translated into their mother tongue to be understood. They lived in an atmosphere of their own, hermetically sealed in, as it were, by their ignorance of our language, augmenting the intensity of their feelings, exciting their exasperation by continual meetings, where their minds were influenced and ruled by a small group of Americans, to whom they rendered a peculiar fealty. These Americans controlled them by mental superiority, by a wide experience in handling strikes, by the strength of the fraternal bond by

which their union held them and by the means of frequent and intimate intercourse.

To quell the lawlessness in this district it was necessary to eliminate the personal influence of these leaders. This was done by deporting them. I suggested to a man who had been active in this work of extermination, that the measure of deporting these men was severe. He answered that they might have been allowed to stay, but that their presence would eventually have resulted in disorders of such a nature that there would have been as many dead men as there were deported ones.





TWENTY-THIRD INFANTRY CARGADORES.

## THE CARGADOR IN MINDANAO.

BY COLONEL PHILIP READE, TWENTY-THIRD INFANTRY.



EARLY in August, 1904, the Regimental Commander, Twenty-third Infantry, received orders from the Commanding General, Department of Mindanao, to select seven privates and one non-commissioned officer from each company for duty in the Rio Grande Valley, Cottabato District, which was a region previously garrisoned by the Seventeenth Infantry. The Department Commander's instructions read, in terms, that the men selected should be the best men obtainable for hard work—good shots, able to swim, in short, the best eight men for extraordinary and hard service to be found in each company.

The following-named officers were, by Maj.-Gen. Leonard Wood, assigned to the Provisional Company, Twenty-third Infantry: Capt. Monroe Crawford Kerth, First Lieut. Harry S. Howland, William T. Merry, Stephen O. Fuqua. At a later period, Col. Philip Reade, Twenty-third Infantry, temporarily commanding department of Mindanao, assigned, in addition to the foregoing, the following recent graduates of the Military Academy to the Provisional Company, viz.: Second Lieuts.



Arthur Wood Copp, Richard J. Herman, Wilber A. Blain, Christopher Jensvold. The Provisional Company remained in the Davao and Cottabato District, in the field, for six months. Of the original officers designated, Captain Kerth, Lieutenant Fuqua, and Second Lieutenants Copp and Blain remained constantly with the organization. At the outset, Asst. Surg. R. L. Carswell, Medical Department, was assigned as the medical officer accompanying the Provisional Company, but ill health caused his relief. Thereafter the company had such a succession of medical officers that their identification with it was not of long tenure. In the make-up of the Provisional Company, the men selected by the company commanders were, first of all, sent to the post surgeon to pronounce upon their physical fitness, also upon their proficiency in First Aid. Men rejected by the medical officer for any cause were replaced by alternates from the same company for like examination. From start to finish about two hundred men served with the Provisional Company. On the relief and return from field-service the members were subjected at Malabang to a like physical examination by the same post surgeon and his assistant. Record was kept by latter of weight, age, military service, etc., of each member of the company. The accruing data of Asst. Surgeons Geo. J. Newgarden and Chas. J. Brownlee is more valuable than mere assertion regarding the matter of effectiveness and impairment of health by means of protracted exposure in Mindanao.

After the men who were selected by the respective company commanders for duty with the Provisional Company had passed the medical examiners, they were culled further, reference being had to classification in small-arms firings, last season of practice, experience in ability in the handling of vintas, proficiency in visual signaling, hiking experiences, familiarity with rules for self-cover, etc., as prescribed in the Soldier's Handbook. The details and conditions of personal equipment were gone into. Each man was outfitted as follows: Q.M.D., one hat and coat, one pair service trousers, one undershirt, two pairs shoes, two mosquito bars, one blue flannel shirt, two pairs drawers, five pairs socks, one poncho, soap and towel; Ordnance Department, 150 rounds of ammunition, haversack with its prescribed contents, and canteen. Care was taken regarding water-boiling outfit. Ten days field rations accompanied when, 12th Aug.,

the organization left by launch for Parang, departing from Parang three days later for the region indicated. In the main, from that time until February, the Provisional Company marched. It covered thus 400 miles during the first six weeks of its organization. Its object, co-operating with other troops, was the capture, destruction or subjugation of Datto Ali and the hostile Moros under him.

Cargadores were hired in Malabang to accompany the command. It was not expected, nor desired, that the Provisional Company, or *company*, as this writing will hereafter term the organization, should exhaust itself either with unnecessary marching when no definite object was in view, or its members be required to load themselves down with any excessive amount of rations: hence ten cargadores, per squad, were desired. It was hoped, rather than expected, that in some regions chickens and a certain amount of vegetables and fruits could be procured in reasonable quantities. In regions not hostile, it was hoped, rather than expected, that food could be obtained from the natives by purchase. As the company was content to always conduct itself as though in the presence of an active and intelligent enemy—the carrying of rations by the soldiers for, say, a ten days' trip was deemed inconsistent, with due preparations against surprise, ambush, etc. The separation of detachments from the company for even a short time and distance in less numbers than twenty-five men for reconnaissance, etc., was forbidden. The country to be operated in was roadless; no highways, hence no vehicles on wheels accompanied; the region did not anywhere admit of pack-trains or pack-animals. Only a small percentage of ground had previously been gone over by American soldiers. Maps and sketches, aside from the Rio Grande's banks, were non-existent. The company expected to find cogon grass, mosquitos, morasses, chigres, foul water, jungles, leeches, dhobie itch, vinta work, bejuco entanglements, scant fuel and rations. These expectations were realized.

First Lieut. H. S. Howland, Twenty-third Infantry, has, pursuant to the instructions of the regimental commander, rendered a general report of operations during four months' service with the Twenty-third Infantry Provisional Company in the field.

Its subheads include character of the country; rafts, cogon grass or cane, guides, prisoners, interpreters, physical

ailments in campaign, mosquitos, drinking water, products of the country, vintas, rations for, and cooking on vinta trips, camping in vintas, loading of vintas, etc. all of which details are unique to the major portion of foot troops and would be valuable to the successors of the Seventeenth, Twenty-second, Twenty-third Infantry, Fourteenth Cavalry, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Battery Light Artillery; but our purpose and object of the present screed is cargador service in Mindanao.

#### WEIGHTS OF RATIONS.

One hundred cargadores are necessary, at forty pounds per cargador, to carry ten days' full rations for one hundred soldiers. Such weigh 3950 pounds. Add four cargadores for the kitchen, four for officers (one to each), two for the hospital, and one to carry a tent fly: total 111 cargadores. For carrying the rations for these cargadores and for themselves, eighty-seven additional cargadores are necessary.

Leave behind the baked beans, tomatoes and jams, the total weight of ten days' rations is reduced to 2387 pounds; the weight to be carried for a ten days' march of one hundred men with the reduced rations, reduces the number of cargadores to five for each four soldiers, or 126 cargadores for the company. The number of cargadores for the kitchen, officers, hospital, and tent fly remains constant.

If a still further reduction in the number of cargadores is necessary, it can be effected by carrying only half rations for the latter. One day's rations for a cargador is 17.4. For carrying ten days' reduced rations for 100 hundred men and half rations for the natives, ninety cargadores would be necessary.

The number of cargadores might still be reduced by apportioning out to each cargador his ten days' rations, half or full, and making him carry them himself instead of having the native rations carried in bulk by cargadores employed for that particular purpose. In this way the number of cargadores would be limited to those actually engaged in carrying soldiers' rations and camp equipage, that is, a total of seventy-one cargadores. Giving a Moro his whole ten days' rations at once tempts him to enter into a competition with nature in an effort to eat it all up in a few days, and thus an officer will find all his cargadores out of rations before the end of the hike. Moros without food are useless. Lieutenant Howland says

that it is a safe rule to go by to calculate forty pounds per cargador of the reduced field rations and the full native rations carrying the latter in bulk. It is a sufficient load for a soldier to carry with his field-equipment, a shelter half-roll and a lunch in the haversacks. The trend of opinion is showed by the writer that a kind of back-pack improvement of the knapsack type 1860-5 will be less of an incumbrance than the Civil War pattern, and more of an assistance in tropical service than a wobbling haversack.

#### CARGADOR PACK METHODS.\*

A Moro cargador can arrange his own load better than any American can arrange it for him. He, from infancy, is habituated to quickly construct a cage, or back basket, in which to tote potatoes, brass dishes, pans, fruits, rice-bags; is an adept in weaving bejuco. The Moro basket is flat on one side, provided with the loops necessary for shoulders and head. The position of the cargador in the march is well toward the rear with one or two squads behind them for a rear guard, while the men of another squad are distributed among them. Each man has charge of a certain number of cargadores, it being his duty to keep them moving along, prevent straggling and unnecessary delays.

In battalions, the cargadores usually march between the third and last company, the quartermaster-sergeant and cook of each company marching with, and having immediate charge of cargadores of their company.

When heavily loaded, one rest per hour of ten minutes is insufficient for the cargadores, but two rests per hour of five minutes each satisfies them. No matter how loaded, heavily or lightly, cargadores prefer short and frequent rests.

He has no means of carrying water. It is not necessary to stop when crossing streams; the cargadore merely stoops over, and making a cup of his hand, obtains enough to satisfy his thirst by scooping up the water.

\*The accompanying illustrations show a group of five (5) Moros employed as cargadores at Malabang, Mindanao, P. I., Aug. 12, 1904, to accompany the Prov. Co., 23d Infantry. Each cargador has packed his cargo as best suited him. One carries a fifteen (15) gallon galvanized iron metal-topped water boiling can; interior of the can is filled with kitchen utensils. Another carries a twenty-five pound tin of hard bread, plus two tins of bacon, each containing nine (9) issue bacon. Another carries four 9-lb. tins of bacon. Another packs a burlap grain sack, partly filled with tomato cans.

The strips uniting these packages are of bejuco (native rattan), one hand loop and two arm-pit loops to each pack. The loops are also of bejuco. Background shows cogon grass.



MORO CARGADORES PACKED FOR THE MARCH.

With Moros, the desire to possess firearms is a mania. Some of the frequent thefts of U. S. Mag. cal. 30, arms, also of revolvers, are due to cargadores. A Moro who has been broken in the work of a cargador has, occasionally, a spirit of camaraderie for the soldier; but he will assassinate him all the same if he cannot obtain his gun by any other way. They are not known by name in all cases, are tagged about the same way that General George Crook tagged his Indian scouts when he commanded the Twenty-third Infantry in its Arizona campaigns. The Moro is known best by his number. This number may be in a tag of canvas attached to the cargador.

From among the cargadores the most intelligent one, to whom the others are likely to show the most obedience, is selected as boss. It is his duty to look after the others, to represent them before the commanding officer if they have any complaints to make, to see that they all do their work, and to exercise a general jurisdiction over them. He, in turn, is looked after by the quartermaster-sergeant. The boss is not required to carry as large a load as the ordinary tao; to do so, lowers him in the eyes of his fellows; sometimes he carries no load at all.

Four cargadores, usually strong men and intelligent, are selected for the kitchen. They carry the kitchen effects on the march and work about the kitchen in camp. Two cargadores one assigned to the hospital corps, one to carry the medical supplies, and one to carry the surgeon's effects. One cargador is assigned to each officer, to carry the latter's roll, assist in putting up the tent fly, wash and dry clothes, etc. These assignments are generally permanent, because when a cargador has once learned the duties expected of him, he performs them satisfactorily. When camp is reached, the officer's cargador clears a space for the tent fly, gets water, etc. In designating a camp for the cargadores a spot is indicated some distance away from the men, usually near the kitchen. In camps on rivers the cargadores are always camped down stream below the kitchen fires; they are required to have their own fires and they should always do their own cooking. No cargador is, as a rule, allowed to carry a bolo, kriss, kampilan, barong, or other weapon. Sometimes the cargador boss is allowed to carry one of these because to a Moro, the possession of a weapon is a sign of personal authority and prowess.

## THE CAVALRY HORSE OF THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE.

By "ARABIAN."



HE war between Russia and Japan has demonstrated unexpected, not to say, astonishing, ability and resources on the part of the Japanese.

Although these little Orientals are not horsemen, they have recognized the value of the horse in warfare, and have endeavored to make good the lack of horses by large importations from abroad. So far has this country been depleted that contractors have ceased to export, only because horses of the required type can no longer be obtained. The Boer War had already drawn heavily on our stock, so that it is no wonder the country is no longer able to meet the demand for this class of horses.

What are we doing to make good for the loss—and what more vital element is there in the equipment of an army than the supply of horses because of the time required to mature them.

A battle-ship can be built in two years, guns manufactured in a few months, other equipment in less time, soldiers mustered and drilled in a few weeks, but horses require six years to be prepared for service.

Gen. Henry T. Allen in his article on "Cavalry Mounts" in the January number, 1904, of the JOURNAL OF THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION suggests that the Government make contracts with breeders to supply horses of a cavalry type and bred from stock suggested or selected by the War Department.

In the May number of the same year was another article on the same subject commending General Allen's plan and demonstrating the value of Arab blood for the purpose.

In a recent issue of *The Rider and Driver*, I find the following which has a bearing on the subject:

"Nime" was out of Nagli by the phenomenal Arabian "Maidan" who came to India before "Kismet" and raced as a two-year-old.

From two to five he was unbeaten; as he could win no more, he was sold to Captain Brownslow, of the Seventy-Second Highlanders,






"KHALED."

(For pedigree, see accompanying text.)

who weighed 260 lbs. with his equipment, and who rode him as a charger for twelve years. Captain Brownslow was killed before Kandahar at the end of the famous march of Lord Roberts to Kandahar from Kabul through the Afghan Mountains.

"Maidan" was then bought by the Hon. Eustace Vasey, and though seventeen years old and having done work enough to kill three ordinary horses was taken to the south of France where he won steeplechases at Pau until twenty-three. He then was taken to England where he won in many races. At twenty-four he broke a leg and had to be killed. Prior to the accident which caused his death he was absolutely unblemished. It is from these progenitors that Khaled, perhaps the leading horse in the Huntington stud, is descended. His pedigree is as follows.




All ancestors pure desert-bred Arabians of the family of Manehgi Hedruj.

Khaled stands a full fifteen three. We unhesitatingly affirm and challenge the world to disprove that this horse is the noblest Arabian in the civilized world, as he is known to be the largest. His offspring, whether pure Arab or otherwise, inherit his wonderful conformation, intelligence, hardness of hoof, sinew and muscle."

Here then we have in Khaled a horse that seems especially suitable on account of his own merits and his breeding from which to produce the highest type of cavalry horse.

I add the pedigree of his brother in blood, Lord Roberts,† who is twice descended from the great "Maidan," and who is about the same size as Khaled.



Have we any horses in our army like "Maidan" that could stand up under such work for twelve years, and then be a winner, in flat races and steeplechases with the best horses of the world?


\*The unbeaten racers.

†See tailpiece.

Can breeders do better than take these two horses, or their equals, if there be any, and conserve their rich blood heritage to produce for America the cavalry horse of the future?

Inasmuch as a horse should have a special preparation for his work, and as this can best be accomplished by men in the service, it would seem the best plan to have the breeders deliver the colts as yearlings or two-year-olds, so that they may be early accustomed to the work they have to do. Also from the point of economy it would be the better way, for the Government cannot only do this work better, but at a minimum expense, at the large military reservations at Fort Riley and other posts.

Has anyone a better plan to suggest than this of General Allen's for the breeding of the best type of horses for the army?




"LORD ROBERTS."





# CAPTURED BY THE JAPANESE AFTER TWO DAYS FIGHTING

(London Graphic's Special Artist, Frederic Whiting.)



away to the right in succession were Grassy Hill, and Bare Hill. Below these hills was a vast plain covered with dotted small villages. On the

extreme left the Japanese Sixth Division was engaged in an outflanking movement, while the Fifth Division was engaged on the right, and the Third Division in the centre. The battle that followed has already been described in these pages.





## FIELD AND SIEGE OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST.\*

BY COLONEL WILLIAM R. LIVERMORE, U. S. A.  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

### II

#### BATTLE OF THE YALU.

[Japanese, 45,000 or 50,000. Russian, 15,000 or 20,000.]



On the 25th of April, the Russian gunboats made demonstrations near the mouth of the Yalu.

On the 26th, the Russians were driven from the island of Chiu-ti-tao. Eight Russian heavy field-guns were seen by the Japanese on Hu-Shan.

On the 28th the Russians had withdrawn to the right bank of the Ai-ho, keeping up a desultory fire of artillery.

On the 29th they withdrew from Chin-ting-tao and the Twelfth Japanese Division commenced to bridge the Yalu at Shin-kon-chin. Before the troops and guns advanced, every point of the road where it might have been visible from the Russian side had been screened by fences of cornstalks and of young trees cut near the roots and set in the ground.

On the 30th the Twelfth Division crossed. The Japanese occupied Cheng-Chang-Tai. The Japanese artillery silenced the Russian artillery, and the bridge over the main stream of the Yalu at Chiu-ti-tao was completed. The Russian artillery took the position on the islands shown on the map. The gunboats made demonstrations up the river as far as Antung.

May 1, 7 A. M. The Japanese advanced. The gunboats bombarded Antung. We cannot do better than quote the language of Major-General Ishimoto, the Japanese Vice-Minister of War: "Early on the morning of May 1st the Twelfth

\*Continued from May JOURNAL.

Most of the information upon which the descriptions of the battles from the Yalu to the Sha-ho are based has been taken from the *Russo-Japanese War*, published monthly by the Kinkodo Co., Tokio. The rest has been taken from the reports in the *London Times*, Fred. Palmer's "With Kuroki in Manchuria," Douglas Story's "Campaign with Kuropatkin," T. Cowen's "Russo-Japanese War," articles by J. F. Millard in *Scribner's Magazine*, *The Illustrated London News*, *London Graphic*, *L'Illustration*, *United Service Magazine*, *Revue d'Artillerie*, *Journal R. U. S. Institution*, *Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift*, *Mittheilungen über Gegenstände des Artillerie und Geniessens*, *Revue du Génie Militaire*, Series of Lectures on the Russo-Japanese War, by H. D. Robson, etc., etc.

Division crossed the Ai-ho and attacked the left wing of the enemy at Chin-lien-cheng. The place was sixty meters above the river bed and in itself a stronghold. But the Twelfth Division with their mountain artillery delivered such a heavy fire on the flank of the enemy that the latter's artillery became utterly demoralized, and could offer no resistance to the crossing of the river by the Guards and the Second Division in front of Chin-lien-chang, from which the Russians withdrew at 9 A. M."

Another account says: In the early morning of May 1st, artillery fire from Wiju having failed to draw fire from the Russian trenches, the Guards and Hishi's Second Division advanced across the river assisted by fire from the island of Chin-ting-tao. On the troops reaching the opposite bank and continuing their advance across the open, the Russians opened a heavy fire from their trenches some 800 yards distant. Seeing the difficulties of further continuing the advance in this direction, Nishi cleverly withdrew his men to the cover of the river bank, and changing his direction to the left made a flank march in the presence of the enemy down the river.

Having got to his required position, he made a new attack on the conical hill which was not strongly held by the Russians, and which Nishi saw would give him protection from fire and a foothold on the right of the Russian position. Frederick Palmer, who watched this battle from Wiju, says: "At either side of the Ku-lien-cheng trench were ravines leading up to either end. Pressing under cover of the heights we soon saw a column passing up either ravine. The extreme left of the line filed into the little town of Ku-lien-cheng.


Nishi's attack was successful and the Guards division were thus greatly assisted in their advance against the Russian center. The position was occupied and the Russians retired.

#### NANSHAN.


[Japanese, 45,000. Russian, 15,000.]

The fortifications were of an obsolete type although protected in front by *trou de loup* wire entanglements and mines.

The artillery fire commenced at 5.30 A. M.; and at 6 A. M. from gunboats. Eventually six torpedo-boats took the Russian position in the flank and rear. The Russian artillery replied, but after three hours its fire greatly slackened. The



BATTLE OF THE YALU.  
(30 April, 1904.)













Japanese infantry advanced with alternate halts under a deadly fire up to about 500 yards of Russian advanced line.

At 11 A. M. all the unsheltered guns of the Russians had been silenced, but two batteries of new field-guns had already retired to Nau-kuan-ling from which position they fired on the Japanese throughout the day.

In the forenoon the Russians supported by the fire of a gunboat, made a counter attack on the Japanese fleet. Four guns at Ta-fang-shan continued to fire against the Third Japanese Division until 7 P. M.

Up to 5 P. M. no opening had been made and the Russians threatened to surround the Japanese left flank. The First Japanese Division rushed forward and suffered fearfully. But the fleet renewed its heavy fire on the rear of the left wing, which also became a focus for the fire of the Japanese artillery and infantry. An advance was made along the whole line. The right flank waded through the water up to their waists and completely turned the Russian flank, which had thus become untenable, the Japanese inflicting fearful losses with the fire of infantry and machine guns.

Considering the disparity of the forces and the advantage which the Japanese held from the command of the sea there is nothing marvelous about this battle. If the Japanese had been properly led they could have accomplished the same results without the wanton sacrifice of lives.

#### TI-LI-SSU OR WA-FANG-OA.

[Japanese, 40,000.      Russians, 30,000.]

It will be remembered that General Stackelberg was ordered to march to the relief of Port Arthur and it is understood that this was against the judgment of General Kuropatkin. His army amounted to about 30,000 men and he was met by General Oku with 40,000 marching from the south in three columns and from the west in one. On the night of the 14th-15th of June, the position of the Russian Army and of the Japanese center were as shown on the map. From 3 P. M. of the 14th until sunset, the Japanese artillery had been bombarding the Russian position.

On the 15th General Oku ordered the right column to firmly hold the line between Sung-chia-tun and Weng-chia-tun and during the night the central column was sent from Wu-

chia-tun to occupy the hills west of Ta-yan-kou. On that morning there was a dense fog. Fire was opened at 5.30 A. M., and as the firing on both sides increased in strength, a portion central column, posted north of the Fuchou River, found itself gradually hard pressed, but was steadily advancing when a detachment of infantry and artillery, which had been hurrying from Fuchou since daybreak, arrived on the heights west of Wang-chia-tun at 9.30 A. M. and co-operating with the central column succeeded in repulsing the Russians in the vicinity of Ta-fang-shen at 11 A. M. The Russian artillery stationed on Lung-tan-shan and on the heights of Lung-wan-miao poured a heavy fire on the central column and the detachment from the neighborhood of Fuchou, but the latter pressed forward climbing cliffs and precipices.

Meanwhile as the Japanese were turning the Russian right, the Russian left was turning the Japanese right.

The Japanese right was twice reinforced from the general reserve of the army, but its position soon became almost insupportable. A cavalry detachment, however, arrived on the scene and threatened the left and rear of the Russians who were now almost surrounded by the Japanese but made a vigorous resistance, and on receiving reinforcements tried to regain their advantage by repeated counter attacks.

The main force of the left column of the Japanese occupied a position facing the north at Kao-chia-tun, covering the left wing.

At 10.50 A. M., learning that seven or eight hundred Russian infantry were retreating from Ma-chia-fang-chen toward Wu-chia-tun by way of Hsi-lung-kou, two companies of infantry and a battery of artillery were sent out on the heights east of Lung-chia-tun to intercept the retreating Russians. A little past 1 P. M. the Russians fell into the ambush, sustaining great loss.

At 3 P. M. the Russians were forced to retreat, but the ground was unsuitable for effective pursuit and they passed the night on the battle-field.

The most interesting feature of this battle was the employment of the artillery, which is described by Millard, the correspondent for *Scribner's*, on the side of the Russians. He estimates that the Japanese had altogether 108 guns along the line that had a front of over three miles. The Russians had sixty-four guns; thirty-two of them in two redoubts on the higher



part of the hill, while the remainder were without protection except that afforded by the uneven terrain.

At 9.30 the Japanese artillery opened all along the line and, fifteen minutes after, not a single Russian gun fired another shot. The Japanese used both shrapnel and percussion shells, and both were terribly effective. The Russian redoubts, which were of the old fashioned kind, offered scarcely any protection from the shrapnel, while the new high explosive used by the Japanese caused fearful havoc, ripping up the entire top of the ridge like a plowed field. "The scene," says Millard, "during the frightful cannonade was typical of modern war. Looking toward the Japanese lines nothing was visible except the brownish green slopes of the hills ribbed by the darker shading of the gorges. Nowhere within the hill-bound perimeter of vision the slightest sign of the enemy."

In this battle the Japanese used entirely indirect fire. So the Russians at Wa-feng-oa (Te-li-ssu) were for hours under a terrific artillery fire yet not once did they catch sight of a Japanese gun.

As soon as the Russian artillery was silenced, the Japanese fire was shifted to other objects. When the Russians began to retreat, the position of each column was detected by a cloud of dust, and the position of the railroad station by the smoke of the locomotives. The Japanese artillery concentrated its fire on one after another until it was supposed to be routed or destroyed. One regiment just arrived from Europe lost 900 men from this indirect fire within half an hour from the time they stepped from the train.

#### KAIPING AND TA-SHI-CHIAO.

[Japanese, 50,000. Russians, 30,000.]


After the battle of Te-li-ssu, the Russians retreated to Kaiping and on the 8th of July were occupying the district between Kai-ping and Hai-shan-chai and the highland north of Shi-tai.

On the 9th of July they were driven back by superior numbers of the Japanese and took up a position south of Ta-shi-chiao.

On the 23d the Japanese took a position from Haia-tang-chih to Chu-chia-tun. The Japanese had about 50,000 men; the Russians about 35,000.

The Russian artillery fired on the enemy at Wu-tai-shan and





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the Russian cavalry advanced from Ta-ping-shan to Chang-i-tun. The Russians were strongly entrenched.

Before the dawn of the 24th, the Japanese right wing advanced on Ta-ping-ling. At 8 A. M. the armies occupied the positions shown on the map. The Russian artillery on the left of the line fired on the Japanese position by indirect fire, to which the Japanese could not reply. Its infantry, therefore, had to occupy a covered position and await an opportunity to attack. Under cover of the artillery at Hwa-erh-shan, the Japanese infantry occupied the heights north of Sun-chia-tun at 10 A. M., but were unable to go further on account of the fire of the Russian artillery at Ching-shih-shan and Wang-ma-tai.

The Japanese left also advanced a little and its artillery at Ta-ping-chuang engaged in a severe duel with the Russian artillery at Wang-ma-tai.

The Russian position covering the ridge of the heights commanded the view of the ground over which the Japanese advance must be made. The entrenchments which were made in terraces had loopholes and overhead cover and were defended by abatis wire entanglements and mines. The artillery had taken positions from which the guns could not be seen by the enemy, whereas the Japanese guns could not be concealed. This arm suffered severely and was ordered to advance regardless of losses, but was driven back with severe losses. The Japanese artillery ceased fire at sunset, the Russian, at 9 P. M.

The chief interest in this battle lies in the fact that it was the first in which the Japanese made a successful night attack. At 10 P. M., the majority of the infantry of the right wing advanced and captured the advance works near Ta-ping-ling but with heavy losses, and then at 3 A. M. another fort, and finally occupied the heights near Shan-si-toa. Before daylight the Russians evacuated the position. On the Japanese left the cavalry protected the flank and rear against the Russian cavalry and horse-artillery.

#### YU-SHU-LIN-TZU AND YANG-TZU-LING.

[Japanese, 60,000. Russians, 30,000.]

#### YU-SHU-LIN-TZU.

In the middle of July, the Russian Army had been considerably reinforced and sent out a force of about 30,000 men to confront the First Japanese Army under Kuroki. On the night

of the 31st they occupied the lines of elevations indicated on the map. The Japanese decided to attack the Russians before their preparations were completed.

The ground at both Yushu-tin-tzu and Yang-tzu-ling is cut up by steep mountain ridges and deep valleys. The Russians had fortified their positions by lines of earthworks and redoubts.

The right wing stationed about three battalions of infantry in the neighborhood of Lao-mu-ling to guard the right flank. The remainder advanced in two columns—the right column at daybreak of the 31st attacked in front and flank the Russian advance guards on the heights about 2000 meters ahead of the enemy's main position, which they occupied at 8.50 A. M.

While the Japanese were awaiting the arrival of the left column, the Russians made several attacks but were repulsed each time.

The left column encountered about two regiments of the Russian infantry at Pien-ling at 6.35 A. M. and repulsed them after a severe engagement. A column which started from Hsia-ma-tang at 1 A. M. attacked about a battalion of Russian infantry at 8 A. M., dislodged them and pursued them toward Pien-ling and thus came upon the flank of the Russian column which was retiring from Pien-ling and fired on it at a distance of 200 to 1000 meters, putting it to route. Afterward this detachment attempted to advance on the right of the enemy's position near Yu-shu-lin-tzu but without success, owing to the difficult nature of the ground. It passed the night in the neighborhood.


At dawn of August 1st, the Russians at Yu-shu-lin-tzu commenced to retire and the Japanese occupied Lao-hu-ling at 9.40 A. M. The left column came up on line to the south of the right but too late to take part in the pursuit. On the morning of August 1st, the Japanese drove the Russians from their new position at Li-pu-ling.

#### YANG-TZU-LING.

At dawn of the 31st, the left wing of the Japanese began its advance against the Russian positions at Tawan and Yang-tzu-ling, but the frontal attack made no progress at all until noon. The detached bodies sent to outflank the enemy advanced over hills and valleys and reached the position indicated on the map about noon. The Russians evacuated their first line, which was occupied by the Japanese, at 3.30 P. M.



ASSAULT ON KEY TO RUSSIAN CENTRE AT LIAO-YANG: CHARGE OF THIRD  
FROM A SKETCH MADE ON THE BATTLEFIELD BY GRANT WALLACE, LONDON *Illustrated News*



1. One of the strongest defences of Liao-Yang: Russian redoubt. Artillery, invisible, just over summit.
2. Russian Infantry in flight.
3. Scene of most terrific modern bombardment: A slight eminence whence 100 guns rained shells from 11.30 A.M. till 10 P.M., August 31 on Hill 10 and 16.
4. "Round Top," where Russians were frequently repulsed and trench was filled with dead.
5. Buddhist Temple of Kwan-Yin and the Nine Golden Gods: each colossal God hit by shrapnel.
- 6, 6, 6. Japanese charging Russian redoubt in open order.
- 7, 7. Where Oku's 33d regiment hugged the ground in Chinese graves all day and lost 30 per cent. of their numbers under cross-fire.
8. Wire entanglement which Captain Inouye's twenty-two men failed to cut; twenty-one perished.
9. Openings cut in entanglements by Inouye's men and sixty other engineers, with clippers and folding saws.
10. Japanese battery firing at 300-yards' range. Nearly all gunners killed.
11. Junction of Oku's 3d division and Nodzu's 5th division: Oku's 6th regiment charging.
12. Oku's 18th regiment.
13. Portion of 21st regiment (Takushan army).
14. Our artist's position with the 41st regiment.

15. Part of 42d regiment.
16. Buddhist Temple where artist slept on it.
17. Red Cross Hospital wedged in.
18. Field hospital, shell nese guns hidden here.
- 19, 19. Sorghum (cane).
20. Bean fields where killed.
21. Where some companions and one lost every.
22. Kuroki's battle ground.
23. Seven subterranean killed.
- 24, 24. Five rows of soldiers.
25. Entanglements protruding.
26. Cane-covered plain charging every Russian position.
27. Bombproof shelter, by the Japanese, who were killed.
28. "Little Round Top," cross-fire.

# E OF THIRD AND FIFTH DIVISIONS.

*Illustrated News SPECIAL ARTIST AT LIAO-YANG.*



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
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At a little after 4.00 P. M., the Japanese advanced to the attack of Yang-tzu-ling but were unable to carry the position until 7 or 8 A. M., on the 1st of August.

### LIAO YANG.\*

[Japanese, 220,000. Russians, 200,000.]

The Russians had fortified the line of hills extending from the Tai-tzu River along the crests of Han-po-ling, Pa-pan-ling and Kung-chang-ling via Ta-tien-zu to Ta-hsi-kou, thence westward to Hsia-fang-shen and An-shan-tien on the railroad and to Teng-ao-pu in the plain beyond.


At midnight of the 25th, the Japanese Right Army under Kuroki carried the first line on the heights of Kung-chang-ling, and the neighboring mountains, at the point of the bayonet, but it was not until the next night that the Russians were finally driven off the heights. A similar night attack on Hung-sha-ling was unsuccessful, but in the evening of the 27th, after a heavy fight of infantry and artillery, the Japanese were in possession of the heights east of the Tang-ho from Hung-sha-ling to Ta-hsi-kou.

Meanwhile the Central Army under Nodzu had advanced east of the railroad to a line confronting the Russian position, and extending from Ssu-chia-tun to Shang-shih-chiao-tzu, and the Left Army under Oku to a line from Hou-chia-tun to Suma-tai. This delay of two or three days enabled Kuropatkin to make his arrangements to meet the attack or to concentrate a heavy force on the Japanese right.

*August 28.*—On the 28th, the first column of the Right Japanese Army reached the Tai-tzu-ho, the second carried the hills north and west of Anping, and the third those west of Tang-ho-yen. The Russians held a strong position at Ta-shih-men-ling. On the night of 27th-28th, the Russians evacuated the position at Anshan-tien and fell back north of the Sha-ho hotly pursued by the Japanese Central and Right Armies.

*August 29.*—The Russians (probably the Third Siberian Corps) crossed the Tai-tzu-ho by a military bridge near the mouth of the Tang-ho. They were also driven from Ta-shih-men-ling and fell back to a position north of Meng-chia-fang

\*The ground work for the plans of the Battle of Liao Yang is taken from the "Russo-Japanese War" of the Kirkodo Co. but the troop positions are original and based upon all published information accessible.



BATTLEFIELD OF LIAO-YANG

and Tayuchi. Kuroki's second column advanced to Ta-shih-men-ling and Shi-tan-tzu, and the third to Hsu-chia-kou. The Russian right fell back to its strong position extending from Shou-shan on the west along the hills south of Feng-chia-tun, Hsia-li-tun and Tsao-fan-tun, with a second line of the two hills west of Nan-pa-ti-ching. The Russian corps were disposed in the following order from right to left: First Siberian, Fourth Siberian, Second Siberian, Tenth European. Nodzu and Oku pursued. Nodzu's right column came up on Kuroki's left, and his left column on Oku's right.

The battlefield is thus described by the correspondent of the *London Times* who accompanied Oku's Army.

South of the Tai-tse River, east, west and south, the approaches to Liau-yang are through the flat, rich alluvial plain of the Liau. Where the soil is so rich in the vicinity of a town it is easy to understand that this great belt of plain is highly cultivated and thickly dotted with groves and villages. At the period we are describing, the roofs of the houses and the tops of the trees just peeped above waving heads of the ten feet millet. This plain is bisected by the railway running north and south for six miles until it reaches the rib of hills which is named after the village of Sa-san-po, lying at its base. This rib, which stretched away to the east until it mingled ten miles away with the underfeatures of the heavier country, was the first position south of Liau-yang which the Russians had prepared against the Japanese advance from the south.

The ten miles of front form a faint crescent, of which the horn conterminous with the railway is thrown further back than the other. For some occult reason, although this rib stood obviously defined as a military position, along its whole length the Russians had elected to prepare only half of it—namely the  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles of the crescent conterminous with the railway. The prepared position consisted of the five most western excrescences of the crescent. These five hills for the sake of easy definition, reading from the right, we named in succession Gibraltar, Grassy Hill, Green Hill, Brush Hill and Bare Hill.\* Gibraltar, as its name suggests, is a great, rugged rock rising sheer from the Liau plain, 350 feet to 450 feet above the level of the railway, which passes close to its western base. It was crowned with a Chinese watch-tower, which served as an admirable observation post for the whole position. Even the rugged face of this commanding hill was cut with trenches, while at its southern base, in an angle made by the railway embankment, lay a walled village which the Russian engineers had cleverly loopholed and defended. The next link in the chain was Grassy Hill, an insignificant shoulder of turf with natural glacis which gently rose to a sky-line of 100 feet. The trenches cut in this slope covered the main Hai-cheng, Liau-yang road, which made its way over the crescent east of Grassy Hill. From this road another glacis sloped upward. This was Green Hill, a peak 200 feet high, the steep face of which was cut with a double tier of turf-revetted trenches. The position sank to a long, low saddle, which at its lowest could not have been above 50 feet. Half a mile of saddle, and then

\*Vide Sketch.








the left of the Russian position. This was a long hog's-back ridge, which we named Brush Hill, from the fact that it was covered with undergrowth. At its highest point this ridge was 20 feet, but it sloped down to the east and ran into a water-cutting, through which passed another of the so-called Liau-yang roads. In front of Brush Hill, and projecting from it, was a lower conical hill, which was likewise faced with brush. This we called Bastion Hill, and it played a very important part in the defense. With Brush Hill the Russian scheme of prepared works came to an end, in spite of the fact that the continuation of the crescent, a great scarp-topped hill which we called Bare Hill, was obviously the point of least resistance in the whole Russian line. But 2000 meters in the rear of Brush and Bare Hills was another low ridge of rocky excrescences, and this was heavily intrenched, but all the broken country which marked Bare Hill's connection with the heavier hills and the loftier spurs forming the left horn of our imaginary crescent were not prepared. In a word, in a natural position of ten miles front the Russians only prepared the four and one-half miles nearest the railway for defense. This four and one-half miles, however, had had every device known to modern engineers in the matter of earthworks used upon it. Here there were no shallow trenches and death-trap citadels as at Nan-shan. Wherever the contour of the position required it a double tier of trenches had been cut into the hillside, one low down to give scope to the flat trajectory of the modern rifle, the other higher up, but well below the skyline. The trenches, which were 4 feet 6 inches deep, and narrow, had had their front carefully turfed, so that it was, at artillery range, almost impossible to distinguish the parapets. Each section of the defenses had its covered way leading to commodious splinter-proofs cut into the reverse of the position. From the foot of the position, for 1200 yards along the whole front, the millet had been cut, while there was no portion of the actual approach to the position that had not been prepared with obstacles. At all the salients these obstacles took the shape of a honeycomb of deep pits below and barbed wire above. Round the base of Bastion Hill and passing up the western slope of Bare Hill this pitted entanglement was 12 feet broad, while to add to the terror of the assault contact mines had been added. It will be seen, therefore, that Kuropatkin's defended position was, roughly, as follows. A line of hills, four and a half miles long, and lying east and west seven miles south of Liau-yang. From the left of this position a sudden turn to the northeast, with three prepared positions in the interval of plain which lay between it and the Tai-tse River. From the Tai-tse the Russian position ran north, following the course of the stream. Roughly, the entire Russian front must have been twenty-five to thirty miles, and formed a right angle of which at first Brush Hill or the position behind it was the angle. Then over and above this first line of defense Liau-yang itself had been surrounded by a succession of earthworks in the plain, which were destined to be Kuropatkin's second line of defense; and when they became so, then the bifurcating point of the Tai-tse, east of Liau-yang, became the angle.

*August 30.*—On the 30th Kuroki began his flank march to turn Kuropatkin's right and cut off his retreat by railroad to the north. At midnight of the 30th-1st, most of his first column crossed the Tat-tzu-ho by a pontoon bridge, while the remainder



BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG.—II.  
(Aug. 30-JI. 1904.)

and the second column followed. The left wing of the third column came up on the right of that column on the east side of the "Peking" road. Nodzu's right column carried the height south of Tsao-fan-tun, and the Twenty-first Regiment of his left column, forming the extreme right of Oku's army, effected a lodgment on the slope of a hill south of Hsin-li-tun. Oku made a succession of frontal attacks along his entire line, which were repulsed with fearful carnage. He attempted to turn the Russian right but was met with strong opposition northwest of Shou-shan.

*August 31.*—On the 31st, Kuroki's second column crossed the Tai-tzu-ho and the first column crossed toward the Yen-tai coal mines. Before dusk Kuroki had occupied the heights from Kwan-tun to San-tsa-kou and Shiu-chuan.

The hills to the west were occupied by the Cossacks and by advance guards, probably of the Third Siberian Corps. Orloff with thirteen battalions was ordered to hold the position from the Yen-tai mines to Hei-ying-tai, but he had not arrived.

Oku repeated his bloody attacks by night and day all along his front without effect, but another attempt to turn the Russian right was repulsed at Pe-tai. Oku reinforced Nodzu's column on his right and the Russians here fell back on their second position near Nan-pa-li-chuang. At midnight they withdrew from Shou-shan and fell back on Liao Yang. Kuropatkin, judging from the fact that Kuroki's attack on his left wing on August 30th and 31st was far feebler than on the center and right wing, inferred that Kuroki's main force had turned his left wing and was about to cut his line of communications, withdrew his troops to the final position two or three miles from Liao Yang, and concentrated all available forces against Kuroki.

*September 1.*—The Tenth Corps crossed the Tai-tzu-ho. The Seventeenth, and Orloff with part of the Fifth, advanced to the support of the Third. Kuroki made but little progress. A Japanese column on the extreme right, which had crossed the Tai-tzu-ho at Pen-shi-hu, drove the Russians northward toward Hsiang-shan-tzu.

In the center the Japanese advanced to the north of Ya-yu-chi and on the left to within about five miles from Liao Yang.

*September 2.*—September 2 Kuroki carried the heights from the coal mines to Hei-ying-tai. Orloff attacked him from the north but was driven back to the west. Kuroki was driven

back from the hills southwest of Hei-ying-tai. Kuropatkin endeavored to regain the hill at Hei-ying-tai, but though partially successful was unable to maintain it. The Japanese center and left closed in toward Liao Yang.

*September 3.*—Kuroki was barely able to maintain his position and was obliged to send for reinforcements. Nodzu and Oku bombarded the position at Liao Yang.

*September 4.*—Kuroki's third column crossed the Tai-tzu-ho and came up on his left, driving the Russians from the hill 131 southwest of Hei-ying-tai. The Pen-shi-hu column came up on his right. The Russians were driven from Liao Yang.

*September 5.*—Kuropatkin retreated toward Mukden, hotly pressed by Oku and Nodzu in the rear and by Kuroki on the flank.

Liao Yang was the first of three great battles, either of which would compare favorably in magnitude and interest with any battle of ancient or modern times.


The past thirty years have been years of invention in which the efficiency of weapons has been materially multiplied, and it is interesting to note whether their effect has been similar to what had been predicted.

The fight for the outlying hills on the 26th and 27th demonstrated the necessity and practicability of night attacks. Oku's repeated attacks by night and day on the Russian position at Shou-shan demonstrated the impracticability and folly of attempting to carry a properly prepared position by a frontal attack. The success of the left column of Nodzu's army forming the extreme right of Oku's attack showed the advantage to be gained by turning an unprotected flank of a fortified position.

Captains Reichmann and March, who accompanied the Russian and Japanese armies respectively, explain the use made of deep intrenchments, and Captain Reichmann points out the effect of the fire of 200 quick-firing guns on a front of 1000 yards in the attack on Shou-shan on the 30th. The armies of continental Europe have recently been taught that intrenchments are useful for the defense, but that they should not be permitted in the attack because they would destroy the *elan*.

The *elan* and the *personnel* of the left of Oku's army were destroyed while the division on his right was patiently digging its way around the Russian flank.

The question is constantly asked why 220,000 Japanese



BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG.—III.  
(Sept. 1-2, 1904)



drove out 200,000 Russians from a strongly intrenched position, when, with modern weapons, one man should be able to stand off many times his number. Any opinions as to what actually happened is based upon imperfect information and must be subject to modification hereafter, but so far as may be gathered from the published reports the Russian position was only fortified over a part of its front and was no stronger than its weakest point.

The grand tactical interest in the battle relates mainly to Kuroki's march to turn the Russian left. In a modern battle the object of every form of attack is usually a turning movement of some kind. If an enemy is strongly intrenched the first effort is to turn his flank. If, however, his line is too much extended, in order to avoid this danger or to turn our own position, an attack on the center is worth a great effort, because, if successful, it will be equivalent to turning two of his flanks. Kuroki's extended march left a gap of ten miles in the center of the Japanese position, but this gap was protected by an unfordable river. If Kuropatkin could have surrounded Kuroki while slowly retiring from Oku, he could perhaps have annihilated one after the other. But when the left flank of the Russian right was turned it fell back so rapidly, either by design or from necessity, that Kuropatkin did not catch Kuroki. Orloff had been ordered to hold the range of hills from Hei-ying-tai to the Yen-tai mines, but failed to do so. Kuroki carried the position on the 2d and Orloff's forces were dispersed. Kuropatkin brought up all available forces to regain the hills, but too late, and Oku pressed harder on Kuropatkin than Kuropatkin pressed on Kuroki. If Orloff had held the hills, Kuropatkin could, perhaps, have driven Kuroki into the river. As Kuroki held the hills, Kuropatkin, right or wrong, thought he could not surround him.

The grand tactical advantage was on the side of the Russians, but the agility was on that of the Japanese. Kuropatkin did not destroy Kuroki, but he effected a masterly retreat, which was advantageous to the Russians. In a modern battle a frontal attack is dangerous; a flank attack is advantageous. If a position has no flanks, it can be surrounded and invested; if it has flanks they can be turned. If the defense is more active than the attack it can surround the surrounders.


Upon the whole, the advantage of initiative enjoyed by the attack may overbalance the advantage which passive re-

sistance gives to the defense. It is not, however, as easy now as it was in 1796 and 1814 for a small force with interior lines to strike right and left and annihilate the enemy's detachments in succession.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]







258. BRIDGE AND OLD POST. FORT SNELLING.



ARTILLERY OFFICER.

## TYPES AND TRADITIONS OF THE OLD ARMY.

### III. MEMORIES OF THE FIFTIES.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL MICHAEL R. MORGAN, U. S. A. (RETIRED),  
LATE COMMISSARY GENERAL.

IT affords me pleasure to dwell upon my early life in the army and to think of those of my acquaintance of whom the army was composed at that time. I have no unpleasant recollection of the time, all were kind to me and I hope I was equally so to them. We rarely regret having done too much for others, but are often sorry for not having done more.

I always loved the army. My first station on entering service (1854) was the Presidio of San Francisco. I traveled across the Isthmus of Panama; all the way in the rain, part of the way on platform cars and the worst part on mule back. As I was getting on my mule an impecunious fellow-passenger accosted me, saying: "Lieutenant, could you spare me a loan of sufficient to charter a mule to Panama?" I was not provided amply with funds, but I did not know how to decline. The passenger was a newspaper man. When I reached San Francisco he found me and paid me back part of the loan, and on the strength of this he said I ought to stand treat. I stood treat.

At the hotel, "The Oriental," I found some of my classmates who had just arrived by another steamer. They were Chapman,

Closson and Townsend, all "Seps." By the next steamer came Gordon, Gracie, Pegram and Greene, O. D., and perhaps Deshler. As was usual then, we all, second lieutenants or brevet second lieutenants, put up at the most expensive hotel. The rates were five or six dollars per day, but as the bookkeeper was an old schoolmate of ours, we paid only three dollars. I remained there for about two weeks as the date at which I was to report had not yet arrived.

Gordon and I had been assigned to the same company. I was glad to have a "sub" at the start and one so pleasant as dear old "Jake." His name was George Alexander, but I gave him the nickname of "Jake," by which he was lovingly known all his too short life.

One day at the Presidio in front of my quarters, rooms in the old Spanish adobe building, I being inside heard several of my visitors, Gracie, Pegram and Greene, with Gordon, crying out against the hardships of our service and the superior advantages of the British where commissions were bought and sold—they had not yet joined their first posts—one would sell out for \$30,000, another for \$20,000, another for \$10,000. I was indignant, and rushing out among them I told them I would not sell out for \$40,000—I would not sell out for anything—I was satisfied. And so I have been all my life.

In a day or two these gentlemen left for their posts, Gordon was taken from me and sent to San Diego to Burton's company, and on the increase of the army the next spring was transferred to the dragoons. Shortly after the departure of Gordon, our assistant surgeon, Hammond, was ordered away, and his successor, Laub, having stationed himself in the city, there were left but two officers, myself and my captain, who was a most kindly gentleman. He required nothing of me except to attend Sunday morning inspection and to be officer of the day every alternate day. I do not think he remembered when it was his turn or my turn to be officer of the day. As I was adjutant I kept the run of our tours of duty, and on my day never went off the post except to run over to Fort Point where engineer officers were blasting out a foundation preparatory to building what is now known as Fort Winfield Scott. As soon as I was seen approaching over the sand-hills, there was a cry to the little servant, a boy from India, whom they called Abdel Kader, "Abdel, mix a six-mule toddy for Sir John." We all had distinguished titles; I being the youngest was only a baronet. We had the Earl of Alcatraz, the Marquis of Lime Point, etc. I would invariably answer, "No, Abdel, a four-mule is strong enough." I did all the drilling of artillery, infantry and target shooting. My captain told me that he believed in the English plan, having all the drilling done by the sergeants, but he never interfered with me any more than I have hereinbefore indicated. He let me even select the non-commissioned officers.

The headquarters of the regiment, as well as of the department, were at Benicia, and there was no interference with the captain in the exercise of his duties. He wrote a letter, appointing non-commissioned officers, which was approved by the regimental commander.

The Presidio was the only military post in the harbor of San Francisco at that time. The department commander was a brevet major-general and assigned on his brevet rank. We were more economical of rank than of pay. We had then but one major-general (Scott), and two brigadier-generals (Wool and Twiggs) and the quartermaster-general. Soon after one brigadier was added (Persifor F. Smith), but both Wool and Twiggs, and I believe, Smith, were assigned to duty as brevet major-generals, with rank and pay. Gen. James Shields claimed that the vacancy to which P. F. Smith was appointed was created for him.

One day, when it was my day off, the general commanding, with some friends, arrived at the Presidio to hold an inspection and found no officer present. He was disappointed, and when I met him in the city a few days later he stopped me and whispered to me that if he ever came to the post again and found no officer present he would have to issue a positive order requiring one officer to be present all the time. The general came again, having been invited, with several others, to what my good captain called a *Dejeuner à la Fourchette*. I put the company through an artillery drill. We had four six-pounder brass pieces. The grass on the parade was very high, and when I put the men through dismounting and mounting the pieces some of the linchpins and washers got lost in the grass, whereupon the department commander helped us look for them. I gave the general a salute on his arrival. So far as I was concerned he was out there on that distant coast "The Major-General commanding." I would not give him short measure, and so gave him fifteen guns. We had so few generals at that time that we could afford to be generous. We had plenty of old powder.

A lieutenant of infantry who had been stopping for some time at the post was going home on leave. I promised him a salute, and as his ship was passing the Presidio I let him have it—eleven guns—no one found fault.

On Sunday mornings we had a review, I commanding the troops while the captain received the review.

On the whole these were pleasant times. I was as conceited as most young second lieutenants, and my captain as kind, gentle and indulgent as a captain could be. He saw my presumption of knowledge and ability, but only said, "When you get older you will know better." I hope I did learn better; at any rate I learned to appreciate the kindness and indulgence shown me on my entrance

into a service whose officers were unsurpassed by those of any service for integrity, ability and gallantry.

Before reaching this point I had learned how to draw my monthly pay, and to see that it was very small. It was consoling to know that others had lived on it and remained in the service. When I entered the service my pay was \$64.50 per month. Within two months thereafter, because of the pay of the soldier having been increased four dollars per month, the pay of a second lieutenant of infantry or foot artillery was raised to \$68.50 per month. To make out his pay account a young officer was required to have some skill as a clerk, as well as being an arithmetician. He must enter on his monthly account his pay proper, \$25, four rations per day at 20 cents each, \$24; for his servant the pay of a private soldier, \$11 per month; a soldier's clothing, \$2.50, and a soldier's ration at 20 cents, \$6 per month, making the allowance for a servant \$19.50, and making in all \$25 plus \$24, plus \$19.50, \$68.50 per month. On this princely (?) pay the second lieutenant was to eat, drink, clothe himself in broadcloth (see order of Secretary of War, Honorable Jefferson Davis) and practice hospitality. In addition to this he was allowed fuel in kind and one room to live in and a kitchen. This was everything the officer received until after he had served five years, when his allowance was increased by one ration per day. Each officer received an additional ration for every five years' service. The commanding officer of a post drew double rations, the rations belonging to his grade. A lieutenant, captain or major drew four rations as such. If he commanded "a double-ration post" he drew eight rations. A lieutenant-colonel drew five rations and a colonel six. These rations were doubled when the officer commanded a double-ration post. The "double-ration posts" were announced in orders from the War Department from time to time.

Others than he who drew the double rations considered that this allowance was intended to cover the expense of entertaining. Of course the commanding officer did entertain, but the expense of entertaining strangers was generally defrayed by the bachelors' mess.

It happened, however, at times that an officer, passing through a post on the frontier to a new station with his wife and children, would drive up, bag and baggage, to the quarters of the commanding officer expecting to be hospitably entertained there. As a rule, he was not disappointed. The old army had very little pay, the officers were generally poor but hospitable.

I have, however, known of an instance where a colonel drew up with his baggage, at a post, to the quarters of the department commander, expecting to be entertained there. A little later he was informed that his baggage had been moved to the quarters of an aid-de-camp.

There was no retired list, and an old colonel might receive, and

there were instances where a colonel of fifty-five years' service did receive, as many as eleven foggy rations, amounting to \$2.20 per day. But old colonels were few and there were no young ones. The foggy rations were not doubled.

Although pay was very small, spirits, not *spiritus frumenti*, were high, and hospitality in a simple way flourished everywhere in the army. Especially was this the case among the younger officers who had nothing to save and did not save what they had.

At the Presidio we had a splendid company or post garden which produced all the vegetables we used and of a good quality, so that on drawing my pay I put aside only \$35 for my mess bill. We had a good cook in the person of an old soldier belonging to the company. For my laundress I set aside \$6 per month, and for my striker \$10; what became of the balance of my pay I cannot now recall.

The blank on which I drew my pay required that I should describe my servant. His name, height, complexion, his eyes and the color of hair. I wrote it "John, negro, black hair and eyes and about 5 feet 6 inches high." There was no darky in California who held himself so cheaply as to serve me alone at a soldier's pay and allowances.

On receiving my appointment I laid in a supply of clothing for which my father paid. I did not think of ever requiring any more.

The engineer officers who were building Fort Point were better off than I was. They drew commutation of quarters at the rate of \$20 per room, and lived in their offices, the senior officer building a house for himself and family on the reservation. But they had better pay than I had, and one of them, about my own age, would come along on his pony on his way to the city, and calling out from the hill above the adobe quarters in which I lived, "Hello, Sir John, let us go to town." I would sometimes reply, "No, I cannot go I have no money." He would almost invariably answer, "Never mind, I have sufficient for both. Saddle old Tom"—a badly used up government horse—"and let us go." We would go probably, and while I paid all necessary personal expenses, such as for stabling "Old Tom," my engineer friend would provide theater or opera tickets for ourselves and for the young ladies whom he invited. We hired no carriages, nor did we have a supper after the opera. No, indeed, no foolishness of that sort. Dear old Alex! he was a lovely man. He died two or three years later of yellow fever on Ship Island, Louisiana.

There was a most agreeable young gentleman, a son of an army officer, who was permitted to occupy quarters at the post. He was employed in the city during the day, but I had the advantage of his companionship in the evening, without which I would have found service at the Presidio very dull. In addition I frequently met some of the officers of the engineer corps stationed in or near the city.

Some of those were De Russey, Tower, Whiting, Trowbridge, Prime, N. F. Alexander, Lee and Elliot. I was the only lieutenant of the line of the army in the harbor. My captain, although very good and considerate, was, after Martin Burke, the senior captain of the regiment, and indeed I saw very little of him, as he was in the city every day and all day attending to his affairs. I am under such obligation to him that I must make record of the occasion of it.

Our dining-room was next the captain's bedroom where he could hear the least noise made in the former room. One morning he asked me what was the noise he heard some evenings in the dining-room. I asked him the nature of the noise; he said the clinking of glasses. "Oh," said I, "you hear me!" "What are you doing?" "I'm mixing a toddy," replied I. The four-mule toddies at Fort Point had become agreeable, and being so alone I sometimes mixed a toddy and drank it for company. He replied to my answer: "Stop it, young man, stop it; never drink alone, if you get into such a habit, by and by you will be unable to stop it." I did stop it right then and there. He told me afterward that I was a reliable officer, that I was always present at Sunday morning inspection. That was the one important duty that he wished done well.

The post surgeon had remained in the city when ordered to the post, coming out twice a week to attend to what he looked upon as necessary duties. This, of course, was with the consent of the post commander; but while the latter was away on some detached service, and I left in command, instructions came to the post commander from department headquarters to direct the surgeon to take up his quarters at the post. This the doctor did not like, while it was very agreeable to me, as it promised me more society. One morning while the doctor was making his biweekly visit and calling on me I wrote out the order and handed it to him in accordance with received instructions. He coaxed and protested; I should not do it, he said; that I was only in command by accident and that a second lieutenant should not exercise such authority while in temporary command. It was the first written order I ever gave, and as I left the post soon afterward was not complied with when I left.

About this time, and in the absence of the captain, there was an officer on leave from an interior post who had incurred the just displeasure of the department commander. He was stopping at a hotel in the city. The post commander was instructed to take the officer to the Presidio and keep him there. The officer was my senior, but I hunted him up and making known to him the order of the commanding general, told him I would expect him at the post the next day. He demurred on the ground that I was his junior; but the order was not mine, I was only executing the order of our common superior. He came. I had him put to bed and he was in fact my prisoner. As I did not know how to treat a case



like his I was very glad when after a few days his post commander, Lieut.-Col. Benjamin L. Beall, First Dragoons, came along and by authority of the commanding general took him back to his post.

There were two light or mounted batteries in each of the four regiments of artillery. These batteries had permanent captains, but the three lieutenants serving with each of them were detailed for two years for the purpose of instruction. I was detailed to serve with Light Company "E" of my regiment, the service to commence at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, October 1st. I had ample time given me in which to reach my post. The order was received probably about the end of June, but I might not leave my station until I was relieved by the department commander.


The captain being away on detached service there was no officer to relieve me. Lieut. John Pegram came along late in July on his way east from Fort Tejon to join the Second Dragoons and insisted that I must go with him on the steamer leaving San Francisco, August 5th. Pegram went up to Benicia and had an officer, Tyler, ordered to relieve me at once. I got ready in a hurry. There was no paymaster present in San Francisco at the time, and although my pay was small it was desirable to have it. What should I do to get my pay for July? There was in San Francisco a banker named Capt. William Tecumseh Sherman. He had resigned from the army and was conducting an agency for a St. Louis banking-house. I took my pay accounts to him, and he cashed them for me. Lieutenant Pegram and I sailed for Panama. After a delightful trip down the coast we reached the isthmus and crossed over by the Panama Railroad to Aspinwall, now called "Colon." Here taking ship for New York we reached that city in about twenty-five days from San Francisco without incident worthy of note. Here we put up at a hotel much frequented by army officers, the name of which I do not now recall. After a day or two Pegram kept on to his post, I suppose, by way of his home. On Saturday afternoon I called at General Scott's headquarters, a small house, and found no one present but a woman who was sweeping and dusting the rooms. I registered, stating at what hotel I was stopping and that I would be there until Monday morning. On Monday I took up my residence with some relatives in the city, remaining with them for two or three weeks. Pegram and I had paid a visit to West Point where we were treated with the usual hospitality at the hotel.

Having visited in New York as long as I cared to remain—I had drawn my mileage from San Francisco and so had plenty of money. They paid us ten cents per mile. I believe I received about six hundred dollars in gold, which I found very inconvenient to carry, and now I started finally for Fort Snelling and Light Company "E." I found that two orders had been issued in my case from General Scott's headquarters. I wanted but one order, that sending me to Snelling,

which I had in my pocket. The other sending me to Fort Washita, Indian Territory, had been issued later, but I never saw it.

I stopped *en route* at Niagara Falls. I was very proud of having been to California and believed I knew all that was worth knowing. No one could take advantage of me. I learned differently at Niagara Falls, for a hackman then did take one in as he or other hackmen had frequently taken other strangers in at the same place. There is no use in dwelling on an unpleasant episode of fifty years ago; every man of my age remembers plenty of them.

The trip from New York to St. Paul was a long and tedious one in 1855. Arriving at Dunleith, opposite Dubuque, I put up at the hotel and waited for the boat to take me up the Mississippi River.



OLD FORT SNELLING—FROM A DRAWING BY CATLIN.

With a great many other travelers I embarked on the good steamboat *War Eagle* about the 20th of September, 1855, for St. Paul. Among the passengers on board was Captain McDowell, U. S. A.; Asst. Adjt.-Gen.

Being young I found the fare, in quality, satisfactory, but as I would not contend for a seat at the first table I found myself very often reduced to the second, and sometimes to the third table. However, in due time we arrived in St. Paul, at that time a very small city and capital of the territory of Minnesota. At the Winslow House, the principal hotel of the city, I found some army officers, and among them a lieutenant of Light Company "E," who considerably gave

me a seat in his wagon, and having arranged for the transportation of my baggage I accompanied him to Fort Snelling, which I found to be about six miles distant from St. Paul. Fort Snelling was the first so-called fort I ever saw. It was originally called Fort St. Anthony—established in 1820 and first occupied by troops two years later. The name was changed to Fort Snelling in 1824. Situated on the bluff formed by the junction of the valleys of the Minnesota, or St. Peter River, and the Mississippi, and a hundred feet above the water. An enclosed fort of the shape of an irregular pentagon with four towers connected by walls, and storehouses. The stables, workshops, etc., were on the outside of the walls. It commanded the country in the immediate vicinity, so far as was necessary for the purpose for which it was established, viz.: as a defense against hostile Indians.

The walls inclosed an area of about twenty-five acres, over which I have often been drilled on foot through the fresh fallen snow on Sundays when the fall of snow was too heavy for battery drill on the plain. How we have been trotted around "all agog" between inspection and church time!

The garrison at the time of my arrival consisted of Light Company "E," Third Artillery, with its four officers, together with a paymaster, medical officer and chaplain. It was unusual to have a paymaster stationed at a military post except on the frontier and then only for convenience. He had nothing to do with the troops except to pay them off once in two or four months, and even, at times, once in six months. The troops were mustered for payment every two months. Quarters were scarce, and only those whose presence with the troops was necessary should be at the post. The paymaster, not doing military duty, seemed irresponsible and did about as he pleased. He allowed himself much latitude in dress, appearing in civilian dress, except at the pay table, when he appeared in uniform, or nearly so.

The position of paymaster at the time was looked upon as the best promotion a captain of the line could expect, while that of commissary of subsistence was the best thing open to a lieutenant. The two positions were eagerly sought for. Albert Sidney Johnston and James Longstreet were paymasters, and William Tecumseh Sherman was a commissary of subsistence. Old officers, even in the present day, sometimes grumble and growl and find fault, and anent this trait sometimes observed in old soldiers there was a story current in my youth to the effect that an old captain, who had contracted the grumbling habit alluded to above, was asked what he would be willing to take and stop grumbling. After long consideration he said "Well, if I was appointed a paymaster I would stop"; then on further reflection he exclaimed: "No, I would not give up my right to grumble for anything!"

A paymaster had the rank and pay of major and usually lived

in a city where, if he had the means, he could rent a house that would be more satisfactory than the quarters to which an officer of his rank would be assigned at a military post.

Fifty years ago officers and men were most miserably housed. A captain of twenty-five or thirty years' service, with half a dozen children, in two rooms and a kitchen, if the size of the garrison permitted such an allowance! The enlisted men packed in quarters where there were two in a bunk, and at times the bunks tiered three bunks high and infested with vermin! These things at present are vastly better for the troops, officers and men. For officers stationed in cities the allowances for quarters and fuel are not so good as they were fifty years ago.

I was not expected at Fort Snelling, and when I reported with my order in my pocket to the commanding officer he told me so. Capt. Irvin McDowell, one of General Scott's staff, was present and he said he did not remember seeing any order detailing me for duty with Light Company "E." I drew forth my order and that settled it. They were expecting me at Fort Washita with Bragg's Light Company "C," and plans were formed there in which I was to perform an important part. I have always been glad that I never went there. The order sending me to Fort Snelling was confirmed and I remained there until, by the death of General Bankhead, I was promoted to a first lieutenancy.

In the fall of 1855 a portion of the Tenth Infantry, recently organized, moved up from Fort Crawford (Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin) to Fort Snelling by boat. When the news of the near approach of the infantry was received—we had no telegraph, no telephone, no railroad, no nothing at that time—the senior lieutenant of artillery present, a hospitable man and a bachelor, ordered supplies with which to make glad the hearts of the coming officers, saying to me, "I will show those dough-boys what artillery hospitality is." He stood all the expense unaided. He ordered five gallons of whisky from the commissary, a brand new water bucket and tin cup from the post sutler. The bucket he filled with fresh water from a barrel behind his quarters, and this with the tin cup he placed inside his door near the demijohn of whisky. The whisky cost nineteen cents a gallon. I was no judge of whisky at that time, but I believe it was good.

This was one thing in which the old army had the advantage of the present. The *spiritus frumenti* of half a century ago was good and cheap, and the advantage was duly appreciated. They did not take the trouble to decant it into bottles, it was left in the demijohn until wanted for use; then tipping it up gently on your right arm—I have seen it done—and giving the vessel a tilt, you poured all you wished into a tumbler, you had all you desired. As to using water with whisky, I remember one of the old Mounted Rifles who, when

asked if he wished water in his liquor, answered, "Do you take me for a camel?"

This was the way in the quarters of the bachelors. When the officer was married they did not use so large a measure. After being married I kept whisky and sherry on my sideboard and never even let an officer leave my house, unless he was the chaplain, without asking him to "Change his breath." We did not always drink when invited, and this reminds me how unpleasant the host sometimes made you feel when you declined his invitation. A drunken man or a drinking man always wants people to drink with him. This is the rule whether the man lives in the city or in the wilds. The cowboy on a spree will sometimes shoot if you refuse to drink with him. The habitual drinker, wherever he is, will be displeased under the same circumstances. Your refusal is a reflection upon his condition or habit. I was once sitting in an officer's quarters when another officer coming in was asked to take a drink. He accepted, and as he had the demijohn on his arm and about to tilt it asked me if I would not drink. I replied, "No, I thank you," whereupon the host broke out with, "No, damn him, he won't drink, and sits there watching us, expecting to gain promotion by our death." You had to be careful about refusing as well as in accepting such invitations.

I remember one officer who always kept the best whisky in his house and would insist just before luncheon on having all officers whom he saw go in to drink. He would stand on his porch with his dexter forefinger on the side of his nose, which all knew meant "Come in and partake." A failure to accept the invitation was a *casus belli*.

There was an old officer in command at a large frontier post who after office hours would place himself in front of his house and ask each officer coming by, one by one, to walk in and take a drink. When asked by a curious acquaintance why he pursued this course instead of asking all in at once, replied, "Because I want to get half of my own liquor." He too was opposed to drinking alone.

But to return to the hospitable artilleryman, who has been left too long alone; when he had his preparations made he said "Now let the d——d doughboys come on." The boys came on. There is now only one of those good fellows living. Nelson, Gardner, Bee, Tracy, Dunovant, Marshall, Maynadier, Kelly, Swaine, Rossell, Hill, all gone home.

It may be interesting to know that at Fort Snelling all the water we used was hauled up the steep hill from the Minnesota River in barrels by ox-teams. The battery horses were ridden down to the river to be watered, the ice being broken for them in the winter.

I have often, going out to reveille roll-call in the winter, thrown a blanket around me and returned the polite salutation of the colonel commanding the post who was on hand outside of his quarters every

morning. There were giants in those days—Alexander, C. F. Smith, E. R. S. Canby, T. W. Sherman, Ayres, etc. Some had gained their laurels in Mexico, while others had added to their Mexican renown fresh distinction in our Civil War.

On my first day on duty I was directed to accompany the officer whom I was relieving in all his duties for that day. I did so, and at night I was told that the duty then completed would be required of me every third day. My captain, although a strict officer, never corrected me nor called my attention to any failure or slight of duty while I was with him.

The battery had four pieces, two sections. I being the third lieutenant in rank was chief of line of caissons. The battery was short of men and the commander required any men of his who might be in the guard-house to attend drills and stable duty. One cold evening I was on duty as orderly officer at the picket-rope, and an ugly fellow named Caldwell, a prisoner, having two horses to groom, told me that he would groom but one as he did not get his full ration. I didn't know what to do. He was a prisoner already, I couldn't make him more so, and I couldn't see how I could make him groom that other horse. Of course, he was taking advantage of the inexperience of the young lieutenant.

Along came "The Major" to see how the young sub. was getting along. He addressed me pleasantly as usual. "Well, young man, how are you getting on?" "Not very well, Major, Caldwell says he does not get his full ration and will groom but one horse." "Well," replies my captain, "what are you going to do about it?" "I don't know what to do, he is a prisoner now." "You have ordered him to groom two horses?" "Yes, sir." "Well, see that your order is carried out. Never give an improper order; let your orders be just and proper and then see that they are duly executed. When the horses have all been groomed except that one of Caldwell's have the first sergeant 'lead in,' tie Caldwell to the picket-rope by the side of the ungroomed horse and keep him there until he agrees to obey orders." I had this done, whereupon Caldwell said: "Well, Lieutenant, there is no use in waiting; I will groom the horse."

This was a lesson to me that I never forgot. It came in very pat two years afterward, when I was all alone on an Indian reservation with a detachment of men who had been "picked out" for me.

The major was a good battery commander. He saw that his command was well instructed and his horses, guns and harness in good working condition. He drilled regularly, not neglecting target-practice nor foot drill. It was something of a hardship for the lieutenants to be required to provide their own mounts for the short detail of not to exceed two years. I had my own horse, but the major did not require it.

The inspection on Sunday mornings was equal to a drill. We



would be marched out toward Minneapolis, which was then but a small village, and put through battery maneuvers about the same as on week-days. There was a story on this subject which the major liked to have told on him in after years, showing how contrary he was. I do not vouch for its authenticity.

The ladies of the garrison, it was said, did not want the battery taken out of their sight for Sunday morning inspection, and asked the senior lieutenant to request the major to have inspection and drill on Sundays take place under the walls of the fort where they could witness it. The senior lieutenant said there was no use in his asking, his request would not be granted; "Let \_\_\_\_\_, meaning the junior lieutenant, make the request, he is the major's pet." So the junior sub. told the major that the ladies of the garrison were indignant with him for not showing more respect for the Sabbath; that in their opinion there should be no drills on Sunday, but that they thought he, the major, seemed to delight in desecrating the Lord's day and without any respect for their feelings had Sunday inspection, with drill at times, under the walls of the fort. The major was mad, and declared he would drill his battery where he pleased, and that hereafter, weather permitting, he would have his Sunday and monthly inspections right under the walls of the fort.

After this the ladies had the Sunday inspections where they could enjoy seeing them, from the walls of the fort. The general used to say in after years, "I believe that story is true, it was so like me."

After the accession of the companies of the Tenth Infantry to the garrison at Fort Snelling, we "marched on" a large guard. The artillery detail, three men and a non-commissioned officer, marching on with the infantry, but doing duty only at the artillery stables—two men with the non-commissioned officer remaining at the guard-house, the one sentinel only being at the stables.

We had an officer of the guard as well as an officer of the day; the captains of the garrison doing duty as officers of the day, and the lieutenants as officers of the guard; the battery officers performing their quota of duty with the others.

There was always a good deal of drunkenness in the command just after pay day, not alone in the companies of the recently organized regiment, but in the veteran battery as well, and as our guard-house was a poor affair of insufficient capacity we had to employ auxiliary means for keeping the prisoners in good order. We had three or four cells leading off from one side of the guard-house, into which were put the worst cases. On the other side a ramshackle affair, which was so narrow that it allowed only room for the prisoners to lie down side by side, and when the number became too great or the men too noisy they were taken out and made to march around a ring until they became quieted down—or they were tied up in the cold as long as it was safe to leave them there, or until the gentle



colonel came along and saw them, when they were taken in. This was prison discipline.

Having the very bad prisoners parade during the night, whenever the relief was turned out, was pretty hard. Having a man sentenced to wear an iron collar on his neck with long spikes so arranged that he could lie with the spikes only in one position seemed to me then, and seems now, very severe. But they were very unruly men and of these the artillery furnished its quota. There may now be worse men and more severe punishments inflicted than I then knew of, but I hope not.

I have rarely seen an officer strike his men on drill with his sword, but I have seen it. Later I have myself been called to account for correcting a non-commissioned officer, by name, on drill.

One cold night as I sat quietly in the room of the officer of the guard, a lieutenant of artillery rushed in, his coat off and dress very much disordered, and reported that he had confined Caldwell of the battery, the same who did not want to groom a second horse, and that he was fighting drunk. I at once went into the guard-room where bedlam seemed to have broken loose; the prisoners were yelling like wild animals, the members of the guard nervous and moving about and not half trying to put Caldwell into a cell. I told them to pick him up and put him in. At this Caldwell broke from those who were holding him, and striking me on the head knocked my "tar-bucket" hat, the uniform hat of the time, out into the snow. I conscientiously whacked the fellow with the edge of my dull sword. A member of the guard jumped at me, taking hold of my shoulder, but catching him under the chin with the point of my saber he dropped me and apologized for his act. I got things quieted, putting Caldwell into a cell and the member of the guard placed in confinement.

Caldwell complained of me next day, but received no satisfaction. It was a little singular that no one would acknowledge that he saw Caldwell strike me, although a member of the guard went out, picked up my hat, and brought it to me. My other assailant was duly tried by court-martial in a very mild charge preferred by me, for the mildness of which he was duly grateful. While he was undergoing punishment in the guard-house, and I came on as an officer of the guard, Pike, that was his name, asked and was permitted to wait on me, making my fire and sweeping out my room. He turned out a good soldier in Utah.

To go back, as soon as matters became quiet in the guard-house the prisoners became quiet, but in order that they should remain so I tried to find out who were the leaders in the rumpus; but the worst man there whom I questioned said he did not know, and indeed if he had told on anyone but himself it would be no pleasant resting place for him. The prisoners were packed in as closely as sardines in a box, so I told them that if there were any further noise I would flood their

place of abode, and the water was very cold. We had no more trouble that night. The threat of resorting to that kind of "water cure" in that day, and in winter at Fort Snelling, had a sedative effect.

The prisoners, I believe, tried each officer of the guard one after the other that winter.

After this, one night when the major was officer of the day, and a deaf lieutenant, who wore spectacles, was officer of the guard, the prisoners broke out, the guard were driven from the guard-house by the prisoners who seized the muskets and musketoons, fortunately unloaded, and took command. The long roll was sounded, the companies formed, but the officers led by the officer of the day went to the guard-house in a body, and after running the gauntlet of a shower of small arms and of balls attached to men's legs by chains, the prisoners were got under control. The officer of the guard just missed a ball thrown at his head by one of The Major's bad boys. Hitherto, sentences of ball and chain had allowed a length of six to eight feet to the chain; after this three feet was the extreme length allowed.

The man who nearly brained the officer of the guard with the ball attached to his leg by a too long chain was tried by court-martial and sentenced to wear a spiked iron collar for six months.

Having five companies of infantry and one light battery of artillery, and the headquarters of the Tenth Infantry, with full complement of officers, we were pretty closely packed inside the walls of the fort. Twelve of the officers at the post had their families with them. Two married lieutenants were sent to the hotel on the plain, near the Springs and Minnehaha Falls. We were so pushed for quarters that two lieutenants turned out the ordnance sergeant from the upper room of his quarters, he and his wife retiring to the basement. The lieutenants occupied the vacated room all winter. The little room was a place of assembly in the evening for those interested in "a little quiet game." My rank was not sufficient to entitle me to any quarters that I would accept of, for if I could avoid it I would not displace a non-commissioned officer and his wife. I had been "turned out" by two captains. The senior lieutenant at the post let me have his front room for my use. Indeed it was the only room in his quarters. It was small and back of it was what would now be called a cupboard opening into my room, which was the only means of access to it, in which he slept. My room, one-third filled with my big bed, which, with a lounge, I had bought from my predecessor, and both were of a rather rickety nature, was our only sitting room, and indeed the place of assembly for the officers of the post. My infirm lounge was found useful on occasion. We had a large box-stove and beside it a box of sawed wood.

We had a basement under this room and the cupboard, in which

was our dining-room, kitchen and servants' room—our dining-room was the officers' mess room.

Not being of a highly hilarious nature, I went to bed in good time and did not before—"retiring" it is called in good society, but there was no retirement in the room—going to bed indulge too freely in the contents of that same old demijohn which was never empty—I fell asleep, but was seldom permitted to do so undisturbed. The little adjutant took much pleasure in dancing on my invalid bed and filling me with alarm lest it should fall to pieces.

When my senior wished to retire, he placed his hospitality outside his door, which he then locked and left the company to enjoy themselves in the usual way. Before going home they would fill the stove with wood and going out, carefully shut the door. Toward morning I would wake up because of the intolerable heat of the room. I lived through the winter with but one severe cold.

The quarters of each officer were so cramped that we could not object to those who had families spending a large portion of their evenings in the quarters of those who were so unfortunate as to be unmarried. However, the young men enjoyed life at Fort Snelling that winter. We hadn't much and there was not much expected. I was invited to little evening parties and to dinners. I, with others, visited around in the evenings and played some round games at cards and ate apples and nuts. In case we did not wish to spend the evening, we excused ourselves on the plea that we must go out and attend tattoo roll-call.

I remember attending a card party—it was a stag party—which I greatly enjoyed. The refreshments were simple and inexpensive. They consisted of cold fresh beef, properly cooked, roasted not too rare, an excellent quality of bread and butter, whisky and water, with pipes and tobacco. Everything in abundance. We did not play for money. I preferred those refreshments to cucumber sandwiches or a little weak lemonade, as might be offered at the present day.

In the winter "the major" let us have a team of four battery horses—to exercise them—with a driver that he could trust; the quartermaster gave us a wagon-body filled with hay, on runners, buffalo robes, blankets, etc.; we did the rest. The sleigh was soon filled with young people, and off we went on the frozen Mississippi to St. Paul. We enjoyed all there was, whether a dance or a ——— conversatione. I will confess that the dance was the more popular amusement.

While I was at Fort Snelling there was assembled there, what was very rare in the army at that time, a general court-martial, for the trial of a commissioned officer. Among the officers present were Colonel Abercrombie, Major W. T. Sherman, with Capts. Irvin McDowell, Fred Steele and Alfred Sully. All general officers in the war that raged between the States a few years later.

Sully was something of a wag, and one day as the only carriage at the post was being driven past the post headquarters, where Sully and a number of others were standing, called out to the driver, the owner of the outfit, an old officer, a paymaster, who was very independent and not particular about the appearance of his civilian dress, and whose apparel, though it might be comparatively new, never presented anything like a fresh or brand-new appearance, "Hello, Y——, where did you get that hat?" Major Y—— instinctively pulled up, took off his soft hat to see what was the matter, and looking at it critically, answered, "Why, it's the same old hat." The officers all laughed and Sully said, "I thought so." Major Y——, seeing the laugh was on him, shook the reins saying, "Get up!" and not having on hand any language such as might be used with propriety in polite society, used such as he was most accustomed to use on extraordinary occasions. He had been captain of a light battery of artillery, and I think a captain of a light battery has more occasion for the use of a variety of language than has a commander of a cavalry troop. We have all heard of the much-criticized language of the army in Flanders, and I'm sure it will be conceded that to adequately command horse and man a more varied vocabulary is required than to command man without the horse.

Before the Civil War and long after the close of that dreadful conflict paymasters were not required to take station at posts—indeed, they were as detached from military posts as were some department commanders three-quarters of a century ago, and later when General Brown commanding the army lived on a farm near Sackett's Harbor, and later still when General Wool lived in Troy, N. Y.

Ah, those were glorious times! The War of 1812-15 was over, and we would never have another war. Someone since that time has said, "How pleasant the army would be were it not for the soldiers."

\* \* \* \* \*

I had just arrived in Kansas and was stopping in the city of Leavenworth waiting for my quarters at the fort to be vacated, when I again met the paymaster to whom I have hereinbefore referred and of whom I would not write were it not that he enjoyed telling stories on himself. He rode up from his home every day to his office at the fort in a shabby, ragged and ramshackle vehicle, an old ambulance with torn curtains flying in the wind, and drawn by a pair of horses to match. His own dress was in keeping with this outfit, of which he seemed unduly proud. He kindly called for me two or three times to take me to the fort, but as he got through his work at his office earlier than I did, I found it convenient to get a conveyance for my exclusive use to take me to and fro. This he laughingly ascribed to pride on my part, not wishing to be seen in his carriage, and then told me the following story apropos of this:

"One morning as I arrived at the fort and was hitching my horses to the hitching-bar near my office, a poor, sickly-looking darky came up and looking at me and my outfit, accosted me, saying, 'Are you the man that takes colored gentlemen to the smallpox hospital?' I told him in as appropriate language as the circumstances seemed to demand that I was not that man."

This was the same officer who when in camp in Utah refused in unmistakable language the compliment of being crowned "Queen of the May" when a frivolous young officer tried to insist on conferring upon him that honor (?).

I now bid good-by to Major Y——, who was as warm-hearted, generous and hospitable a man as ever I was acquainted with, but one who could never get "on the colors" if he ran for them all summer.

His bones are dust: his sword is rust,  
His soul is with the saints, we trust.

We had a wedding at Fort Snelling toward the close of winter, which, added to the departure of an officer, a lieutenant, my senior, "on leave of absence," caused a movement in quarters. The newly married, or to-be-married captain, took the vacated quarters—in fact, exchanged quarters with the departing lieutenant.

I was so uncomfortable in my restricted quarters that I made application for the lieutenant's quarters on the ground that I had had no quarters, no quarters had been assigned me, and it was now my turn to select. The commanding officer decided against me. I appealed to department headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. The appeal was not heard from until summer, when, because of the departure of troops from the post, I had all the quarters I could desire.

"Time cures all things."

The appeal was then decided against me, and justly.

While on the subject of quarters I will mention a Fort Snelling incident. A regular quartermaster, a captain and brevet major, a one-armed veteran of the Mexican War, was assigned to duty at our post in the spring of '56. He did not take quarters, but went to work to prepare quarters for himself and family outside the fort. There were out there two old tumble-down houses, six or eight hundred yards from the fort, one or both of which had been used by the beef contractor. There was money available for repairs, but none to be used in building quarters. You might repair a wagon if you had only a wheel to begin on, but you might not build a wagon out of funds for "repairs." The quartermaster now went to work to repair one of these houses into habitable quarters. When toward the close of summer he got the house completed a staff-officer, his senior, who occupied quarters in the fort, asked the commanding of-

ficer if the newly rejuvenated quarters were assignable, and being answered in the affirmative, applied for and was assigned to them. The quartermaster then went to work to fit up the other old house for his use. Whether anyone took this house from him when completed I do not know, as it was not finished when I left the post. The officer was as quiet and as industrious as the spider, which when its web is broken renews its labors and mends the breach; but which one of the two officers was the real spider I leave the reader to judge.

In the spring Brevet Col. C. F. Smith and Brevet Lieut.-Col. E. R. S. Canby came up from Fort Crawford with the companies that had wintered there. Some of these, with others from Fort Snelling went under Colonel Alexander to Fort Ridgely, while others went under Col. C. F. Smith on the expedition to the Red River of the North (Pembina); some went to Fort Ripley and one remained with Colonel Canby at Fort Snelling. This last company (Tracy's) with Light Company "E" Third Artillery constituted the garrison for the summer and ensuing fall. We were very short of officers that summer. There was no lieutenant of infantry present, and because of the illness of the captain I found myself off and on in command of that infantry company. When Colonel Canby took command of the post, he, sitting on the steps of one of the sets of quarters whittling a pine stick and with an unlighted cigar in his mouth, addressed me as I was walking past him: "Mr. ———, I'm going to take command of this post, and I would like you to assist me as adjutant." I felt pleased and complimented at the order and at its wording and the manner in which it was given. That summer of 1856 was quiet and uneventful. In the fall the major, who preferred to command rather than to be commanded, went off "on leave," the battery being under the command of Lieut. R. B. Ayres. In September Captain Heth, with Lieutenants Dudley and Deshler, came in with his company mounted on Indian ponies from an expedition that had been out on the plains under General Harney. The ponies were sold and Heth went away on leave.

As the first snow was falling, the expedition to the Red River of the North under Colonel Smith returned and settled down for the winter.

Colonel Smith assumed command of the post and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Canby went away on leave.

At that time officers went away on leave of absence with full pay. I am of the opinion that the law in the case should now be the same, and allowing, as at present, to each officer a month's leave for each year. This might be allowed to accumulate for six years.

In November I was promoted first lieutenant, and on receipt of the notice of my promotion in December, Colonel Smith relieved me from duty at the post and I proceeded to join my new company at Fort Miller, in southern California, on the San Joaquin River.



I liked my first promotion very much, but would have preferred to remain at Fort Snelling until the spring, and thus avoided the very disagreeable trip through the snow-covered country from St. Paul to Dubuque, the then terminus of the Illinois Central Railroad.

My memories of Fort Snelling are mostly pleasant, and before I leave that then frontier post to take station at a one-company post in the interior of southern California, another frontier post, I would relate an occurrence in connection with Col. C. F. Smith's arrival at Fort Snelling with his command from Fort Crawford, Wis., and while encamped on the plain preparing for his expedition to the North. At the time of which I write there was the greatest formality between the captain and his lieutenants. We looked upon a captain as an officer of considerable rank—, a rank to which we might hope to attain in eighteen or twenty years. I remember Colonel Canby telling me of being a second lieutenant for seven years, and I recall that Lieut. Nat. Michler was a brevet second lieutenant for six years. The engineers and ordnance officers had a law enacted by which they became captains in fourteen years.

Well, eighteen years seemed a long time to a young lieutenant, and to see ourselves captain seemed about as far as we could see. I remember the visit in 1856, at Snelling, of a captain of my regiment; he was on sick leave, seemed to have consumption, and I supposed would not live much longer. Promotion was very slow and we counted upon him for a file. But

Hope tells a flattering tale,  
Delusive, vain and hollow.

In 1866 I was a major in the staff and he applied to me for a transfer. We could each take the other's place.

But to go back, a lieutenant never addressed his captain without prefixing his title, and the captain reciprocated by mistering his subalterns. There was the greatest deference shown to rank.

Colonel Smith was a distinguished soldier, having received three brevets in Mexico for gallantry in battle, and died as a major-general of volunteers.

I'm coming to it. All of us officers paid our respects to Colonel Smith in his camp, and he in return called on each and every one of us in our quarters. How it would be now under like circumstances I leave those who have had experience to tell.

P. S.—It has been suggested by "My Publisher" that my "Memo-ries" end "rather abruptly." I would ask if everything pertaining to the military does not end abruptly.


I know of nothing much more abrupt than "cease firing." When an officer reaches the age of sixty-four years he is abruptly placed on the "retired list." I could multiply instances of abruptness in military life.



Long ago there was a military officer at Fort Snelling who seldom made "calls"; he was a man of few words. He played on the violin, and when he made a call he took his violin with him and made it talk for him. On such rare occasions he played the tune known as "The Arkansas Traveler" and, playing, recited the words of the "Old Man" and the "Stranger." When he was through he would tell his audience, "I have no more to say," and would abruptly leave the room. He had no more to say at that time. There was an old officer who was a colonel at the opening of the "Mexican War" and whose rank had not increased at the close of that war. He saw young men who had been actively engaged, which he had not been, receiving two or three brevets, while he, an old man, had received nothing. He thought he should receive at least one brevet, and asked General Scott to recommend him for one. General Scott thereupon said, "What shall I say, colonel? What shall I say?" "A faithful old soldier, general, a faithful old soldier," replied the colonel. "But what shall I say, colonel?" A faithful old soldier, general," again replied the colonel.

"But what shall I say" in the way of bidding good-by? It is now only a case of "cease firing." I may resume firing again.

M. R. M.



OLD ROUND TOWER.

FORT SNELLING, MINN.



#### TRAINING SOLDIERS IN PERSONAL HYGIENE.

LEUT.-COL. H. K. ALLPORT, R.A.M.C., writing in the *Journal* of the Royal Army Medical Corps, states that this is almost a new idea, but more probably an old one revived or intensified. Formerly it was not possible; now we live in more sanitary times, and the only barrier to the attainment of the idea is the ignorance of the soldier. The *esprit de corps* story is not yet old, and is still applicable to men in the ranks at the present time. The soldier has never been taught the practical art of healthy living, indeed Colonel Allport does not know of any class to whom it is systematically taught; it is an art neglected in civil life as well as in the army. But the young soldier, of all men, requires such instruction; he has been placed without preparation in new surroundings, the purpose of his life has been changed, he is expected to become a healthy animal, fit in every way for the strain of war or foreign service. He may, and indeed must, learn something of personal hygiene, but there is no system, no teaching, and there is nobody responsible. He is encouraged to learn everything else needful for his profession, but in this matter the recruit is supposed to be inspired. Colonel Allport's experience shows that the recruit does not know the simplest things, such as how to wash, how to care for his teeth, or his feet; how to look after his underclothing, how to eat or drink, how to avoid cold or heat, how to preserve his health and fitness under varying and unusual conditions. The young soldier is in these matters a grown up baby whose education stopped at the age of three, when he was left to look after himself. If the soldier can be successfully trained in these matters the result will be of immense value to the State, as well as to the man himself. Colonel Allport is impressed with the necessity of training the recruit in this art, and making it a part of the routine through which he must pass. It is futile to condemn the men for their apathy and their ignorance of simple sanitary laws—they know nothing about it.

An officer of a distinguished regiment once said to Colonel Allport:

" 'tis no use, you can't clean them, 'tis their nature to be dirty, they like it. This would be a nice regiment without the men, just the band and the mess." Colonel Allport admits they were difficult, but that was in the old days. Still, however, he continues, it is hard to influence the men in a regiment; they are set; whatever may be the habits and traditions of the men, they are almost unchangeable. To be quite successful this training should be commenced in the depot and carried on in the regiment. Who will carry out this work? What branch of the army will undertake it? There are no arrangements at present in force. Colonel Allport thinks there can be only one answer. The officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps have the necessary training; it is their interest; it will further their work; they ought to undertake it. The sympathy of the regimental officers should be aroused, and the co-operation of the non-commissioned officers is essential, as they are in constant touch with the men, and can get them to do things that no amount of talking will accomplish.


Colonel Allport in his paper sketches very briefly his experience among the recruits of the Royal West Kent Regiment at Maidstone. Here he found the plastic material he desired. Colonel Brock, commanding the troops, entered fully into the plan. The men were assembled in the gymnasium once or twice a week, and Colonel Allport talked to them. Practical illustrations were given when possible, and a blackboard was useful. They formed a very interested and attentive audience, and Colonel Allport learns that his lectures form texts for barrack-room conversations. The subjects and the language were simple; just their daily life and habits, about fresh air, sunlight, food and drink, their clothes, their rooms, the care of their teeth, cleanliness. Many converts were made, and a new feeling is growing. The work is also carried on at weekly inspections; this is very important, and a most practical way of impressing and teaching the men. The idea is kept before their minds on every suitable occasion, in the gymnasium, at vaccination, at hospital. The regimental officers give their support, and the non-commissioned officers assist, they come into direct touch with the men in their rooms and daily life. The gymnasium instructors especially have a very powerful influence, which they employ for good. For the short time that this work has been carried on the results appear most favorable, and encourage a feeling of great hopefulness. The recruits begin to understand and take a pride in following rules intelligently. Colonel Allport states that he is gratified by the ready, "Yes, sir, I do since you told us about it." Even men in the militia, he says, get their friends in the regulars to "put down for a tooth-brush," so that they too may clean their teeth. Men buy a fourth pair of socks so that two pairs may go to the weekly wash, and two are kept in wear. Excessive cigarette smoking has diminished, spitting (of all habits the most disgusting in soldiers and sailors) is discountenanced, and has almost ceased. Altogether, there is the commencement of a higher standard of cleanliness and comfort. It is gratifying to know that even incomplete results can be attained; but the work must be continued in the regiment, or these men will get under the influence of traditions that may not be favorable to the new idea.

Training the soldier in this practical art of healthy living should be commenced in the depot but still carried on in the regiment. If the officers of the R.A.M.C. undertake it, it will give them a wider interest in the soldier, a deeper interest in their work. It will do

more, it will encourage and cement a comradeship and sympathy with the other branches of the service; it will get rid of that feeling that the medical officers are always fault-finding; they will have the soldier interested in his own welfare, and the sympathy and co-operation of the regimental officers. It is gratifying to know, Colonel Allport concludes, that this educational effort is not an isolated one; others have been working in the same direction, and he feels encouraged to hope that the movement may spread widely.

#### THE HORSE IN BATTLE.

THE part which a cavalry horse takes in a battle can never be filled by any machine, no matter what its capabilities. The horse seems, in the hour of battle at least, to take on characteristics which belong only to a being endowed with reason. He partakes of the hopes and fears of the conflict, the same as his rider. If he has been six months in the service he knows every bugle-call. As the column swings into line and waits, the horse grows nervous with waiting, and if the wait be long will often tremble and sweat. As the call comes to advance, the rider can feel him working at the bit with his tongue to get it between his teeth. As he moves out he will either try to get on faster or bolt. The lines will carry him forward, and after a minute he will lay back his ears, and one can feel his sudden resolve to brave the worst and have done with it as soon as possible. A man seldom cries out when hit in the turmoil of battle, and it is the same with a horse. Five troopers out of six when struck with a bullet are out of their saddles in a minute. If hit in the breast or shoulder, up go their hands and they get a heavy fall; if in the leg, foot or arm they fall forward and roll off. Even with a foot cut off by a jagged piece of shell a horse will not drop. It is only when shot in the head or heart that he comes down. The horse that loses his rider and is unwounded himself will continue to run with his set of fours until some movement throws him out. Then he goes galloping here and there, neighing with fear and alarm, but will not leave the field. When he has come upon several riderless steeds they fall in and keep together, and the rally of the bugle often will bring them into the ranks together.





"BATACLAN." \*

## LONGEING AND TRAINING AT OBSTACLES.†

BY COUNT RAOUL DE GONTAUT-BIRON, FORMER RIDING MASTER AT  
SAUMUR.

*Translated for the Second Division, General Staff, United States Army.*

*By Captain CECIL STEWART, 4th U. S. Cavalry.*

### CHAPTER IV.

#### HOW THE RIDER SHOULD BEHAVE DURING THE JUMP.

THE following experiment has produced the result about to be read:

When, after some days drill, a free jump has been arrived at of about 1 m. 30 in height, a weight of seventy-five kilograms, for example, can be placed on the horse, and the latter jumps approximately about the same height without appreciably more labor. We have only noted that the different movements of head and neck were quite more pronounced. Yet, if this burden is replaced by a man, even lighter, but himself riding the horse up to the obstacle, the animal no longer jumps as high. The only explanation of a like result is that the man's hand is what is heaviest upon the back of the ridden horse that jumps. In fact, however light the hand, it can never be sufficiently so to permit complete action of the different parts of the horse's body, notably of head and neck action, all the more marked as the weight is heavier, and which gives rise during the different

\*Owned by Lieut. K. de Nemesker, Instructor at Saumur. He is represented at the head of this page as clearing a table around which some comrades are drinking in honor of horse and rider.

†Continued from May number of the JOURNAL.

phases of jumping to the several distributions of weight, thanks to which the jump is performed without unnecessary fatigue.

Consequently the rider intending to come the nearest possible to perfection, must be imbued with this truth: *that to jump an obstacle well, is not to hinder his horse; and not to hinder his horse is to let the different parts of said horse perform the actions they would if free.*

We will now study what the rider ought to do during the jump at different gaits:

First.—*How the rider ought to behave during the jump at the walk.*—It is easy now to deduce the way a man should behave during the different phases of the jump, so as to not hinder his mount by paralyzing his powers of action.

He should be careful to approach the obstacle squarely, hands low, reins lightly held, arms half bent.

During the whole execution of the jump he should sit close; for the first condition for having good hands is to have a good seat, without which it is impossible not to cling on to the reins to remain in the saddle.

Besides, the rider who loses his seat in spite of himself, or even intentionally, supports himself on the stirrups, which prevents his carrying the legs back to stimulate the horse when that is necessary. It is the same with the rider who grips almost solely with the knees; the joints of these parts are hindered and the same result produced as concerns the legs.

In principle, during the whole duration of the jump, the man's




FIGURE 12.

body should remain almost vertical, so as to hinder the horse the least possible in the way he makes use of his own weight.\*

In fine, if the rider's body inclines backward at the moment when the horse, after having raised the forehand, unbends the hind quarters, that part of the animal would be loaded with an unnecessary weight and consequently would have to make a greater effort to spring from the ground.

If, during the seesaw motion induced by thrusting forward of head and neck (second phase of jump) the moment when the animal has hind quarters in the air and forehand toward the ground, the man leans forward, he will not prevent the horse's jumping, but might occasion his fall by overloading his forehand when he grounds.

\*Young riders, when jumping, being naturally given to carrying the body forward, becoming rigid and seeking to escape the horse's movements, it is expedient for some time to advise them to hold the body backward, before, during and after the jump. This position compels them constantly to keep in contact with the saddle, and accustoms them to connect with the horse's movements, an indispensable condition for having good hands.




FIG. 14.—The rider's hands obediently accompany head and neck in their extension before withdrawal upon the trunk (1st phase?).

neck during the three phases of the jump (Fig. 14).

This lightness of the man's hand on the horse's mouth is above all essential during the leap proper, when the horse extends head and neck their whole length to carry weight forward, and to call forth the seesaw motion (Fig. 15).

The rider should have, even during this second phase of the jump, a light enough touch in the fingers to let the reins slip the amount necessary, if, after giving his own arms, the horse's head and neck call yet for further extension (Fig. 16).

This is what happens every time an obstacle of some height is jumped at a walk, the animal, almost deprived of any start, being obliged to jump almost solely by way of using his own weight during the different phases of the jump, otherwise stated, by a very pronounced thrusting out of head and neck.

Suppleness in the arms is quickly enough acquired; but much practice is necessary to obtain light touch in the fingers. Nevertheless this last quality is indispensable, when, holding the reins with both hands, serious obstacles are approached at slow gaits, the animal then leaping by the use he makes of his weight in distributing it unequally and successively on the forehand and hind quarters.

Summing up, the arms perform the office of springs, which should yield to the motions of the rider's body as well as to those of the horse's neck and head. In truth, the play of these springs is determined either by the rider's body leaning forward or backward, or




FIG. 15.—Beginning of second phase (horse unbending the hind quarters).




FIG. 16.—The rider's hands obediently accompanying head and neck (second phase of jump).



by the horse's head and neck withdrawing upon the trunk, or extending away from it, or finally by the two factors together, as when, in the second phase of the jump, the one extends forward while the other withdraws backward.

It is this flexibility in the arms and light touch in the fingers that it is indispensable to acquire perfectly enough for the horse to jump, when held, with as great facility as when free.

These two qualifications, flexibility in the arms and light touch in the fingers, should allow the horse to do with head and neck what man does with his arms, when feet together he wants to jump upward some distance.

To prepare for the jump he bends down on his legs at the same times that he carries his arms to the rear; he next vigorously

Figure 17.



FIG. 17.—He bends down on his legs and carries his arms forward. He thrusts his arms forward and into the air. Deprived of use of his arms.

exerts the calves and launches his arms forward in the air to give him the start that allows him to jump well.

What would happen, if at the moment the man throws his arms forward to help him clear the obstacle, someone had just pulled them back by stretching, more or less, strings previously attached to his wrists, even though these strings were of India rubber? Evidently, his jump would be badly interfered with, and might cause a fall (Fig. 17).



\* FIG. 18.—The rider wrongfully holds on to the horse's mouth. Impossibility of the horse's seeing the ground on which he should land.

The rider who has not flexibility in the arms, necessary lightness of touch in the fingers, commits the same mistake as the man pulling back the arms of someone jumping, at the moment he throws them forward (Fig. 18.)

When head and neck need be no further extended, which happens when the horse grounds, or is about to ground with the fore feet, the rider also should no longer yield the hand; otherwise he would cause the horse to cease feeling the bit, and the animal, suddenly losing the support that had never failed him during the whole performance of the jump, might fall. The rider should feel his horse's mouth to




FIG. 19.—Lack of flexibility in the arms.

badly. If, after having himself leaped some obstacles in a gymnasium, one has taken account of the important rôle of his own arms at the moment that he lands on the other side of the obstacle, he will be persuaded of the benefit the horse derives from using his balancing pole, which is no other than his head and neck.

It is necessary to warn riders against faults to which they are given as well as against some prejudices.

Before jumping an obstacle, in place of letting the horse's mouth feel their hands, they too often use these hands so as violently to take hold of the horse's mouth. Thus this action at once prevents the animal from thrusting out his head and neck in the last strides before the obstacle; moreover, it hurts the most sensitive part, to wit, the mouth, that no longer will dare, in the second phase of the jump, bear on the reins in order that head and neck may be extended and thus carry weight forward (Fig. 19).

The result is a badly performed jump.

In fine:

The take-off is hindered, the horse not being able to make it at the spot that his instinct might have pointed out.

In the leap proper, the horse not being able or not daring further to extend head and neck to properly redistribute his weight is obliged to bring into play a very great amount of muscular energy to clear the obstacle.

Finally, instead of grounding with the fore legs first and head low enough to permit his eyes to judge the spot where his legs should be placed, the horse lands head high, hind legs touching the ground at the same time as fore legs, or sometimes even before, which causes

be ready to aid him in case of a stumble while landing; he must, however, carefully avoid holding back his head unnecessarily under pretext of supporting him; the horse thus hindered would no longer be able to choose the spot favorable for landing, and would be liable to put his feet in a hole or on a stone and to give himself a sprain;\* he would be deprived of a real balancing pole that prevents his falling at the instant he reaches the ground. The want of freedom in using this balancing pole is not only the cause of numerous falls in grounding, but again of the strains and injuries horses get in landing




FIG. 20.—Jump "on chandelle."

\*I am not thinking of saying that once launched in the jump man and horse could change their direction; but it is certain that while the leap is making, alighting on a stone or in a hole can be avoided.

the loins and hocks great suffering. This is what is called jumping "*en chandelle*" (Fig. 20).

There is but a single case where the rider ought to take hold on the horse's mouth, that is when he feels that the animal seeks to avoid. He will deprive him, it is true, of a great part of his means for jumping; but first of all he must make him jump, and consequently take possession of the helm; in other words, of his head and neck, at the same time vigorously urging him by the use of the legs.

It is regrettable, moreover, to have to resort to this extremity, for often the animal will lose confidence, and will no longer dare to support himself on the bit.

The rider should not then use this means until forced thereto.

Above all, he should not conclude, in order thus to deprive the horse of part of his powers and thereby to provoke either refusal or avoidance, that *he must hold his head, must not give him his head*.

These two expressions, too often made use of without their true meaning being known and the application of which requires on the rider's part so much tact and skilful management, mean in sum:

*That the rider, while entirely avoiding in any way hindering, should make the animal feel that he holds him, and that he is ready, if necessary, to impose his will upon him.*

There are, however, some horses with strong necks, with coarse mouths, that succeed in overcoming the resistance of the rider's too rigid arms and perform their jump, conforming nevertheless to nature's rules. It then happens that,




FIG. 21.—Rider lacking flexibility in his arms, consequently is pulled forward by the extension of head and neck (bowing).

in the second phase of the jump, the arms, nervously tense and unyielding, the horse's head and neck pull the rider's body abruptly forward (sometimes even jerk him from the saddle) which may occasion falls by overloading the forehead at the moment it reaches the ground (Fig. 21).

The rider who at the moment when the horse is taking off gives head and neck freedom to stretch out, has not always had flexibility enough in his arms to accompany

return upon the trunk, with the object of helping the forehead to rise. The reins are then hanging loose; the horse for an instant finds himself unsupported. So when in the second phase of the jump the animal thrusts forward head and neck to shift weight forward, these same reins suddenly tighten, and the horse's mouth receives a sudden jerk all the more felt the more the rider's hands grip tight.

We have previously studied the serious troubles that result from this sudden jerk. It is somewhat the same with riders who, with the object of giving the horse greater freedom in extending his head and neck, carry the arms suddenly forward, even before the horse has asked to stretch out his head.

The importance is then seen of keeping a gentle feel of the horse's mouth, without, however, this feel harming in the slightest the different motions of head and neck.

Second.—*Way the rider should behave in the jump at full gallop.*—

That the rider remain seated, body almost vertical, *that he suppress himself to some extent on the animal*, so that the latter feels nothing more than the dead weight and may use both head and neck, as when free; such is the great difficulty in jumping at the walk, because at that gait the movements of head and neck are very pronounced. But at a lively gallop they scarcely longer exist, since the horse is already extended; the execution of the jump becomes for this very reason quite easy. It is easy enough for the rider to have some flexibility of the arms so as to accompany head and neck in their slightly marked movements (Fig. 22).

At all times the rider should avoid falling on the neck at the moment that the horse plants his fore feet on the ground, as this movement would too heavily load the animal's forehead at the moment of grounding, and make it impossible for the man to help him in case of a blunder.

Moreover, it is quite wrong to attribute to the hard blow from the animal's loins this forward jerk of the man. At a walk, it is the consequence of the rider's bad hands (he can be pulled from his saddle as we have explained above) and at a full gallop of the jolt from the animal when he reaches the ground.

The race-horse who knows his business perfectly should jump without manifesting any pause, and consequently his jockey should have no trouble in keeping his seat, since the movements of head and neck, that are the principle causes of the rider's displacement, may be said to not exist at this gait. Without difficulty, the jockey at the start can allow himself to take obstacles with short reins, although crossed in both hands (as is necessary in order to hold a racer in his gallop); for the hands may remain sensibly fixed, since the head and neck are extended by only a very small amount. Things do not always happen thus; it is not unusual to see excellent steeplechasers, particularly when about to jump a new obstacle, show a pause, which is the cause, during the jump, of different movements of head and neck, more or less marked as the pause was more or less pronounced. The jockey ought then to have touch of the fingers carried to the extreme limit; for leaning back to assure his seat, he generally extends his arms, and if during the execution of the jump he would remain in the saddle, while allowing the horse complete freedom to stretch out head and neck, he is forced to allow the reins to slip through his fingers, a thing not easy to do with the habitual hold of the reins and still less so with reins crossed in both hands, as it is proper to hold them when riding a race. Very few jockeys have this light feel of the fingers; so we see a large number of them more or less pulled from the saddle, hindering their horses and thenceforth causing numerous falls. For during a jump the least constraint, that at an ordinary gallop only bothers a horse, can at a fast gallop make him fall.

Instantaneous photographs, taken recently on different race courses, have demonstrated the truth of our opinion. We have often therein noted jockeys, during the jump, absolutely out of the




FIG. 22.—Jump at full gallop.




FIG. 23.—Jockey thrown on to the neck following sudden stop of his horse.

arms extended, this light feel of the fingers, which already is only too difficult to have when the habitual hold of the reins is used.

Why then take, when it is not necessary, a hold of the reins with which the feel of the fingers becomes still more hard to obtain?

If, at the full gallop, the horse committed the error of making a pause before the obstacle, the jump would become more difficult for the rider than at the walk. Indeed, the man thrown on to the neck at the moment of the animal's sudden stop is yet further so by the spring the horse makes immediately after (Fig. 23); and as the leap is made like a standing jump, so that the movements of head and neck are quite pronounced, the rider will be violently torn from his saddle if he has not light feel of fingers carried to the extreme limit\* (Fig. 24).

The experienced rider who shall have remained well seated in his saddle, in spite of this stop, alone would be able to clear the obstacle without being thrown upon the neck, and without running the risks that might be the consequence.




FIG. 24.—Jockey violently pulled from his saddle by extension of head and neck which has immediately followed the sudden stop.

\*At the opening of the Paris hippodrome, Avenue de l'Alma, the management of this amphitheater wished to have a race as a mere advertisement. The Auteuil track was chosen. A negro jockey, wearing an extraordinary jacket, rode an old horse that, suffering from sprained tendons, had lost all confidence in jumping.

The horse at full speed reaches the water jump at the grand stand, makes a pronounced stop that already sends the negro on to his neck, then, gathering himself like a hunter, leaps, so to speak, from a stand, extending, as a consequence, head and neck their whole length, which he had drawn back upon the trunk after stopping. The negro, instead of yielding to the extension of head and neck by giving the arms and by feel in the fingers, grips the reins with all the strength he can muster. Thus he is torn from the saddle with such violence that he is seen to describe an arc of a circle, having for radius the taut reins that he continues to hold in his tight-closed fingers. Landed on the ground in front of his horse, he does not even let go the reins and is dragged for some bounds, when finally the horse finishes by slipping his bridle. Our negro got up without being hurt, and had not quit his reins.

1. The steeplechaser *Ventriloquist*, winner of the Auteuil grand stakes in 1876, was an excellent jumper; but during the last two years that he ran at Auteuil he came up to obstacles holding back, and landed like an animal suffering from sprained tendons.

However, this half-lame horse still won races, and never fell, because of the admirable manner in which his jockey, H. Andrews, rode him. The latter, thanks to his sense of feeling in the fingers, allowed the horse at every obstacle to use his head and neck during the jump, absolutely as though he had been free. *Ventriloquist*, having left the Marquis of Saint-Sauveur's stables, was no longer ridden by a man possessing as much feeling in his fingers as H. Andrews, and not only thereafter was he incapable of winning a race, but he could not even complete one, I believe, without falling.

Third.—*The way the rider should behave in the jump at intermediate gaits.*—The principal preoccupation of the rider should be not to thwart in executing the jump, the play of the horse's head and neck, which play is all the more pronounced as the gait is less rapid. It is understood, then, that the more quietly the animal goes, the more the man has need of sense of touch, for the jump to be executed under the best conditions, and that on the other hand, the faster the horse goes, the less ticklish will be the rider's task in fulfillment.

From the preceding we deduce that a horse that throws the rider forward while jumping (*bowing*, as it is called) has unjustly generally, the reputation of having a rough throw of the haunches. This movement of the man's is in fact but the consequence of his bad hands; as to the horse, it shows a mouth hard enough to resist these hands and to master them, even to pulling the rider from his saddle with more or less violence.

#### CHAPTER V.

##### HOLD OF REINS ADVISED.

A quite recent fashion consists in holding the reins in both hands during the whole execution of the jump. We see in this great inconvenience; for this hold of the reins demands on the rider's part, if he does not wish to hinder his horse, great flexibility in the arms and very delicate sense of touch in the fingers in order to let the reins slip at the horse's demand. Therefore, in our opinion, if flexibility of arms can be obtained with practice, sense of touch in the fingers remains the attribute of very rare artists, and is entirely out of reach of the great generality of riders, though experienced, for whom we are writing.

Why not imitate our predecessors, if they are to be judged by old engravings, French and English? Why not profit by what the whippers-in still do at the hunt, always first to jump or adroitly to pass obstacles they meet, although often they are very bad riders, and ride very bad horses? Both alike hold their reins with one hand.

Taking inspiration from these examples, we have sought the hold of the reins permitting the rider to be master of his mount before reaching the obstacle, in order to prevent his avoiding it, all the while hindering the horse the least possible before, during and after jumping.

The one we have always used, and which has seemed to us best to fill the conditions sought, is the hold of the reins called the German style, that is the four reins in the left hand, bridle reins proper in the middle, a finger between each rein; the right hand holds both right reins (one or two fingers between these two reins) in front of the left hand, up to the instant that the horse, arriving at the obstacle, is felt to be about to spring, and quits them at the very instant of jumping, to resume them again as soon as the obstacle is cleared (Fig. 25). This hold of the reins has appeared to us to fulfil all conditions sought for.



FIG. 25.

Indeed, before reaching the obstacle, and if necessary it allows, in withdrawing the right wrist from the left, of separating the reins sufficiently for the





FIG. 26.

horse to feel himself well under control, and even of separating them entirely if one has an obstinate horse (*Fig. 26*). During the jump it prevents the man, in spite of himself, from interfering with the movements of head and neck, at the same time that it gives him every chance not to be pulled out of his saddle. For, while the rider drops the reins from his right hand, he is careful to let this hand fall and even carry it along by his side and to the rear, which draws the right shoulder likewise back and keeps him seated; besides, the horse has every help in extending head and neck since he has only to overcome the resistance of a single arm, that, even with an inexperienced rider, because of the forward movement of his left shoulder (following the movement of the right shoulder to the rear) is too weak to communicate to the horse's mouth the sensation of being held by a rigid agent (*Fig. 27*). The arm under those conditions, is found to be a true spring, and quite a mild spring, that follows naturally movements of head and neck. Finally, after clearing the obstacle, the rider adjusts his reins, if needed, and replaces the right hand as before jumping.

During the first instruction we think even that the trooper, during the execution of the jump, should throw the right arm to the rear and up in the air, as if he wished to give someone placed behind him a back-handed thrust (*Fig. 28*).



FIG. 28.




FIG. 27.—The rider offers no opposition to execution of the jump.

This motion will be condemned by some as awkward. But in the first place such is not the opinion of many others, and again were it the case, we still prefer to pass over this defect, if it be one, provided it help our troopers to jump without hindering their horses.

Every time we have been able to try this method with recruits it has been wonderfully successful; after only a few lessons they jumped with confidence, and several times in succession, the obstacles on the drill ground, and the horses, not attempting to avoid, were quiet before, during and after jumping.\*

\* At that time, being at Saumur, before one of our chiefs whom we wished to convince, we employed this method with a riding squad of probationary assistant veterinaries who had never jumped an obstacle. By following the progression indicated further on for the education of the men over obstacles, all the pupils, at the end of the period which had lasted an hour, jumped with confidence at each circuit of the hall a bar 6 m. 50 high, and this in better form, with regard to jumping correctly, than a squad of old troopers holding reins with both hands.



The reins should be of equal length so that the horse bears evenly upon all four; for, if the bearing is uneven, there would be a liberation of the jaw and the animal would not take hold on the rider's hand. We do not favor the use of the snaffle by itself when the horse is fully bridled; first, because the jolting bit inflames the jaw, causes it inopportunely to open at the moment when, on the other hand, it ought to close in taking hold, and next, because the snaffle on a bridle always being slender and therefore sharp, the horse supports himself badly upon it when used by itself.

Of course we do not apply this hold of the reins to riding races. We speak here only of what concerns hunters or chargers. At times, however, the jockey while jumping may drop the reins from one hand; we have seen this done very properly under some circumstances by men knowing their business perfectly.

#### CHAPTER VI.

#### STUDY OF THE DIFFERENT METHODS OF TRAINING AT OBSTACLES.

A horse may be trained, first at large, second on the longe, or third when ridden.

##### I. TRAINING WHEN AT LARGE.

We know of two ways:

That in a straight away chute.

That on a track in a ring.

First.—*In a straight away chute.*—This method, which has some advantages, presents, however, serious difficulties:

In the first place, everybody has not a chute at his disposition, and it is always costly to set one up. Again, time is necessary, and occasionally trouble to catch up the animals at the farther end of the chute. Moreover, if it is desired to have the latter traversed several times in succession, which is necessary to hasten the training, the animals often refuse to enter the chute, doubtless because they fear the blows of the long whip, which must be given at each obstacle in order to prevent their pausing before jumping.

Besides, this training requires a numerous personnel until the horse is well trained; for one or two men are necessary at each obstacle to sustain him with the whip, and thus prevent hesitation, wandering about or stopping, especially across the track.

I will add that the horse that has been educated in a chute, having always jumped the same obstacles, will not be used to natural obstacles, so different from others. Also, when you wish to jump in the open you will find yourself often in presence of great difficulties.

But what we blame most in this method is that the animal, jumping only quickly, does not learn to use his head and neck at reduced gaits; and as to that, if it is proposed to train a horse for hunting or war, where jumping is done at paces relatively shortened, the chute does not fulfil the ends we seek.

The advantage of this system, especially for race-horses, is that if time can be spared during a number of sessions to keep at obstacles of little height and width, so as to avoid all wavering and all stopping, horses that jump very quickly will have been obtained. Also we advise, if one has the luck to have a chute at his disposition, making the horses jump in it once or twice a day, before or during the period of training on the longe, our principle being that a horse is not reputed trained unless he jumps well at all gaits.

We shall, however, make one observation on the use of the chute. The matter of catching up the horses at the other end requires quite a large number of men, and at times gives rise to accidents if the following precepts are not conformed to, and with which we have been quite satisfied.

The chute should be of the same width throughout so as to be capable of use for horses with riders. But on each side of the exit, for a length of about five meters, the wing barriers about 2m, 50 high (so that a rattled horse might not try to clear them) should be topped with boughs and movable around a vertical axis in such a way as to meet at their ends in the middle of the chute which thus will end in an angle. The horse that has jumped is then caught up by a single trooper coming behind him, and calling him as in a stall at the stables.

After two or three repetitions of this exercise, if the horse has been rewarded, he will let himself be caught up without difficulty.

A feed box full of oats might even be fitted to one of the barrier, at the end of the chute, which would help to quiet the horses.

*Second.—In a circular chute*—This method is essentially incomplete. Only obstacles of very little width can be jumped there, the horse at all times bending on the circle.

Furthermore, the animal only jumping obstacles of little importance and at relatively slow gaits, necessarily acquires the habit of springing near the obstacle; and if this exercise is persisted in he will retain this habit, the serious drawbacks of which will be appreciated later on when it is desired to negotiate serious obstacles at full speed.

In fact, this training presents the same defects as that in the straightaway chute, because of the impossibility of varying obstacles and the difficulty of obtaining changes in speed judged proper.

## II. TRAINING ON THE LONGE.

As we shall see, the different ways of generally using the longe do not accomplish the end that we seek. We shall, however, examine the methods most employed.

Some put the instructor, who holds the longe, on the far side of the obstacle; the horse is on the near side, at some distance, held perpendicularly to the obstacle by an assistant. At a given signal the assistant lets go the horse, that a third person, provided with a long whip, urges vigorously from behind, while the instructor pulls forward on the longe.

Although pulled by the instructor, the horse arrives at the obstacle most often by wavering, seeks to avoid it and even succeeds sometimes when the obstacle is not long.

If he jump, it is in desperation and under bad conditions, the play of his head and neck being hindered by the instructor. Finally, having but little start, he cannot clear the distance.

In spite of that the animal will acquire, at the end of a relatively short time, apparent willingness, and will give complete satisfaction to persons who see a liking for obstacles in his haste.

As to ourselves who, once willingness in the horse is obtained, consider our task as scarcely begun, we do not admit of this method at all. We believe, on the contrary, that willingness is only lasting if it is the result, not fear of punishment, but of jumping performed without fatigue and therefore capable of frequent repetition. Now

the method in question is tiresome for the instructor and above all for the horse, if it be judged by the abundant sweating; it cannot then be prolonged at risk of seeing the animal become obstinate in spite of correction, or prematurely worn out.

Another method consists in circling the horse, then suddenly enlarging this circle so that the obstacle is met with on the circumference. The horse is then surprised and most often stops, although the instructor has been careful to make him increase the pace by using the whip before jumping. This method has still in part the same objectionable features as the preceding one, and like it, does not inure the horse to real docility.

In neither of these two systems does the horse jump of his own free will, and consequently does not learn, as he must, to use his head and neck, a condition nevertheless essential for jumping to be performed without fatigue.

Finally there is a third method that we should be glad to see authorized in our cavalry regiments, and that is excellent for producing a jumper, qualified, at comparatively moderate gaits, safely to go over regions where obstacles are not of great importance.

It is quite pactical, its application not requiring special knowledge on the instructor's part, who at will increases or moderates the horse's




FIG. 29.—Circular training inclosure.

pace, and the lesson can be given by a few men to a great number of horses and in relatively short time.

This method consists in putting the horse on the ring in a circular training inclosure, over obstacles progressively increased. The instructor is at the center, holding the longe in one hand and the whip in the other (Fig. 29).

This system, which has the advantage of simplicity, is not, however, in reach of all, for one has not always such a track at his disposal even outdoors. It has further the inconveniences of the circular chute and finally does not sufficiently accustom the horse to docility on the longe, docility necessary, however, if it is wished to exercise the animal over natural obstacles on the outside.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]



## Comment and Criticism.

### "Accountability for Public Funds."

THE interest felt in the subject presented in the article in the May-June number of the *JOURNAL OF THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION*, entitled "Accountability for Public Property and Funds," by Col. H. O. S. Heistand, M. S. Dep't, is manifested by the prominence given to it in the service journals.

The article was reproduced in full in the *Army and Navy Register* and was made the subject of a leading editorial in the *Army and Navy Journal*, and numerous letters of comment from officials and civilians have been received, though space will only permit very short extracts from a few of them, and it is proposed to print others in a future number of the *JOURNAL*.

Mr. C. M. Busch, a capitalist and State printer of Pennsylvania, says:

"It seems to me the claim that extra clerical force would be needed is nonsense. It takes no longer to keep an account properly and simply than it does to audit and discard the mistakes in an ill-kept one. If kept at headquarters by men especially trained to the work, no detailed audit would be necessary, and the balance never arrived at by uncertain methods."

Maj.-Gen. George W. Davis, U. S. A. (retired), says:

"I have read the paper attentively, and I am very glad that you have started a discussion of this subject. I agree with you as to the need of a change, and it seems to me that you have stated some facts, known to all of us, so cogently and forcibly, that it cannot but have an effect."


Col. George B. Donavin, formerly Quartermaster of the Fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry during the Spanish War, and later Quartermaster-General of Ohio, a business man who has large dealings with the Government, says:

"I have never read anything more practical, more necessary, than the suggestions contained in your paper which you have sent me to read. You owe it to the men in the field to ventilate this idea on every possible occasion.

"I have read your forceful and convincing reply to the criticism on your paper. You have met every argument advanced and I believe the article in this Journal will command so much attention that sooner or later a change will be made."

Maj. Charles E. Woodruff, U. S. A., says:

"I have read the proposal for reform of paper work, and I want to congratulate you on the suggestion. It has got to come in time. I have devoted much time and have written much on the subject of decentralization to avoid useless papers; but it seems to me that the bookkeepers of the nation are not the brains of it. No business is ever conducted by the bookkeepers. Modifications of the methods evolved in any great corporation are the only sensible things to adopt. Now we are fiddling with a system devised by Hamilton when there were no big business concerns in the world, and he merely modified what was useful in a small haberdasher's."





## Reviews and Exchanges.

### Crisis of the Confederacy.

**I**N the "Crisis of the Confederacy" (published by Longmans, Green & Company, New York), Capt. Cecil Battini, Fifteenth the King's Hussars, has produced an interesting, ably compiled and readable book, if one be in full sympathy with the Secession Histories of the events of 1863 and 1864 in the War of the Rebellion.

It is the narrative of the events of that period as he finds them presented to the English public through the writings of either Confederate officers or their sympathizers.

This is the most valuable book of the kind we have yet had added to our war literature, since it is frank and earnest in its good intentions, and gives the Confederate view of everything.

When, in the preface, the author writes: "The Americans still hold the world's record for hard fighting"; and again, at the termination of this history of the continued struggle and bloody contention between the armies, he adds: "It has not seemed necessary to attempt a eulogy upon the Army of the Potomac or the Army of Northern Virginia;" we at once feel that he has a right to our respect and belief in his honesty of purpose.

He gives as his authorities for this history the Comte de Paris, Colonel Long, Adjutant-General McClellan of Stuart's Staff, and Gen. A. A. Humphreys of the Union Army; but states also that he "sought inspiration from the pages of Henderson's *Life of Stonewall Jackson*." His volume shows that in this search for inspiration he was successful; he was inspired all through.

It is an honest book, written by an able officer, but the author has not been able to examine all of the official records. It is a narrative written from the Confederate standpoint. The descriptions of movements are from that side and treat of the action as if the author or authors quoted had fought against the Union.

In the space allotted to this brief notice of this admirable work it is impossible to review it. To make a simple statement of what Captain Battini writes without showing wherein he commits grave errors would be to follow the example of the reviewers who know little of the War of the Rebellion from personal experience.

The writer of this article finds many of the old misrepresentations



made by Rebel historians repeated as matters of historic truth. He points to the following as instances of this careless writing:

At the battle of Gaines' Mills, according to Rebel records, General Porter is reported to have had 45,000 men. He had 17,900 on the field. The Rebels acknowledge that they had 5500 under Longstreet, Hill and Jackson. Captain Battini gives us the Rebel version of this battle:

Porter was charged with the duty of holding the tête du pont at the bridges over the northern portion of the Chickahominy. He held the ground until nightfall against three times his numbers. It is declared in the Southern version of this battle that Porter was routed; but that little band of Fifth Corps men left the field sullenly and only after the object to be attained was fully accomplished. Supports to Porter came too late and since a retreat had been determined upon, and all of the advantage gained by holding a large portion of the Rebel Army north of the James were to be thrown away, it was useless to hold Porter at Gaines Mills or to reinforce him to the necessary extent to enable him to threaten or turn the rebel corps.

In describing the Battle of Gettysburg Battini is led into many errors by his authorities.

On July 3d—How could Stannard with his Vermonters have held the Clump of Trees and still attack Longstreet's men on the flank? That Clump was held by Pennsylvania men. How could Pickett order *his portion* of the charging mass of 14,000 to retire? No one saw Pickett in the front and no one in the front got back to the Rebel lines. The crowd of prisoners coming in through Webb's line had no room—their surrender *looked like* a piercing of the line.

He talks of earthworks—the breasts of the Union soldiers were high above the two feet of stone wall. These were the only breastworks.

On July 2d—The regiments of Wright, which are said to have advanced so as to overlook the Union position, were allowed to enter the abandoned battery—this was done in order that they might be captured, as most of them were, by Webb's Regiments, prepared to perform that service. Wright was incautious.

The claim that "heights" were stormed and taken is again made. The "heights" did not exist—the field is almost level.

The romance of "two lines of fire" and earthworks is all repeated in spite of maps and official reports and surveys.

On page 259, relating the occurrences of Gregg's defeat of Stuart—a synopsis of the fight probably made from the account of it given in McClellan's "Life of Stuart," Captain Battini states:

"Finally the Federal horse were forced back, but their guns protected their retreat which they accomplished slowly and in good order toward Rock Creek."

Stuart had 6000 cavalry; Gregg 5000. Stuart advanced from behind Rummel's house—the battle was fought to the south of it—Gregg took and occupied the position held by Stuart. Rock Creek was to his rear and left, or southwest; Rummel's house was to the north. It was Stuart who retreated. "The pursuit of Stuart was kept up past Rummel's; Stuart was driven into the woods beyond or north of it. The line of fences and the farm buildings, the keypoint of the field which in the beginning of the fight had been in the possession of the Confederates, remained in ours at the end"—(see Rawle, page 25).

Stuart's adjutant-general must be responsible for this misrepres-



sentation of the results of this fight, yet he must have realized Stuart's discomfiture since he retreated with the crowd to the York Road.

However, Captain Battini has given us a scholarly criticism of these campaigns of Gettysburg and the Wilderness, and although he is in full sympathy with the leaders in the Rebellion, he shows a spirit of fairness, a full appreciation of the fighting qualities of American soldiers, and it is to be regretted that the "inspiration" he sought was so certain to lead him into a repetition of the often contradicted and absurd claims of partizan writers for the English press.

A. S. W.

### The Victoria Cross.\*

THIS account of the 520 awards of this coveted piece of bronze has mainly followed the official reports published in the *London Gazette*; the photographs of the recipients to the number of 392 materially add to the personal interest which the recital of the brave deeds arouses.

Queen Victoria by Royal Warrant, dated January 28, 1856, created the decoration, to be "awarded to those officers or men who have served us in the presence of the enemy, and shall have then performed some signal act of valor or devotion to their country." The merit of conspicuous bravery, it is stated further, shall alone be held to establish a sufficient claim to the honor.

In August, 1858, the Queen was pleased to extend eligibility to those in the service, by whom life or public property might be saved under circumstances of extreme danger, under the rules theretofore promulgated; and in July, 1859, the honor was extended to certain non-military persons who, as volunteers, had taken up arms against the mutineers in India. In January, 1867, the privilege was extended, under the rules, to colonial forces acting with the royal troops in military operations "as may be necessary." In April, 1881, her Majesty decreed that the qualification should be understood to be "conspicuous bravery or devotion to the country in the presence of the enemy," and that officers and men of the auxilliary reserve forces (naval and military) should be eligible under the rules.

In August, 1902, King Edward authorized the delivery of the decoration to the representatives of certain officers and men who fell in South Africa in the performance of certain acts of valor, which, had they survived, would, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, have entitled them to be recommended for the distinction.

These awards have been distributed among branches of the service as follows:

Royal (and late Indian) Navy.....	41
" Marine Artillery.....	2
" Lt. Infantry.....	2
Cavalry (nineteen organizations).....	48
Royal (and late Indian) Artillery.....	43
" Engineers.....	27
The Military Train.....	2
The Foot Guards: Grenadier four, Coldstream three, Scots five	12

\*The History of the Victoria Cross. By Philip A. Wilkins. Illustrated, pp. 443, quarto 1904, Archibald Constable & Co., London, Ltd.; E. P. Dutton & Co., New York.

The remaining crosses are distributed among:

Infantry (eighty organizations).....	252
Old Indian Army (thirty organizations).....	59
Colonial Corps (twenty organizations).....	32
	<hr/> 520

It will thus be seen that every quarter of the globe has possessed recipients of this decoration.

An analysis of the deeds so immortalized would be interesting from the standpoint of morale, heredity and *motif*. Whether any of these deeds have had their origin or been stimulated by the zeal to win the decoration, and how many of them have been the unconscious expression of a real heroism, an inherited or acquired character, no power of analysis could reveal.

The expression of the conception that the soldier's life is not his own, but the property of the sovereign or commander, held for the time in the keeping of the soldier as a trust to be wisely disposed of in the cause of the sovereign, appears to have controlled the awarding power. No special uniformity of decision can be found, except that a spontaneous admiration and tribute of comrades or commander appear to mark these deeds of valor.

Some achievements which were plainly in the line of duty have been apparently signalized for these reasons only.

The historical past is united with the sentimental present and the military future in making awards.

"Without a thought for his own safety" is the prominent element in the official report of a dangerous act, "coolness and gallantry" another. "Unhesitating," "precipitate dash," "unflinching determination," "devoted conduct," "greatest gallantry," "daring energy and example," "conspicuous courage," "heroic conduct," "conspicuous bravery and humanity," "conduct zealous, resolute and self-devoted," "bravest soldier in the regiment," are some of the generalizations in these reports.

It may be conceded that the thought so couched in varying language is difficult to define, and that words would fail to characterize each act; the actual impression which the deed made upon survivors is the chief factor. Some men have won a reputation for being perfect gods of war, fighting with such swiftness, unerring skill and demoniacal energy, as to compel astonishment and admiration. Thus *e. g.* White of Ladysmith fame in a charge on Afghans in 1879, and another at Kandahar in 1880 capturing a piece; or Hartigan, a sergeant, who dashing unarmed at four rebels attacking Sergeant Cross, smashed A in mouth, seized his tulwar, killed B with it, and wounded C and D, although himself receiving several severe wounds in the fight.

What psychological classification can be made of the element which existed in common in these gallant men and which made them regardless of self, sympathetic for comrade, patriotic and determined for the flag, perfect in cool and courageous assault, or impetuous beyond words in wresting victory from defeat?

In a short series of translations printed in this Journal last year of writings by Dr. Campeano, of the Roumanian Army, a most clever discussion of the psychology of the soldier portrays some of these elements which relate to courage, obedience and devotion.

He regards the army life as a media into which the soldier enters

only to undergo, as by endomose and exomose, a transformation, slowly and peaceably by infiltration whereby a result is accomplished. This having operated on many men an army class is formed constituting a caste, as distinct as any social or religious power could create. He says: New soldiers have motor disturbances through awkwardness and timidity, and timidity creates liars, and mendacity is inconsistent with great courage. Hence the army by training must give certitude and honor.

The psychic force of army training to create courage, discipline, devotion and *amour propre* is shown unquestionably to be the basis of most of the deeds which have won the cross.

But there are hereditary and racial elements which make possible the army, and the caste of the fighting man, and these are evident in this group of 520 men. Sons of clergymen and business men have gone out, who had the bravery of Joan of Arc, or the dash of Marshal Lannes.

When Vice-Admiral Grenville died in 1593, saying: "Here die I, Richard Grenville, with a joyful and quiet mind for that I have ended my life as a true soldier ought to do, fighting for his country, queen, religion and honor," he enunciated the enthusiasm of one of this caste.

The United States Medal of Honor authorized by act of Congress in 1863 to be awarded "to such officers, non-commissioned officers and privates as have most distinguished or may hereafter most distinguish themselves in action," resembles the British decoration and has generally been bestowed with care and upon the recommendation of commanding officers. The handsome volume here noticed should be supplied to every post library in our army as an encouragement and inspiration to similar deeds of valor.

C. E. L.

#### Last Hours of Sheridan's Cavalry.\*

WHEN Cæsar premised his commentaries on the Roman-Gallic War by saying "All of which I saw and part of which I was," he set a hard task for all future military authors, as he had not only fought well, but could also write equally as well as he had fought. The result has been that one is apt to open a book by a military man expecting rather too much in the way of personal experiences. In this case, however, the author has told his story easily and graphically, and in a desultory way has made up a volume that holds the attention of the reader to the end.

The book, as its author says, is a reprint of his notes which Maj.-Gen. John Watts de Peyster rescued, edited and published in 1891 and 1892, and right here the writer of this article cannot help saying that few of us realize how much General de Peyster has done for coming writers, in just this way of hunting out, rescuing and editing papers relating to our wars that otherwise might never have seen the light of day in print. General de Peyster has an extensive knowledge of military affairs and he knows the importance of personal experience in non-official papers, especially those that shed a side light upon historical facts, and in this, his chosen field of research, he

\**Last Hours of Sheridan's Cavalry.* By Henry Edward Tremain. New York. Bonnell, Silver & Bowers. 1894.

has collected and brought to the front much in the way of unconsidered manuscript from the pens of participants in various battles, that will eventually greatly aid the future historian, who, a hundred years hence, when all prejudice and bias regarding the War of the Rebellion of 1861 and 1865 shall have passed away will essay to write a true history of our great Civil War.

The author has added to his own notes much in the way of extracts from the pens of other officers that took part in the closing battles around and beyond Richmond and Petersburg in the last days of the siege, and during the retreat of the Army of Northern Virginia from Petersburg to Appomattox Court House, and in an appendix has given the reader copious extracts from General de Peyster's article "La Royale" on "the last twenty-four hours of the Army of Northern Virginia," and also a copy of the splendid oration of Gen. Francis A. Walker before the Society of the Army of the Potomac at Portland, Me., on July 4, 1890, and has also given ("for which much thanks,") copies of the now historical order of march of the Army of the Potomac, and the Armies of the Tennessee and of Georgia, at the final review of those armies at Washington at the close of our Civil War.

To the military student the book gives interesting episodes of the closing struggles between the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia from March 30th to April 9, 1865, inclusive, and the tale is told in a fascinating way to even the civilian reader. It is a book that should be read as it was written—in a desultory way, a book to lie upon one's library table and to be taken up now and then and read thoughtfully.

The author is a keen observer, and one follows his description of the retreat of General Lee's army and its pursuit by General Grant's forces with the interest that always attaches to a well-told story by an intelligent participant. It is in such books especially, that the civilian learns to appreciate the hard work and difficulties of armies on the march, what they have to overcome in the way of stormy days, bad roads, seas of mud and short rations, and it shows the tenacity of good troops from the side of both the Confederate and Union armies in the attack and defense during the nine days of the retreat. The short reference to the fourth man and led cavalry horses on page 44 opens up a new vista to the unthinking civilian of one of the few worries that the commander of a mounted force in a wooded country has to overcome, in handling his command in dismounted attacks on the retreating enemy's trains.

In many side remarks the author thus emphasizes the routine annoyances that are constantly cropping out in an active campaign, and in this way, he gives an outsider a far better idea of the day's work of an army than he is likely to get in any ordinary volume on military subjects.

The daily movements of the two armies are closely followed and the way in which the cavalry moved, attacked, impeded and finally outflanked and threw themselves in front of the enemy at Appomattox Court House is concisely but graphically told, and the names of many gone and half-forgotten generals are again brought to mind, and their devotion to duty and undaunted valor blaze out on history's page as splendid examples to coming generations.

The fighting during the eleven days of the closing campaign of the Army of the Potomac from March 30th to April 9, 1865, was opened by Sheridan's cavalry at Dinwiddie Court House, Va., a little shire-town in Dinwiddie County, thirteen miles southwest of Petersburg,

and ended in the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House, another little shiretown in Appomattox County on April 9, 1865. These eleven eventful days are so crowded with military incident that it is exceedingly difficult to brief General Tremain's book in a short review. The battle of Dinwiddie Court House, on March 30th, which was fought by Sheridan with his cavalry corps only, and his assault and capture of the enemy's works the next day at the battle of Five Forks, April 1, 1865, fought by his cavalry and the Fifth Army Corps together, turned the right flank of the Army of Northern Virginia and compelled the evacuation of the entrenchments before Petersburg, thereby rendering the line of twenty-eight miles of earthworks in front of the rebel capital at Richmond untenable. Accordingly, General Lee notified President Davis of the Southern Confederacy at Richmond on Sunday morning, April 2d, that as his lines had been pierced he should immediately evacuate both Petersburg and Richmond, and that night he carried out his intention, and on the morning of the 3d of April he was out of his entrenchments and with his army on his way south.

The two Armies of the Potomac and the James lost no time in vain regrets, but immediately started in full cry in pursuit. It was the beginning of the end, and it is the story of this pursuit by the cavalry, and incidentally the work of the infantry, that General Tremain tells so well, that makes his book so attractive to both the military student and the civilian reader, for it is a bit out of the common, and unlike the ordinary run of such things, and the author not infrequently, in a reminiscent sort of mood, writes attractively of the generals and colonels and regiments engaged in the campaign, and it gives one a glimpse of the enthusiasm that pervades the cavalry, and in fact the whole Army of the Potomac as it presses forward to the capture of its old and plucky enemy, the Army of Northern Virginia. Toward the close of his work he also takes up, incidentally, and discusses impartially the rivalries of the different corps as to their share in the final result, and gives the statements of their various champions for what they are worth, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions. The discussion as to what General Lee intended to do with his army in case he escaped his pursuers, or whether he meant to surrender, when he answered General Grant's first note regarding the military status of his army, is hardly worth considering.

That he would have avoided surrendering, if possible, there is little doubt, and he only surrendered when compelled to choose between practical annihilation and surrender. The book is a medley, but all the same it is well worth reading and keeping for what it tells about those last glorious days for the Union cause, that saw the end of the Great Rebellion and the collapse of the Southern Confederacy.

To any old cavalryman of Sheridan's command the book will always be a pleasure, for it is certain to carry him back to his youthful campaigning days and as on some cold winter's night he sits in his library, snug in his easy chair, beneath his shaded lamp, and close to a blazing fire, book in hand, its perusal will reawaken dim memories of the past that, graybeard though he is, will surely quicken his pulse and send his thinning blood surging through his veins. Laying the volume aside and all unconsciously clasping his hands before him, he gazes intently into the glowing embers as his thoughts carry him far back to the tented field. Again he is young, virile, strong. Again he is in the ranks, and rides side by side and boot to boot with all his old-time comrades. Again he hears the trumpet call to trot. Again, in

fancy, he tightens the reins of his bridle as the squadron breaks into its increasing pace. Again the trumpet calls to gallop, and the whole command rise in their stirrups and drive home their spurs, while each soldier's sinewy hand closes upon his saber's hilt in a vice-like grip, and as together they swing their sabers over their heads, again he hears the call to "Charge!" as with a ringing cheer and mighty stride he, with his squadron, once more thunders down upon the cohorts of his country's foes.

G. A. F.

### The Yellow War.\*

A FEW months ago, the reading public must have noticed some very attractive articles relating to the war in the Far East, which appeared in the current press, signed "O."

The writer, evidently a close observer, with ample opportunity for seeing and a gifted power of description rarely equalled, has gathered a dozen and a half of his best sketches into a volume, entitled "The Yellow War," published by McClure & Phillips, of New York.

To those who have not seen the papers, "The Yellow War" will be a very entertaining method of getting an idea of what war means, and unless the writer of this review is vastly unlike his fellow men, those who have read the papers by "O." will want to read them again in this new and attractive form.

The chapters are isolated incidents, and form such excellent indices of Japanese character that it is a pity the author does not make them authentic history by giving the actual names of the participants.

H. O. S. H.

### International Law.†

TO quote from the preface: "This compendium is written primarily for the use of students at the service and garrison schools. Like the use of syllabi at various colleges, it is intended to be used in connection with the original subject as a means of making quick reviews and final cramming for examinations."

In furtherance of such object it becomes a "quiz," or legitimate "pony," to use the well-known schoolboy terms.

It is in fact a carefully made syllabus-digest, of value to men past the "school" period.

This field of usefulness would be improved by a thorough index.

D. S.

### Adjutants' Manual.‡

IN this little volume Captain Nixon gives us a very convenient compendium of the things a post adjutant must know. It is a time-saver and satisfier for the novice and a most acceptable and up-to-date assistant for the experienced.

W. J. G.

\**The Yellow War*. By "O." McClure, Phillips & Co., New York, 1905.

†*Syllabus of Davis' International Law*. By C. A. Sloane, Third U. S. Cavalry. Hudson-Kimberly Pub. Co., 1904. Kansas City, Mo.

‡*Adjutants' Manual*. By Courtland Nixon, Captain Second Infantry, U. S. A. John Wiley & Sons, New York; Chapman & Hall, Limited, London, 1905.



**Arbitration.\***

**T**HIS little book adds to its "historical review," a statement of the steps so far had in furtherance of international arbitration, not yet recorded in history

It sums up (in its "conclusion," Chapter VIII.) in an optimistic spirit:

"We know too sadly, by the daily intelligence from the East, that universal peace has not yet come, but we may fondly hope that the era of Alexander, Cæsar and Napoleon has passed never to return; that the ambition of rulers and the rivalry of nations may henceforth lie in the paths of education, industry and commerce; and that The Hague court will long stand as a beacon light in the tempestuous sea of international politics, and its influence and efficiency grow with the advancing years."

It is reasonable to share in such humane and Christian hope; it is also reasonable to make preparation for its non-fulfillment.

D. S.

**The Rifleman's Handbook.†**

**T**HE Rifleman's Handbook," by J. G. Ewing,‡ Assistant Inspector-General, Small Arms Practice, Delaware National Guard, is a compact little book on rifle shooting. It will be found of great value by anyone desiring to perfect himself in this art. At the end of each chapter will be found a summary which can be easily committed to memory. These summaries will be found of first importance, not alone to the novice, but to the experienced shot.

The "tables of wind allowance," on pages 48 and 49, give much information as to the use of the wind-gage on the Krag rifle. We recommend this book to the attention of both Regular and National Guard officers.

J. P. W.

**Soldier's Handbook of Target Practice.‡**

**W**E are indebted to the Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, of Kansas City, Mo., for a copy of "Soldier's Handbook of Target Practice." This book has placed in a condensed and convenient form all that there is in firing regulations, 1904, which will aid the soldier in perfecting his shooting.

We wish to call especial attention to the method of keeping a record of every shot fired during the target season. If the soldier is careful to record each shot, he can, at the end of the season, by a careful study of his record, see at what ranges he is weak, and what his error has been. By referring to this record during the next season, he has a better chance of overcoming the faults of the previous season.

J. P. W.

\**Arbitration and The Hague Court.* By John W. Foster, President of the National Arbitration Conference. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, N. Y., 1904.

†*The Rifleman's Handbook for Military Riflemen.* By J. G. Ewing, A. I. G., Small Arms Practice, D. N. G. New York. Laflin & Rand Powder Co. 1904.

‡*Soldier's Handbook of Target Practice.* Being an Abridgment of the U. S. Army Firing Regulations for Small Arms. Kansas City. Franklin Hudson Pub. Co. 1904.



## Estimating Distance.\*

CAPTAIN BELL here relieves the company commander from the tedious calculations to determine the percentage of error in estimating distances in the tests now required before classification as sharpshooter marksman, first and second classman. A labor-saving volume which all captains will be glad to use.

W. J. G.

## James Lawrence.

THE volume, entitled "James Lawrence," by Lieut.-Comdr. Albert Gleaves, United States Navy, with an introduction by Admiral Dewey, and published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, in the "American Men of Energy" series, puts in excellent and concise form the facts connected with the life and death of Captain Lawrence, who, like other heroes connected with the early history of our navy, the American people have come too near forgetting.

The history of the events and the facsimile reproductions of the correspondence leading to the sensational and extraordinary battle between the *Chesapeake* and the *Shannon* make the volume very interesting, and with its many references to other events and early actors in our history, necessary to any library or person aiming at, or desiring, complete historical knowledge of the navy.

H. O. S. H.

\**Estimating Distance Tables.* By Captain Edwin Bell, Eighth U. S. Infantry. Franklin Hudson Pub. Co., Kansas City, Mo., 1904.



## Our Exchanges.

### Military.

*Aldershot Military Society Papers.*  
*Journal U. S. Cavalry Association.*—(April).—  
*Journal Association Military Surgeons.*—(March–April–May).  
*Journal Royal United Service Institution.*—(Feb., Mar., April, May).  
*Journal U. S. Artillery.*—(March–April). 1905.  
*Journal United Service Institution.*—(Jan.)  
*Journal U. S. Infantry Association.*—(April).  
*Proceedings Royal Artillery Institution.*—(Feb., Mar., April, May).  
*Revue de l' Armee Belge.*—(Nov.–Dec.–Jan.–Feb.).  
*Royal Engineers' Journal.*—(April–May).  
*Revue d' Artillerie.*—(Feb.–March–April).  
*Revue Militaire.*—(Feb.–March–April–May).  
*United Service, New York.*—(March–April–May).  
*United Service Magazine, London.*—(March–April–May).  
*Revue du Cercle Militaire;* to date.  
*Rivista di Artiglieria e Genio;* to date.  
*La Belgique Militaire;* to date.  
*La Revue Technique;* to date.  
*The Army and Navy Journal;* regular issues, to date.  
*United Service Gazette;* to date.

### Naval.

*Proceedings U. S. Naval Institute.*  
*Boletin del Centro Naval;* to date.  
*Rivista Maritima;* to date.

### Miscellaneous.

*Annales de la Sociedad Cientifica Argentina;* to date.  
*Bulletin American Geographical Society;* to date.  
*Current Literature;* to date.  
*Journal of the Western Society of Engineers;* to date.  
*Political Science Quarterly;* to date.  
*Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers;* to date.  
*Review of Reviews;* to date.  
*The Scientific American;* to date.  
*The Popular Science Monthly;* to date.  
*The Seventh Regiment Gazette;* to date.  
*The Medical Record;* to date.  
*The Century Magazine;* to date.

## Library and Review.

*In Memoriam Henry Warner Slocum, 1826-1894.* Published by Authority of the State of New York, under the Supervision of the New York Monuments Commission. (Albany) J. B. Lyon Company, 1904.

*Dictionary of Battles, from the Earliest Date to the Present Time.* By Thomas Benfield Harbottle. (New York) E. P. Dutton & Co. 1905.

*Annual Report of the State Historian, New York.* (Albany, N. Y.) April 17, 1903.

*Port Arthur. A Monster Heroism.* By Richard Barry. (New York) Moffat, Yard & Co., 1905.

*The Centennial of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, N. Y., 1802-1902.* 2 Vols. (Washington) Government Printing Office, 1904.

*Russian Provisional Fortifications, from "Ocasional Papers Engineers' School, U. S. A."* Trans. by Lieuts. E. J. Dent and Geo. R. Spalding, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. (Washington Barracks, D. C.) 1905.

*Military Landscape Sketching.* Trans. from the Journal des Sciences Militaires, by Capt. W. V. Judson, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.

*Memorandum Relative to the General Officers Appointed by the President in the Armies of the Confederate States, 1861-1865.* Compiled from Official Records, 1905.

*Edwin McMasters Stanton, The Autocrat of Rebellion, Emancipation and Reconstruction.* By Frank Abial Flower. (A. Krow, Ohio) The Saalfeld Publishing Co., (New York and Chicago), 1905.

*History of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, 1861-1865.* Compiled by the Regimental History Committee of the Third Cavalry Association. (Philadelphia) Franklin Printing Co., 1905.

*Biographical Sketches of Distinguished Officers of the Army and Navy.* (New York) L. R. Hamersly, 1905.

*Problems in Maneuvers, with Solutions for Officers of all Arms.* By Major J. H. V. Crowe, R. A. (New York) The Macmillan Co., 1905.

## Editor's Bulletin.

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Corresponding  
Members  
of  
Council.

**A**T a stated meeting of the Executive Council, June 14, 1905, a number of gentlemen (see page 203), who had signified their willingness to serve as Corresponding Members of Council, were duly elected for the term ending January, 1907.

These officers will represent the Institution in the vicinity of their respective stations and will cheerfully furnish information relative to membership, and the publication of papers in the JOURNAL.

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Field  
Opera-  
tions  
in the  
Far East.

In this issue of the JOURNAL appears the second of a series of careful studies of the Russo-Japanese operations in Manchuria, by a distinguished officer of the Corps of Engineers. This paper is illustrated by a number of maps and plans of battle, compiled from the most authentic sources, and upon which the author has drawn the positions of the opposing forces at certain stages of the battles described.

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Change  
of  
Quarters.

The Library, Museum and Council Room of the Institution, with their contents will, on or before September 1, 1905, be established in the building within the grounds of the New York Arsenal, on Governor's Island, N. Y. H., known as "The Clock-tower Building." The increased space available will permit the exhibition in the Museum of many relics and trophies, which have long been in storage.

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Clerical  
Reform.

Colonel Heistand's strong plea for a reform in the clerical methods of accounting for property and funds prescribed by law and regulations for the Army (contained in the May JOURNAL, entitled "Accountability for Public Funds and Property") receives unexpected and powerful support in the President's letter of instruction

to the Board of Experts recently appointed to revise the existing system for all government accounts, as note the following extract:

**Account-  
ability  
for Public  
Property.**

"In all branches of the government there is a tendency greatly to increase unnecessary and largely perfunctory letter writing. In the Army and Navy the increase of paper work is a serious menace to the efficiency of fighting officers, who are often required by bureaucrats to spend time in making reports which they should spend in increasing the efficiency of the battleships or regiments under them."

We shall be glad to publish the comments of officers of experience on this subject while it is under official consideration.

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Journal  
of the  
Military  
Service  
Institution  
1878  

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1905

Governor's  
Island  
N. Y. H.

# THE JOURNAL

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1905



*SOME of the papers approved for early publication in this JOURNAL.*

- I. "THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF A RAILROAD IN THE THEATER OF WAR."—By Capt. W. D. Connor, Corps of Engineers.
- II. "IMPROVEMENT OF HORSES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES."—By Lieut.-Col. E. E. Dravo, Subsistence Department.
- III. "THE TRAINING AND PERSONNEL OF VOLUNTEER TROOPS."—By Capt. G. D. Snyder (?), N. G. P.
- IV. "ORGANIZATION AND FORMATION OF INFANTRY TROOPS MOST SUITED TO PRESENT BATTLE CONDITIONS."—By Lieut. G. M. Brooke, Artillery Corps.
- V. "SOLDIERING IN THE OLD SEVENTH."—By P. S. Leland.
- VI. "REMARKS ON MANEUVERS; MAINLY FOR THE USE OF OFFICERS OF INFANTRY."—By Capt. U. G. McAlexander, Thirteenth Infantry.
- VII. "OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY SERVICE IN EUROPE—1904-5."—By Captain J. A. Ryan, Adjutant Fifteenth Cavalry.
- VIII. "THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, THEIR EFFICIENCY AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR IN OUR ARMY."—By Lieut. G. A. Wieser, Fifteenth Infantry.
- IX. "TYPES AND TRADITIONS OF THE OLD ARMY." In addition to papers under this head already recorded, the Editor is permitted to make some extracts from the unpublished Autobiographical Notes of the late Gen. Zenas R. Bliss, U. S. A., of his military service 1855-1882.

*THE PUBLICATION COMMITTEE invites contributions of original papers, translations and comments upon current topics. Attention is called to "Gold Medal," "Seaman," "Short Paper," and "Santiago" prizes described elsewhere.*

# The Military Service Institution of the United States.

## NOTICE TO MEMBERS.

### *Amendments to the Constitution.*

NOTICE TO MEMBERS.—At a meeting of the Executive Council of the Military Service Institution, held June 14, 1905, the following amendments to the Constitution were proposed and are here submitted for the action of Members of the Institution. In lieu of a more formal ballot each member entitled to vote is requested to note his action on a postal card thus:

ON AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES III, IV, V and IX CONSTITUTION M. S. I.	
I vote..	III ..... *
	IV ..... *
	V ..... *
	IX ..... *
(Signature) .....	
* "Yes" or "No" .....	

and return it as early as practicable, to "*The Secretary, M. S. I., Governor's Island, N. Y. H.,*" for the action of a General Meeting to be held on October 11, 1905, at 3 P. M.

#### PROPOSED AMENDMENTS.†

(To read as follows.)

##### ART. III. LOCATION.

The rooms or headquarters shall be *located within the geographical limits* of the City and County of New York.

##### ART. IV. MEMBERSHIP.

Sec. 4. All persons not mentioned in the preceding sections, of honorable record and good standing, shall be eligible to Associate Membership

† The words in italics are new.



by a confirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Executive Council present at any meeting. Associate Members shall be entitled to all the benefits of the Institution, including a share in its public discussions; but no Associate Member shall be entitled to vote nor be eligible to office, *except as hereinafter provided.*

Sec. 5. When any member shall have been dismissed from the army, navy or marine corps by order of the President, by the sentence of a court martial, or shall have been convicted *in* a civil court of a felony, his membership shall be forfeited and his name dropped from the rolls of the Institution.

*Any Associate Member who shall be dismissed from the Volunteer Service of the United States or from the Militia of any State by sentence of a Court Martial or shall be convicted of a felony by the final sentence of any court of competent jurisdiction shall forthwith cease to be an Associate Member of this Institution.*

#### ART. V. GOVERNMENT.

Sec. 3 The President and Executive Council shall be elected by the Members of the Institution, at a General Meeting to be held biennially, on the second Wednesday in January, or as soon thereafter as practicable. *One-third* of the Council shall go out biennially, by rotation, but may be eligible for re-election.

Sec. 5. Five members of the Council to be appointed by the Chairman shall constitute a Committee on Publication and Essays.

It shall be the duty of that Committee to examine all papers submitted to it (by the Council) and report the disposition which in its judgment should be made of them and *to authorize* for publication the essays which the Committee may deem most suitable for that purpose.

#### ART. IX. CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION.

Changes may be made in the Constitution at any General Meeting by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Institution voting: Provided that due notice of said meeting shall have been mailed to each member and posted in the rooms of the Institution at least *ninety* (90) days prior to said meeting; and provided further, that absent members may vote by proxy.

T. F. RODENBOUGH,  
*Secretary.*

# The Military Service Institution.

## HONORARY MEMBERS.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Ex-President GROVER CLEVELAND, LL.D.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.      The LIEUTENANT-GENERAL.

## OFFICERS AND COUNCIL.

*President.*

Major-General THOMAS H. RUGER, U. S. Army.

*Resident Vice-Presidents.*

Major-Gen. JAMES F. WADE, U. S. A.

Brig.-Gen. JOHN W. BARRIGER, U. S. A.

*Secretary.*

Brig.-Gen. T. F. RODENBOUGH, U. S. A.

*Treasurer.*

Major E. M. WEAVER, Artillery Corps.

*Asst. Secretary.*

Capt. W. J. GLASGOW, 13th Cav. A. D. C.

*Vice-Treasurer.*

Lieut. W. H. JOHNSON, 8th Infantry.

## *Executive Council.*

*Term ending 1911.*

Major D. L. BRAINARD, Subsistence Dept.  
Captain F. W. COE, Artillery Corps.  
Lieut. Colonel E. E. DRAVO, Subsistence Dept.  
Brig. Gen. A. L. MILLS, United States Army.  
Colonel F. A. SMITH, Eighth Infantry.  
Bvt. Major-Gen. A. S. WEBB, (late) U. S. A.

*Term ending 1909.*

Major G. S. BINGHAM, Quartermaster's Dept.  
Colonel J. E. GREER, Ordnance Dept.  
Colonel W. R. LIVERMORE, Corps of Eng's.  
Major C. E. LYDECKER, N. G. N. Y.  
Major A. MURRAY, Artillery Corps.  
Col. C. C. SNIFFEN, Pay Dept.

*Term ending 1907.*

*Finance Committee.*

Gen. BARRIGER.  
Lieut. Col. DRAVO.

Bvt. Brig.-Gen. D. APPLETON, N. G. N. Y.  
Colonel E. E. BRITTON, N. G. N. Y.  
Major. A. S. CUMMINS, Artillery Corps.  
Brig. Gen. F. D. GRANT, U. S. Army.  
Colonel H. O. S. HEISTAND, Military Sec'y.  
Colonel S. C. MILLS, Insp. Gen. Dept.  
Lieut. Colonel H. S. TURRILL, Medical Dept.

*Publication Committee.*

Gen. BARRIGER.  
Gen. RODENBOUGH  
Col. GREER.  
Col. SMITH.

## CORRESPONDING MEMBERS OF COUNCIL.

*Term ending Jan., 1907.*

Major W. E. BIRKHIMER, Art. Corps G. S.  
Major W. M. BLACK, Corps of Engineers.  
Major A. P. BLOCKSOM, (Cav.), In. Gen. Dept.  
Lieut. G. M. BROOKE, Artillery Corps.  
Major W. C. BROWN, Third Cavalry.  
Major R. L. BULLARD, Twenty-eighth In.  
Col. J. H. CALEP, U. S. A. (retired).  
Lieut.-Col. C. J. CRANE, Eighth Infantry.

Brig.-Gen. F. S. DODGE, Paymaster General.  
Lieut. A. P. S. HYDE, Artillery Corps.  
Capt. J. H. PARKER, Twenty-eighth Infantry.  
Col. J. W. POWELL, U. S. A. (retired).  
Capt. J. ROYALTY, Twenty-eighth Infantry.  
Lieut.-Col. A. C. SHARPE, Thirtieth Infantry.  
Capt. J. A. SHIPTON, Artillery Corps.  
Capt. M. F. STEELE, Sixth Cavalry.  
F. DRAKE, Captain, N. G., Pa.

## MEMBERSHIP AND DUES.

Membership dates from the first day of the calendar year in which the "application" is made, unless such application is made after October 1st, when the membership dates from the first day of the next calendar year.

Initiation fee and dues for first year \$2.50; the same amount annually for five years subsequently. After that two dollars per year. This includes the Journal. Life membership \$50.

NOTE.—Checks and Money Orders should be drawn to order of, and addressed to, "The Treasurer Military Service Institution," Governor's Island, New York City. Yearly dues include Journal.

Please advise promptly of changes of address.



## Annual Prizes, 1905

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(For Rules governing awards, see January, March and May numbers.)

### Gold and Silver Medals

*First Prize*—Gold Medal, \$100 and Life Membership.

*Second Prize*—Silver Medal, \$50 and Honorable Mention.

Subject: "THE ENLISTED MAN'S CONTRACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT; THE MUTUAL OBLIGATION IT IMPOSES AND HOW ITS VIOLATION MAY BEST BE AVOIDED."

### The Seaman Prize

*Prize*—One hundred Dollars in Gold.

Subject: "HOW FAR DOES DEMOCRACY AFFECT THE ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE OF OUR ARMIES, AND HOW CAN ITS INFLUENCE BE MOST EFFECTUALLY UTILIZED."

### The Santiago Prize

*Prize*—Fifty Dollars.

Subject: "FOR THE BEST ORIGINAL ARTICLE UPON MATTERS TENDING TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER, THE SQUAD, COMPANY, TROOP OR BATTERY, PUBLISHED IN THE JOURNAL OF THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION."

### Short Paper Prizes

*Prizes*—Fifty Dollars and Certificate of Award.

Subjects: BEST ESSAY ON MATTERS DIRECTLY AFFECTING THE INFANTRY ("HANCOCK"), CAVALRY ("BUFORD"), ARTILLERY ("HUNT") AND THE GENERAL ("FRY") SERVICE, RESPECTIVELY, PUBLISHED IN THE JOURNAL DURING A TWELVEMONTH.